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The railway industry is today broadly recognised as a complex 
sociotechnical system that operates under considerable pressures for 
increased capacity and reliability. These pressures impact across the 
industry, in particular on rail engineering because of its responsibility in 
providing and maintaining the rail infrastructure. Within rail engineering, 
there is a growing need to address safety and operational risks emerging 
from high complexity. 
Planning has been identified as a fundamental organisational function for 
the safety and efficiency of engineering work. Within this scope, this thesis 
recognises in the planning of rail engineering work the characteristics of 
complex sociotechnical systems and investigates planning activities as a 
part of a wider rail engineering system. 
Resilience engineering has been recently proposed as a safety 
management approach that focuses on the development of means for 
better coping with the variability and uncertainty inherent to large scale 
complex sociotechnical system. The research documented in this thesis 
proposes the use of a resilience engineering based approach as a way to 
improve the ability of the rail engineering planning system to successfully 
contribute to the safety and efficiency of engineering work. 
Overall, the purpose of this research was to describe and understand 
human and organisational factors of rail engineering planning, understand 
planning performance in view of the support it provides to work delivery, 
and investigate improvement to the planning system based on resilience 
engineering concepts. A contribution to the development of resilience 
engineering as a discipline was also made, mainly through the investigation 
of possible methods for measuring and monitoring system resilience. 
The thesis has taken a research approach with emphasis on extensive top-
down and cross-organisational exploratory work of the engineering work 
planning process. This was achieved through the use of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, namely the analysis of archival data on operational 
and safety performance, interviews, observations, and a questionnaire. The 
integration of the researcher within Network Rail’s Ergonomics National 
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Specialist Team (NST) was fundamental for the access to a wide range of 
data and for the employment of a participant observation approach. 
The engineering work planning system is described as a complex decision 
making process, ranging from high level strategic business decisions down 
to the definition and scheduling of work delivery details. The main human 
and organisational factors that either hindered or facilitated planning 
decision making were identified and archival data were used to study 
planning performance. Results from these research steps were then used 
to support the understanding and measurement of resilience in planning. 
Data were interpreted in view of the resilience literature and used as basis 
for the investigation of potential measurement tools and system interactions 
with relevance for the understanding of resilience as an emergent system 
property. 
The methods used permitted a detailed description of the planning process 
and the identification of planning performance features within the wider 
frame of the rail engineering system. Human, organisational and system 
level factors were identified, which contributed to the understanding of 
planning and the identification of constraints and facilitating factors on 
decision making processes. Throughout the duration of this project, 
contributions to the development of resilience engineering and its methods 
were made, whilst identifying sources of resilience in the planning system 
and contributing to the development of measurement tools by means of a 
questionnaire approach. The understanding of resilience in rail engineering 
planning was used as a support for recommendations towards the 
improvement of the planning function’s ability to cope with operational 
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Glossary of terms 
Annual Integrated Work 
Plan (AIWP) 
List of all the engineering work foreseen for delivery 
nationally and within a timetable year. 
Annual tonnage Estimate of the volume of train traffic operating over a given 
section of track. 
Area Delivery Planning 
Unit (ADPU) 
Unit responsible for managing the planning of engineering 




Document which contains all the engineering work which 
has been confirmed for delivery within a given period of the 
timetable year. 
Continuous welded rail Rail that is welded together end-to-end. 
Controller of Site Safety 
(COSS) 
Person responsible for setting up safe system of work and 
ensuring the safety of those working on or near the line. 
Engineering access Defines the presence of every equipment and persons on 
track or within its premises for the purpose of carrying out 
engineering work. 
Engineering possession 
of the line 
Designation of the protection arrangements that are put in 
place for engineering access, which include the transfer of 
control of the line from the signaller to the PICOP. 
Engineering Supervisor 
(ES) 
Person responsible for setting up and controlling all the work 
activities within an engineering worksite 
Engineering worksite Designation of the protection arrangements that maintain a 
safety distance between independent pieces of work within a 
given possession. 
Equated Track Mile Concept which supports the estimate of the work necessary 
to maintain a given section of track by factoring in a number 
of characteristics of the track equipments within that section. 
Ergonomics National 
Specialist Team 
Team within Network Rail which provides human factors and 




Function within Network Rail responsible for the 
development of investment plans and for its submission to 
the planning process. 




Function within Network Rail responsible for the supervision 
and delivery of engineering work necessary to maintain rail 
equipments in operational conditions and in compliance with 
safety standards. 




Units that are responsible for managing and delivering the 
required maintenance work within a given section of track. 
National control logs Daily records produced by Network Rail control centres, 




Function within Network Rail responsible for managing all 
resources necessary for the delivery of engineering work, 
including the planning process. 
Network Access Unit 
(NAU) 
Oversees agreements between train operators (TOCs) and 
Network Rail regarding the rights to access the rail 
infrastructure, either for running trains in the case of 
operators, or for engineering work in the case of Network 
Rail. 
Operations control All operational aspects that relate to the monitoring and 
management of the railways. Network Rail controls railway 
operations by means of control centres distributed 
throughout the country. 
Overhead Line 
Equipment (OLE) 
Catenary and other related equipments for electric 
propulsion of trains. 
Person in Charge of 
Possession (PICOP) 
Person who receives control of the line from the signaller 
and takes possession of the line for the purpose of carrying 
out engineering work. 
Railway infrastructure Designation used to refer to all equipments which support 
train operations, such as tracks, points and crossovers, 
signals, stations, among others. 
Railway points Track equipment (asset) which allows trains to converge, 
diverge or cross over from one rail route to another. These 
are often designated under the generic term of Switches & 
Crossings. 
Rules of the Route 
(RotR) 
Documents issued by NAU on behalf of route directors, 
which formalise the agreements between Network Rail and 
TOCs in terms of access to the infrastructure. 
Signaller Person responsible for the management of rail traffic 
(signalling trains). 
Territory Delivery 
Planning Unit (TDPU) 
Unit responsible for managing the planning of engineering 
work within the geographical domain of a given territory. 
Train Operating 
Companies (TOCs) 
Term used to refer to companies responsible for running 
trains. The designation FOC (Freight Operating Company) 
may be used to refer to companies dedicated to freight traffic 
on the rail network. 
Weekly Operating 
Notice (WON) 
Document issued every week and for each route, containing 
all details of operating conditions for each section of track, 





The UK rail industry is experiencing an unprecedented level of growth and 
development. Demands for more and more reliable train services within the 
limited capacity of the rail infrastructure place the industry under 
considerable government and public pressure. As the owner of the rail 
infrastructure, Network Rail is challenged to carry out the engineering work 
necessary to achieve the envisaged capacity increments, whilst reducing 
disturbances to train services. Within this context, rail engineering is 
considered a critical element for the efficiency, reliability and safety of 
the railway as a whole. 
1.1. Background 
As pointed out by Wilson et al (2007a), there are many engineering 
problems at the core of the railway system, with various degrees of difficulty 
and complexity. Achieving the current targets of modernisation and 
capacity enhancement requires a high standard of engineering work. 
Beyond advanced technology-based rail engineering capacities, this also 
demands efficient and safe conditions to access the rail infrastructure, 
protect the infrastructure, people and equipment on it, and deliver the 
necessary work. Not only must the protection of people working on the 
railways be guaranteed, but also the allocation and utilisation of 
engineering resources must be efficient, which inevitably, requires some 
form of planning. It is thought that many of the risks, failures and general 
issues regarding the performance and safety of rail engineering work can 
be more or less directly traced back to planning problems (Wilson et al 
(2009), Schock 2010 and Schock et al 2010). Understanding the 
planning process is therefore, an essential step in addressing the 
current demands for high efficiency, reliability and safety. 
Wilson et al (2009) identify the railway as a classical example of a complex 
system in which performance conditions are often underspecified and 
demand constant adjustments to unexpected events and varying operating 
environments. Within such conditions, Hale et al (1998) observe that most 
current safety analysis and investigation methods and processes may be 
unsuitable, as they are grounded in predominantly static and well known 
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organisational environments. Investigations into recent accidents such as 
the Columbia shuttle (Woods, 2003) or within the railway domain, Clapham 
Junction (Hidden, 1989) and Ladbroke Grove (HSE, 2000), reveal at their 
origin complex combinations of organisational factors that are beyond the 
scope of purely technical or human failures. Within this frame, research on 
safety and efficiency in the planning of rail engineering work needs to 
recognise the challenges of high complexity in sociotechnical 
systems. 
While identifying complexity in the context of rail engineering and its 
challenges, Wilson et al (2009) propose resilience engineering as a 
potentially relevant approach towards coping with new emerging risks and 
high production pressures. In line with the same viewpoint, the research of 
this thesis hypothesises that the adoption of resilience principles 
constitutes a potentially valuable approach to ensure that planning 
successfully contributes to the safety and efficiency of engineering 
work. As later discussed and for the purpose of this research, resilience is 
generally regarded as the ability to safely cope with high performance 
pressures, such as those emerging from the demands for a modern and 
enhanced railway (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). 
1.2. Aim and objectives 
Railway research, particularly in the field of human factors and ergonomics, 
has known considerable development in recent years (Wilson & Norris, 
2005). Wilson et al (2007a) illustrate the progress of human factors 
research and systems ergonomics approaches in the area of rail 
engineering. Research on planning and scheduling activities has known 
considerable growth in recent years. Within the domain of human factors, a 
considerable number of studies have been dedicated to control, planning 
and scheduling in various manufacturing industrial contexts (McCarthy & 
Wilson, 2001a). In terms of the planning of engineering activities, aircraft 
maintenance is likely to be the most extensively researched field (Kinnison, 
2004). Within the rail industry, despite the work described by Wilson et al 
(2009) and Schock (2010), the domain of engineering planning remains 
relatively unexplored. 
Within the field of resilience, Hale & Heijer (2006b) provide a broad 
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discussion of concepts in the scope of the railway as whole, but so far, 
research in resilience engineering has mainly favoured other complex and 
high risk industries such as air transportation, nuclear power production 
and health care. McDonald (2006) refers to studies developed on aircraft 
maintenance in which several aspects related to high complexity and 
production pressures have been addressed. Despite the growing interest 
manifested by different scientific domains (i.e. engineering, ecology, 
sociology psychology and economics), robust methods of measurement 
and monitoring resilience are still in the early stages of development (see 
section 3.4). 
The overall aim of this thesis is to understand and recommend 
improvements in the rail engineering planning process. To do this, the 
planning system was examined and analysed within both a systems 
ergonomics and a resilience engineering perspective, aiming to extend 
methods and use of resilience as a field of study. The consequent research 
objectives were to: 
1) Develop a description of the rail engineering planning system as a 
complex sociotechnical system. 
2) Identify the critical human and organisational factors of the rail 
engineering planning system. 
3) Investigate relations between planning and engineering work delivery 
and identify the impacts of planning on work delivery. 
4) Describe resilience within the planning system and identify means to 
improve it. 
5) Contribute to the development of a framework, methods and measures 
for assessing resilience in planning. 
6) Produce recommendations to promote safety and efficiency in rail 
engineering through improved planning. 
As stated above, planning remains a relatively unexplored domain of rail 
engineering, which justifies the focus of objectives on the development of 
descriptive and exploratory work. A wide range of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, as well as data sources, were used. These are 
summarised in Table 1.1. Objective 6 is not shown in this table as 




Table 1.1: Summary of methods used 
Objective 1 
x Analysis of planning documentation and business process 
x Planning familiarisation interview 
x Semi-structured interviews 
x Planning archival data analysis 
Objective 2 
x Planning familiarisation interview 
x Familiarisation interviews with planning stakeholders 
x Semi-structured interviews 
Objective 3 
x Familiarisation interviews with planning stakeholders 
x Planning archival data analysis 
x Safety data analysis 
x Infrastructure archival data analysis 
x Archival data from a system perspective 
Objective 4 
x Analysis of interview data from a resilience perspective 
x Archival data from a system perspective 
x Questionnaire 
x Functional analysis (Functional Resonance Analysis Method – 
International resilience workgroups) 
Objective 5 
x Archival data from a system perspective 
x Questionnaire 
x Cooperation with international resilience workgroups 
 
The research methods and their framework within this thesis are further 
detailed in Chapter 4. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The research conducted initially focused on understanding and describing 
planning and its processes. Planning was then analysed in view of its 
interactions and impacts on engineering work, aiming to build a system 
perspective on rail engineering. Lastly, these system interactions were 
interpreted in light of resilience engineering literature, aiming to produce 
recommendations for enhanced system resilience. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the railway context in which the research 
was conducted. The descriptions presented regarding engineering access 
and delivery (section 2.2) and the engineering planning system (section 
2.3), were derived from initial familiarisation work by the author. Given the 
complexity of this research context, it was considered useful to provide a 
basic understanding of railway engineering beforehand. This helps to frame 




Research data are then presented for three different topics: 
x Understanding the planning system (Chapter 5) 
x Understanding asset management and work delivery (Chapter 6) 
x Understanding and measuring resilience in planning (Chapter 7) 
In order to facilitate the reading of this thesis, each of these chapters starts 
with a table that traces the data discussed back to the main objectives 
stated in the previous section. 
Chapter 8 discusses the overall contribution of this project to the field of 
resilience engineering and the relevant recommendations for improving 
safety and efficiency in railway engineering. 
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2. Research context 
This research was conducted under a grant from the centre for Rail 
Research (RRUK) and Network Rail, where the author was based for the 
duration of the project. The focus was set on the sociotechnical system of 
planning rail engineering work, with particular interest in the interactions 
occurring between its components and with its operating environment. 
The growing number of services operating throughout the network reduces 
opportunities to work on the infrastructure for repairs or renewals, which 
generates growing pressures over the rail engineering work system. When 
scheduling and planning for the required engineering work, Network Rail 
needs to consider access to the infrastructure as a scarce resource and 
explore ways of utilising it in the most efficient way within the industry’s 
safety standards. Thus, to ensure the safety of track workers and the 
reliability of the work undertaken, research into more flexible ways of 
planning is needed, so that renewals, enhancement and maintenance 
needs can be efficiently integrated within the shorter time windows 
available for engineering access. 
Throughout the duration of this project, various transformation programmes 
were set in motion within various areas of the Network Rail organisation, 
some of which had implications to the wider rail industry. In particular, the 
reorganisation of planning imposed considerable challenges for the 
development and implementation of sound research methods. Although all 
stages of data collection were carried out prior to the implementation of the 
new planning structure, some transformations came into action during the 
distribution of the questionnaire (section 4.10). Mainly, at that point 
planning staff was being transferred to different organisational functions, 
whilst maintaining the same planning process and methods. The main 
features of the former and current planning process are explored in this 
chapter to provide a clearer understanding of the depth of the ongoing 
transformations. These transformations will then be recalled at different 
stages of this thesis, whenever necessary to clarify the work in question. 
Although planning constitutes the focus of analysis, a basic understanding 
of the overall engineering organisation was considered necessary to 
interpret the investigation results. The following sections of this chapter 
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provide a broad description of planning and an overview of the main 
organisational areas and functions that participate in it. 
2.1. The rail industry in the UK 
The UK rail industry is characterised by a wide diversity of rail 
infrastructure, with a variety in track and equipment types, requirements, 
complexity and ages, as well as varying profiles in traffic types and 
frequency. Such diversity presents an equally diverse range of engineering 
challenges in terms of planning and delivery requirements. For instance, 
planning of work will differ considerably depending on constraints such as 
having less time to access the infrastructure or fewer options for diverting 
traffic whilst working on other lines, or the frequency of maintenance 
required by aging equipment. The following factors can be put forward as 
causes: 
x The different volumes and type of train traffic (passenger or freight 
trains, type of rolling stock, among others), which impose different 
degrees of wear down on track assets. 
x The coexistence of modern rail infrastructure with equipment that has 
been in operation for nearly a century. 
x The great technological diversity in many areas such as electrification 
(overhead line or third rail) and signalling systems, among others. 
x The operation of rural lines in close proximity to complex and heavy 
traffic areas, such as those on the approach to a major terminal like 
London Euston or Paddington stations. 
After a considerable decay between the 1950s and 1870s, the UK railways 
register at present time, one of the fastest growths in Europe. According to 
Eurostat (European Statistical Services), in the five year period going from 
2004 to 2008, the number of passenger-kilometres has increased 22%, 
against 13% in Germany and 16% in France. 
The European Directive 91/440 required member states to separate the 
management of rail operations and infrastructure from the provision of rail 
services, thus creating the necessary conditions for the “open access” to 
service providers. The Railways Act 1993 set out the privatisation process 
of British Rail, under which, Railtrack became the owner of the rail 
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infrastructure in 1994. A series of major accidents such as Southall in 1997 
(Hull, 2000) and Ladbroke Grove in 1999 (HSE, 2000), revealed evidence 
of poor management, and in 2002, Railtrack was replaced by Network Rail, 
the current owner and manager of the infrastructure. This represented an 
important change in the rail industry, as while Railtrack was a private 
shareholder company, Network Rail was constituted as a (not for dividend) 
company limited by guarantee. Instead of shareholders, Network Rail is 
constituted by members such as representatives of the public, the industry 
and the Department for Transport (member with special membership 
rights). On a wider base, entities participating and cooperating with Network 
Rail in the management and development of the network are normally 
designated as stakeholders. This includes representatives of passengers, 
engineering contractors, train operating companies (TOCs) and 
governance, among others. 
The activities and performance of Network Rail are bounded by the 
Network License granted by the Secretary of State for Transport (as per 
Railways Act 1993) and monitored by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). 
This license sets the standards and terms for the service that Network Rail 
is required to provide to train operators. On a strategic level, Network Rail 
negotiates with governance the scope and targets for the development of 
the railways. From these negotiations emerges an investment contract for 
the up-coming five year period. Each of these five year intervals is 
designated as a Control Period (CP) and it sets the investment that the 
government will place on the infrastructure against targeted capacity 
improvements to be delivered by Network Rail. In 2009, the government 
has approved an investment of approximately 24 billion pounds for CP4 
(from 2009 to 2014). In order to achieve the efficiency targets for this 
control period and deliver the desired enhanced capacity, as previously 
mentioned, Network Rail has engaged in significant organisational 
transformations. 
2.2. Engineering access and delivery 
Managing access to the infrastructure is one of Network Rail’s key 
responsibilities. Access is the term used to refer to activities carried out in 
the rail infrastructure. The network is accessed either by operators to run 
trains or by Network Rail and its contractors to carry out (deliver) 
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engineering work. The levels of service desired by train operators and 
envisaged by governance have to be balanced against the volume of 
engineering work required to maintain and develop the network. Train 
operating companies acquire from Network Rail access to the 
infrastructure, under the terms of either a franchise, or an “open access” 
contract, depending on the stature attributed to the route in cause. Under 
these contracts, train operators are granted a given number of timetable 
hours for train services and Network Rail is required to manage the 
remaining available access to deliver its annual engineering work plan. If 
any additional time is necessary for renewals or enhancement engineering 
work or for emergency maintenance, then Network Rail must negotiate with 
train operators, as this access becomes disruptive to train services. Within 
this context, the planning of engineering work faces a considerable 
exposure to business and operational pressures as it deals directly with 
critical decisions regarding the delivery of Network Rail’s service to its 
customers (train operators). As explained by McCarthy & Wilson (2001a) in 
regards to planning, scheduling and control, these tend to be critical 
organisational processes, as “they link customers with the primary 
manufacturing resources, balance the conflicting constraints on, and 
competition for these resources, and shoulder overall responsibility for 
meeting demand. These aspects are further explored in section 3.5. 
Network Rail develops a national annual work plan for engineering access 
that aims at allocating resources as efficiently as possible at a local and 
national level. This plan is formed by the renewals and enhancement 
projects, together with the foreseeable maintenance work. Projects depend 
on the investment programme agreed with the government and 
stakeholders, while the maintenance programme is initially defined on the 
base of the cyclic work required by compliance with the engineering 
standards. These standards establish the volume of work, such as 
patrolling and inspection, which is periodically required to ensure the safety 
and reliability of rail assets (equipments). In addition to the cyclic 
requirements, other types of work fall within maintenance scope, namely, 
small renewals works such as the replacement of assets that have reached 
the end of their life cycle. Above all, maintenance must maintain capacity to 
respond to emergency work requirements. Whenever engineering 
interventions emerge from incidents on the infrastructure, maintenance is 
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often forced to review its planned work and redefine priorities accordingly. 
Within this scope, the development of the annual work plan requires the 
interaction between numerous stakeholders and organisational functions 
within Network Rail, and needs to cover all geographical areas of the rail 
infrastructure. 
The focus of investigation in this thesis was set on Network Rail’s 
organisational structure and the cross-functional interactions that take place 
for the coordination of planning needs at local and national levels. This 
includes functions responsible for the core of planning, those that provide 
input to planning and functions that deliver the output of planning. The 
relevant organisational functions can be described as follows: 
Infrastructure Maintenance is responsible for overseeing the safety of the 
line to run trains and for carrying out the maintenance work needed to 
guarantee this safety of the line. The rail network is divided into sections, 
which are then managed by Maintenance Delivery Unit (MDU). Each MDU 
is responsible for scheduling and resourcing the maintenance work 
required and submitting it to the planning process as independent work 
packs. These work packs are broadly an objective or type of work to be 
carried out in a specific asset or section of line. 
Infrastructure Investments are responsible for developing enhancement 
and renewals projects, as well as overseeing their deployment. Starting 
from the scope of development set for each route, project teams in each of 
the five territories (see later in Table 2.1) are responsible for carrying out a 
given enhancement or renewals programme through the different stages of 
the Guide to Railway Investment Projects (GRIP). GRIP sets out eight 
development stages that have to be followed in order to see any project 
through from its planning to its completion. The stages are as follows: 
output definition; pre-feasibility; option selection; single option development; 
detailed design; construction, test and commission; scheme hand back; 
and project close out. Each stage delivers an agreed set of outputs 
according to defined quality criteria. Project teams are responsible for 
carrying out GRIP stages in such a way that they are able to meet the 
deadlines imposed by the planning process for the submission of each 
work pack necessary to complete the given investment project. These 
responsibilities also include any necessary work to plan the independent 
work packs. This includes identifying necessary resources and requesting 
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them, and carrying out site walks, which are meant to provide a detailed 
local knowledge of the area on which work will be delivered. 
Operations and Customer Services is the Network Rail function in charge 
of managing the relations with train operators (customers) and every aspect 
related to running trains on the network, including traffic control and 
signalling. Signallers manage train traffic and every transfer of control over 
sections of track that are scheduled for engineering work access. Within 
this function are also integrated route control centres. These are not 
directly related to planning but are responsible for overseeing all aspects of 
operations and managing any occurrence that may affect them. Throughout 
the planning process, integrated in this area of the organisation, the 
Network Access Unit (NAU) is responsible for formalising any agreement 
between train operators and Network Rail regarding the rights to access the 
infrastructure, either for running trains in the case of operators, or for 
engineering work in the case of Network Rail. This function also issues the 
Weekly Operating Notice (WON), which contains details of every 
engineering access planned for each week of the year. WONs are 
distributed to each signal box in order to inform signallers of the time, date, 
location and other relevant details, for every engineering access scheduled. 
The contents of WONs in terms of engineering work are illustrated in 
Appendix 1. 
The National Delivery Service (NDS) constitutes the core of planning. 
This organisational function is responsible for gathering all work requests 
(work packs) and for managing and allocating resources, in particular, the 
fleet of wagons and track machinery. NDS integrates work packs submitted 
by maintenance and investments as best as possible within the limitations 
of access and remaining resources, such as machinery and staff, among 
others. Once resource utilisation is optimised and as many work packs as 
possible are accepted, an Annual Integrated Work Plan (AIWP) is issued. 
The functions previously described operate according to different 
geographical structures, in order to cover the entire network. Table 2.1 





Table 2.1: Geographical structures relevant for planning 
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Territories are part of the geographical structure of Infrastructure 
Investments. Prior to the transformation of the planning organisation in 
2008 and 2009, territory level structures were responsible for the initial 
stages of planning. The five Territory Delivery Planning Units (TDPUs) 
would develop an outline of the required access and fundamental 
resources according to the work submitted by projects and the foreseeable 
volume of maintenance. Currently, the new planning process is mostly 
based on area level structures and TDPUs no longer exist. 
Routes are the main geographical structure for the Operations and 
Customer Services function of Network Rail. In general terms, a route 
defines a given rail path that connects to strategic network locations. 
Routes are grouped under nine different management structures. Each 
route (group) director is responsible for defining the scope of work needed 
to respond to the targets set for the running Control Period. Since June 
2005 under a revision of the Network Licence, Network Rail is obligated to 
develop and maintain Route Utilisation Strategies (RUSs). As Network Rail 
defines it, RUSs are developed in conjunction with rail industry partners 
and they seek to balance capacity, passenger & freight demand, as well as 
operational performance and cost, in order to address the requirements of 
funders and stakeholders. Hence, engineering work scopes are defined 
according to the requirements set by each RUS.  
Maintenance Delivery Units, as previously mentioned, are the local 
structures responsible for overseeing a given section of the network. This 
means managing and maintaining all assets, namely tracks, track 
equipments such as points, and signalling and electrification equipments. 
For each of these assets, MDUs must schedule and deliver the patrolling, 
inspection and other repair work, and submit it for formal acceptance to the 
planning process as independent work packs. As shown in Table 2.1, there 
are 40 MDUs distributed throughout the country. 
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Areas are the main geographic structure for planning. Prior to the 
transformation programme, area planning units were part of Infrastructure 
Maintenance as Area Delivery Planning Units (ADPUs). The 16 ADPUs 
across the country would receive the planned work for each quarter from 
TDPUs and further detail it and verify all the requirements for its delivery. 
The transformation has placed the area planning units under NDS and 
these are now responsible for developing all stages of the planning 
process. These units correspond to the 16 engineering areas in Table 2.1. 
Area units provide the details of the engineering work to be delivered each 
week to Operations and Costumer Services, which then publishes them 
according to the structure of the WON areas, as shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.2 summarises the correspondence between the geographical 
structures and organisational functions, as previously discussed. 
Table 2.2: Correspondence between geographical structures and organisational 
functions 
Geographical 



















2.3. Engineering planning system 
The system for the planning of engineering work, in a simplistic way, aims 
to schedule all work packs within the access opportunities available for 
each year, whilst optimising the utilisation of resources (machinery, 
haulage, staff and access, among others). This system consists of the 
functions and geographical structures previously described. NDS and NAU 
constitute the core of the planning system, while the participation of 
maintenance and investments has considerably changed during the course 
of this research, as a consequence of the planning transformation 
programme. The reorganisation has integrated under NDS most of the 
planning responsibilities that were formally disseminated under 
maintenance and investments. Both maintenance and investments remain 
responsible for producing the work packs necessary to respond to the 
infrastructure needs but no longer have planning teams (TDPUs and 
ADPUs) under their organisational structure. 
 In order to achieve the desired optimal application of resources, detailed 
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information is progressively developed to support the delivery of work, whist 
ensuring its reliability and safety. The development of this information 
follows a planning process that is formally designed by Network Rail and 
agreed by all stakeholders. The aim of the planning process is to ensure 
the integrity and robustness of the annual plan by establishing what 
information every stakeholder is required to provide at each stage, as well 
as impose common deadlines for the completion of those stages. Overall, 
the planning process aims to impose deadlines for decisions to be reached 
at national level, regarding the work going forward to delivery and the 
deployment of resources. Despite the standards imposed by the process, 
work requests (work packs submitted to the planning process) are brought 
in at various stages in a response to unpredicted infrastructural and 
business demands, often generating more or less profound changes to 
work until the hours before its delivery. 
Diagrams in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 illustrate the 
transformations to which the organisational structure of planning was 
submitted during the implementation of a new planning process. These 
diagrams were developed based on the overall understanding of the 
planning organisation, mostly acquired throughout the interview processes 
carried out in this research (Sections 4.4 and 4.5), and through the 
consultation of Network Rail planning documentation. Figure 2.1 describes 
the structure that existed when this research was initiated. This diagram 
was developed based on the planning process described in the Network 
Rail Business Process Document referenced as NR/SP/MTC/0056 
(commonly designated as PL0056 - Work & possession planning for the 
railway infrastructure). Using the initial contacts with planners, namely 
those used for the semi-structured interview process (section 4.5), the 




Figure 2.1: Planning process at start of research 
As the transformation was set in motion, the structure shown in Figure 2.2 
was created as an intermediary stage for reallocation of staff and 
resources. The new planning process is described in two main documents 
(NR/L2/NDS/202 - Engineering access & NDS-supplied resource planning 
and NR/L3/NDS/302 - Planning of engineering access & NDS-supplied 
resource for work deliverers) and the organisational structure that was 
developed to support it is shown in Figure 2.3. Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 
were developed from Figure 2.1 and its accuracy was later verified through 









Figure 2.3: Planning process after reorganisation 
A detailed description of these processes and their respective 
organisational structures was considered too extensive and of little use for 
the purpose of this thesis. At this point, a broad understanding of the 
planning system is provided based on three levels that although not 
corresponding to formal planning stages, represent levels of granularity that 
progressively respond to the planning and delivery requirements: Access, 
possession and worksite planning. 
2.3.1. Access planning 
This is the initial step and consists on agreeing with train operators the 
access to which each of the parties involved will be entitle to for the 
upcoming year. This stage starts approximately 90 weeks before the start 
of the timetable (TT) year foreseen for the delivery of work and is 
concluded with the publication of the Rules of the Route (RotR). The RotR 
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represent a contract between Network Rail and TOCs regarding the 
timetable hours for train services and those available for engineering 
access. Network Rail develops these negotiations on the base of the 
foreseeable work needed, for both maintenance and projects. The overview 
of this work is given by the Annual Integrated Work Plan (AIWP), which is 
developed prior to the publication of the RotR. As mentioned above, NAU 
has the lead responsibility in formalising the negotiations but most of the 
information is exchanged between TOCs and TDPUs. In some cases 
where late changes are made to the access conditions ADPUs are likely to 
directly contact TOCs and later formalise agreements through NAU. 
2.3.2. Possession planning 
This stage is developed quarterly and starts approximately 45 weeks before 
the start of each quarter (QT). It corresponds to the integration of work 
packs within each of the times and locations available for engineering 
access. This process is primarily driven by TDPUs, although ADPUs will 
intervene, as profound changes to the contents of possessions are made 
throughout later stages. The term possession represents the actual transfer 
of control over the line from the signaller to a Person in Charge of 
Possession (PICOP) and designates the protection arrangements that need 
to be established prior to and during engineering access. According to the 
Rule Book, possessions are referred to as “T3” arrangements. The PICOP 
is responsible for overseeing any movements within the limits of 
possessions or those going in or out to lines open to normal traffic. During 
this stage, the AIWP is progressively detailed and work packs are derived 
in independent work items. Planning then analyses the possibilities of 
slotting items into possessions, which will lead to the issuing of a confirmed 
possession plan for each of the four periods of the year. This is referred to 
as the Confirmed Period Possession Plan (CPPP) and it concludes this 
stage of planning. 
2.3.3. Worksite planning 
This is progressively developed alongside possession planning, as it 
produces the necessary details for the integration and coordination of work 
items within possessions. However, the core of this process is developed at 
ADPU level and it is held from 26 weeks before the time of delivery (T). 
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Possession Coordinators or Possession Assurance Managers (depending 
on the area of the country) are the planners responsible for preparing all 
information that PICOPs will be requiring on the night of delivery. At this 
point, planners hold a set of meetings until the week before delivery (T-1), 
which progressively detail the contents of possessions and worksites, as 
stakeholders bring in new information regarding work and how they intend 
to deliver it. 
This stage focuses on verifying all the requirements to carry out work, such 
as the timings and locations for each of the steps, resources and electrical 
isolations, among others. Particular attention is given to potential sources of 
conflict between work items which could compromise the safety or the 
deliverability of work. The term worksite designates the safety 
arrangements that separate a particular sequence of work from the 
remaining area under possession. Thus, a worksite is always within the 
limits of the area of track under possession and a possession may have 
one or more worksites. 
Worksite arrangements, together with possession arrangements, create 
two overlapping safety barriers, which aim at not only protecting ongoing 
work from open line traffic, but also preventing any movements within 
possessions that could result in hazardous situations for both track crews 
and equipment. Each worksite is placed under the control of an 
Engineering Supervisor (ES). The ES is responsible for overseeing and 
authorising movements and work within the worksite, as well as 
coordinating these activities with the PICOP. A worksite can either integrate 
several work items or be composed of a single item, depending on the 
complexity and risks implicated in its delivery. For instance, while some 
patrolling or minor maintenance work may be delivered within the same 
worksite, work that involves movements of on-track machinery is unlikely to 
be deliverable together with work that affects the ability to use that same 
track. 
2.3.4. The planning process 
The three stages described above and the organisational structures that 
develop them (NAU, TDPU and ADPU) form the core of planning as a 
system. Figure 2.4 was developed based on the formal planning 
documents previously mentioned in order to represent the three levels of 
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granularity previously described. The timings indicated correspond to 
formal references given by the planning process, at which each of the 
levels of planning is initiated. The square boxes show the documents that 
formalise the output of each of the levels of planning. 
 
Figure 2.4: Basic steps of the planning system 
The process is designed in such a way that a down flow of information 
occurs, which progressively details work towards its delivery. However, 
two-way arrows were used to show that exchange of information between 
levels takes place, as for instance, while worksites are being planned, 
changes to possessions and even access may still occur. These three 
stages could be interpreted as high level planning functions, which despite 
being designed to relate in a linear manner from start to finish of the 
process, they in fact develop complex and iterative exchanges of 
information. 
Although a precise figure was never obtained regarding people dedicated 
to engineering work planning tasks, anecdotal information obtained from 
various colleagues at Network Rail placed this number at around 2000 
people. The iterative flow of information and the range of people, 
organisational functions and geographical structures across which the 
planning system operates justify its characterisation as a complex 
distributed sociotechnical system. As stated by Wilson et al (2007a) in 
regards to the railway as whole, “events, operations, people and technical 
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systems are widely distributed in time and space: they are often mobile, 
people must collaborate using refined social as well as technical skills, and 
the distributed system is spread across regional, national, and cultural 
boundaries”. 
A significant volume of less complex maintenance work (in general, those 
that do not affect the safe running of trains) is often delivered under less 
demanding and less complex protection arrangements. These 
arrangements are designated as “T2” in the Rule Book. One of the factors 
that justify the delivery of this work under fewer protection arrangements is 
the absence of machinery on track, which could affect the safety of the line. 
Hence, the planning of T2s does not require going through the complex 
planning stages that allocate track machinery and other critical resources. 
Network Rail documentation indicated that T2 arrangements do not follow 
the standards imposed by the planning system here described. Informal 
consultations with people involved in engineering planning and delivery 
revealed that the scheduling and planning of T2s is developed almost 
exclusively at MDU level. Because the planning of this type of access 
clearly falls outside the process of T3 arrangements, they were not 
considered within the scope of this research. Hence, this study can be 
described as the planning of work that involves possession of the line. 
2.4. Safety and engineering data sources 
This research refers to several data sources that support the planning and 
delivery of engineering work, as well as other functions within Network Rail 
and in some cases, the wider rail industry. This section clarifies, the 
systems and data sources used, in order to make the contents of this thesis 
more comprehensive. The descriptions here provided were mostly 
produced from work carried out during the initial stages of this research, 
aiming to build an overall knowledge and understanding of the rail industry. 
2.4.1. Possession Planning System  
The Possession Planning System (PPS) is the main support tool of 
planning. It generates a database of all engineering work that has been 
formally submitted to planning and provides details of engineering access 
for the publishing of the WON. Possessions and worksites are created and 
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given a unique reference by the system. Although the system refers to 
worksites, the items inputted under this designation and to which a 
reference is attributed will not necessarily correspond to an actual worksite 
on the night of its delivery. In fact, these are work items and are treated as 
such during the entire planning process, down to the publication of the 
WON. A worksite can be composed of several work items. This is 
frequently the case for track patrolling work, as most work items can be 
carried out simultaneously whilst other types of work are delivered in the 
same area. 
The planner responsible for inputting items in PPS is required to provide a 
minimum of details, such as time and dates, routes that will be affected by 
possession (and therefore unavailable for train services), the mileage to be 
blocked (actual location given in track miles), details of electrical isolations 
if needed, and other general details of work. Every item created in PPS 
remains under a status of “proposed” until all the necessary details are 
provided and inputted, at which point the item can be attributed a status of 
“approved”. Because no worksite can be delivered unless integrated within 
a possession, one of the requirements for worksites is its linkage to a 
possession. Once a reference number is given, PPS keeps a record of any 
changes made to the item with that reference, even if the item is given a 
status of “cancelled”. 
PPS contains free text fields for the input of remarks regarding traffic and 
any other general details of work. Beyond this, the required information, 
mainly concerning the time and location of work and electric isolations, 
must be inputted according to a specific format. Although other parameters 
are available in PPS, only the ones described in Table 2.3 were considered 
relevant for the scope of this research. 
Table 2.3: Description of information contents in PPS 
Details 
Additional remarks regarding traffic (time and head codes of 
engineering trains scheduled for a given possession) or any 
specific work details (key staff contact numbers, critical safety or 
deliverability issues) 
Blocked line Line which will be blocked to train services during possession (up 
or down line, fast or slow line, among other designations) 
Route Section of route on which work will be taking place and therefore, 





Input only required for worksite entries, providing details for electric 




Input only required for worksite entries, providing details of any on-
track machinery that will be operating within the given worksite 
 
PPS records every change made to these parameters according to three 
basic inputs: 
x Created: This operation indicates that information was inputted on a 
given field for the first time. This is also registered in the system when 
the referenced item itself is initially inputted into PP. 
x Amended: The content of a field, which has been previously created, is 
submitted to modifications. 
x Deleted: Information within a field is removed and details are eliminated 
from PPS. 
2.4.2. Planning meeting minutes  
Meeting minutes consist of a record produced during every planning 
meeting, in which any changes proposed and discussed are noted. Prior to 
each meeting, the planner overseeing the given stage of the process 
produces from PPS a printout of every work item proposed. This printout 
resembles the format of the WON (Appendix 1) and shows updated details 
for each item. This is referred to as a “data freeze”. During planning 
meetings, as items are discussed, the meeting chair checks whether the 
printed details are correct and records any changes agreed, in order to 
subsequently update details into PPS. Hence, despite the more or less 
common practices and notations used by the majority of planners, these 
records are mostly made of hand written free text. 
2.4.3. PossMan  
PossMan is a system developed by the planning teams in Maintenance 
using a Microsoft Access programming. This software assists planners 
during the last stages of the process, mainly in managing the grouping of 
work items into actual worksites and linking all the respective resources. 
This represents more or less what was previously described as the lower 
level of planning (worksite planning). Hence, this system manages a part of 
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the planning process for which PPS offered no support. While PPS is 
oriented towards feeding details of engineering work for operations, 
PossMan aims at providing information more suitable for those responsible 
for delivery. The output of PossMan is normally referred to as the Weekly 
Engineering Notice (WEN). 
2.4.4. Safety Management Information System 
Safety Management Information System (SMIS) is an internet based 
software application for safety related incidents. It is managed by the Rail 
Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) and it gathers and codes information 
on relevant incidents from all areas of the industry and nationally. 
Fundamentally, it links events to the assets on which they took place and 
the people affected. This database is then available to all those involved in 
safety activities in all industry stakeholders. 
2.4.5. National control logs 
Control logs are daily records produced by Network Rail control centres, 
reporting all occurrences that affect the infrastructure or operations. 
Controllers at these centres receive information from all parts of the 
organisation regarding accidents and incidents, and non-compliances or 
irregularities taking place within the premises for which Network Rail is 
responsible. The logs are built under the format of free text documents, in 
which controllers progressively add any relevant information. Information 
reaches controllers, usually by phone, or they obtain it by contacting any 
potential source, whenever they feel further clarification is needed. Control 
logs constitute one of the main sources for the production of safety data, 
including the building of SMIS. 
2.4.6. Asset Incident Trends 
Asset Incident Trends is a database generated by engineering statistics, 
using an Excel spreadsheet format. It produces an overall picture of major 
types of infrastructure related events and their incidence in each 
engineering area, and for each of the 13 periods of the year (each period 
has four weeks). The database classifies 51 types of incidents that range 
from possession of the line incidents, track related events, signalling, 




Ellipse is an overarching system that manages asset information. All the 
equipments of the national infrastructure are recorded in this system, 
together with their status in terms of operational conditions. Thus, Ellipse 
provides information about any assets in need of work, which then feeds 
the work scope submitted by maintenance to planning. 
2.4.8. Asset data 
Engineering statistics provided two main sources of asset data: Asset 
counts and Equated Track Miles (ETM). 
Asset counts are produced by the Engineering Information National 
Specialist Team for each Maintenance Delivery Unit and updated for every 
period of the year. The intention is to provide a guide for several 
engineering activities rather than a definitive set of asset counts. Assets are 




x Signal boxes 
x Track circuits 
x Signals 
x Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) 
x Insulated Block Joint (insulation of track circuits) 
x Points operating equipment 
The concept of Equated Track Miles (ETM) provides an estimate of the 
volume of work that each Maintenance Delivery Unit is required to carry 
out. ETM tables are used to inform a number of different areas of the 
business, such as investments and cost predictions, among others. This is 
calculated by the Engineering Information Team based on the asset counts 
and the actual mileage under the control of each MDU. Each section of 
track is multiplied by coefficients that distinguish between different levels of 
maintenance complexity, depending on the type of asset to be maintained. 
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The following track features are used as calculating coefficients: 
x Continuous Welded Rail (CWR) 
x Jointed Track (JTD) 
x Switches & Crossings (S&C) 
As CWR is easiest to maintain, it is given a lower factor than JTD. In the 
same way, S&C is the most difficult to maintain and therefore has a higher 
factor than the previous ones. In addition, a coefficient designated as Track 
Category accounts for the age of track and the Annual Tonnage for the 
estimated volume of traffic passing through a given section. This means 
that an area with less miles of track, straight sections of track with no S&C 
and low annual tonnage will have a lower ETM. Appendix 2 provides the 
conversion table with the coefficients to be applied to each track section 




This chapter explores the key fields of knowledge that support the research 
carried out. As put forward in the introduction, sociotechnical systems 
were considered the background for the investigation of growing 
complexity and its impacts on safety. As a starting point, system theories 
are discussed, as well as the characteristics of complexity (section 3.1). 
This has supported the study of the planning system and the understanding 
of its main human and organisational factors. 
The planning of rail engineering work, as the focus of research, was 
described in relation to critical business decision making (section 2.2). An 
introduction of basic concepts on decision making is given in section 3.2, 
which supported the understanding of planning as a complex process 
ranging from the definition of high level business targets, down to work 
delivery. This also helped the identification of planning boundaries and its 
framing within the broader engineering system. The understanding of 
decision making as a complex and distributed process also supported 
the presentation of literature on planning and scheduling activities 
(section 3.5), and thus further contributed for the investigation of planning 
within the context of rail engineering and the identification of human and 
organisational factors. 
Resilience engineering is proposed in section 3.4 as an approach to 
safety management in complex sociotechnical systems, which aims to 
develop mechanisms that can better cope with variability and 
uncertainty that are inherent to complex environments. While section 3.1 
introduces literature on the sources of this variability and uncertainty, 
section 3.3 provides a background on safety related issues and the 
challenges of safety within complex systems which may require new 
approaches such as resilience engineering. 
3.1. Complex sociotechnical systems 
The planning of engineering work was early on described as a complex 
sociotechnical system. This section provides a definition and main 
characteristics for this concept, and clarifies the arguments which justify its 




Mansfield (2010) defines a system as a “hierarchic or networked group of 
interdependent components that when regarded as a whole, exhibit a 
certain behaviour that is not present in any one part, but arises from the 
interaction of the parts”. In systems, not only the whole is “greater” than the 
sum of the parts, but also the functioning of parts is conditioned by the 
relations between them (Jackson, 2010). Jackson (2010) further considers 
that the interactions and interdependencies are what define the nature of 
the system. Relations between components may be structured by links of 
physical, social or organisational, or even formal or informal nature, among 
others. The behaviour exhibited by the system and produced by the 
existing relations within it, is referred to by the author as an emergent 
property of the system in question. Such properties are the characteristics 
of the whole and not of its parts (Jackson, 2010). This is also what defines 
the boundaries of the system. The limits of a given system are the 
consequence of the relations considered and the behaviours originated. As 
noted by Hollnagel (2009a), this renders the definition of system 
boundaries dependent on the purpose and scope of its description. Any 
elements beyond, outside or not involved in the relations and behaviours 
considered are designated as the environment of the system. 
The World Wide Web has been a frequent subject of research on system 
theories (Barabási & Albert, 1999). In this context, numerous systems can 
be described, depending on the purposes and functions under 
consideration. For instance, online purchases can be considered a system, 
ranging from decision making about buying, to the flow of information that 
produces the purchase, and finally, to the delivery of the bought products. 
This system has few physical structures and boundaries and yet it can be 
defined through the steps necessary to achieve the intended goal of 
acquiring something. This system interacts and/or overlaps with other 
systems such as the sales website company, the banking system (for 
purposes of payment), and supply and delivery services among others. 
From this perspective, the operational environment of one system is in 




3.1.2. Sociotechnical system 
The notion of sociotechnical system is likely to be one most frequently used 
in recent studies of organisational contexts. Mansfield (2010) points out that 
the term was first used in the context of work studies and it was aimed at 
emphasising the interaction between people and technology. This 
presupposes interactions between people and between people and 
technology. From this perspective, sociotechnical systems are distinct from 
purely technical systems, and from natural systems (Vugrin et al, 2010). 
While technical systems are those created by humans but under normal 
conditions, operate independently (certain types of software for instance), 
natural systems includes all those which were not created by humans and 
where no human intervention exists (natural ecosystems). 
Jackson (2010) distinguishes a socioecological system from a human 
intensive system. Jackson (2010) defines the later as any system where 
the human element is the dominant one. This would include every 
organisation, from governmental institutions to companies and 
communities, as illustrated by the system responsible for the response to 
the hurricane Katrina (Jackson, 2010). A socioecological system is defined 
by Jackson (2010) as the result of human intervention in a natural system, 
such as the building of dams on rivers or any conservation action in forest 
or other natural habitats. In human-intensive as well as in socioecological 
systems, there is bound to be some form of interaction between humans 
and technology, and therefore, both could also be considered 
sociotechnical systems. 
From a human factors perspective, any such systems could be considered 
“human intensive”, since at any instance, the control of a dam or the 
management, planning and implementation of conservation measures rely 
on human decisions and actions. To some extent, different degrees of 
“intensity” could be considered. As pointed out by Jackson (2010) and 
mentioned in the previous section, the key principle of any systems 
approach is the definition of its boundaries. The limits of the system in 
analysis in this thesis are discussed in the framework chapter (Section 4.1) 
3.1.3. Systems approach 
Jackson (2010) considers this a designation for methods dedicated to the 
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design, analysis and management of complex systems. Jackson (2010) 
synthesises this approach with the following steps: 
x The identification of system elements provides grounds for the 
selection of appropriate methods and disciplines for the study of each 
element. 
x The subdivision of elements into smaller elements enables proper 
focus on relevant system parts. 
x The grouping of elements provides means for better understanding the 
relations between elements with common goals and of overall system 
structure. 
x The identification of system boundaries supports the definition of the 
system and its goals, as well as the identification of the elements that 
most contribute to these overall goals. 
x The identification of functions for each system element further 
develops the understanding of system operations and how system 
functions are performed. 
x The analysis of interactions between system elements complements 
knowledge of system functions by looking into how elements perform 
together to achieve system goals. 
x Understanding the system environment is crucial for the analysis of 
constraints on system operations and performance of system elements. 
Whenever relevant for system design or analysis, this may include 
looking at elements independently and their environment within the 
system, as each system element may have different environments and 
therefore, also be subjected to different performance constraints. 
x The identification of the emergent properties of the system, as 
previously stated by Mansfield (2010), constitutes a crucial step for 
understanding system functions and goals, as well as boundaries. 
x The development of a synthesis of functions and structures supports 
interpretation and understanding of system performance. 
x Like in any robust scientific approach, verification and validation are 
fundamental steps to be considered. 
The work developed in the course of this research took into consideration 
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these steps, aiming to build a consistent approach to the investigation of 
the engineering work planning system. The section on scope and 
objectives will further explore these steps in view of the stated specific 
objectives. 
3.1.4. Complexity 
Keeping in mind the scale and complexity that characterise the rail 
engineering planning system, complexity is clearly one of the most 
important aspects of systems within the scope of this research. Although 
intuitively the meaning of this concept may be more or less understood, this 
section clarifies the aspects of system complexity considered relevant 
within the context of the planning of rail engineering work. Carayon (2006) 
explores complexity in sociotechnical systems and points out as its 
sources, the interactions among people who work across organisational, 
geographical, cultural and temporal boundaries. 
Mansfield (2010) establishes a distinction between complicated and 
complex systems, based on how each of these two types of systems 
changes and evolves in time. The behaviour of complicated systems 
follows specific rules and, despite its numerous components, the relations 
between them remain fairly stable. Mechanical clocks are an example of 
complicated systems given by Mansfield (2010). The change of state in the 
clock’s components will be likely to change the time it displays on the dials 
for instance, but will not alter the clock itself and how it works (unless the 
system malfunctions). Hence, the behaviour of a complicated system is 
said to be linear, as it could be described through a representation of the 
sequence of its relations and how they alter the state of the system in time 
(Mansfield, 2010). 
Complex systems on the other hand, are characterised by numerous 
interactions occurring between many of its parts at each given time. 
Axelrod & Cohen (1999) define complexity as the outcome of interactions, 
which lead to current events within the system, critically influencing the 
probability of future ones. Mansfield (2010) considers that complexity is 
only perceivable through the behaviour of the system, as opposed to 
considering its components separately. In this sense, the author considers 
that complexity is an emergent property. Axelrod & Cohen (1999) add that 
complexity emerges from the multiple ways in which events in complex 
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systems tend to combine their effects, rather than simply adding, as in a 
mechanical clock. Consequences of events tend to diffuse unevenly via the 
multiple interactions occurring in the system. As mentioned by Axelrod & 
Cohen (1999), Mansfield (2010) and Marais et al (2007), complex systems 
can change in multiple dimensions. Components in complex systems may 
alter their state, form or even position within the system’s structure, and 
these changes produce effects across the system through the interactions 
with other system components. Hence, order in complex systems is 
emergent, rather than predetermined (Jackson, 2010). 
Leveson (2004) states that many systems have today reached a level of 
complexity with a potential for interactions that cannot be fully understood. 
The author points out the contribution of software for this increasing 
complexity, as it gave way to “more integrated, multi-loop control in 
systems with dynamically interacting components” (Leveson, 2004). 
Bertalanffy (2003) develops a similar distinction when referring to closed 
and open systems. Closed systems have no communication with their 
environment and therefore, components tend to settle into a state of 
equilibrium. Once more, the example of the mechanical clock applies, as no 
interactions with its environment exist and it operates in more or less 
accurate constancy. Open systems are subject to information exchanges 
with their environments. Their behaviour is characterised by the constant 
search for a dynamic equilibrium, as a response to the information 
exchanged with their environment. Open systems tend to acquire the traits 
of complexity, as they develop adapting mechanisms to their environment. 
Within this context, the main distinction between a complicated and a 
complex system resides in the fact that while the behaviour of the first 
remains compatible with principles of linearity and constancy, 
understanding the latter requires a nonlinear perspective. Nonlinearity is 
here considered the multiple dimensions that must be perceived 
concurrently, in order to understand the behaviour of a complex system. In 
this frame of mind and for the purpose of this research, a complex system 
is defined as a network of components that interact nonlinearly and give 
rise to emergent behaviours (and properties), which cannot be perceived 
from the properties and behaviours of components. Mansfield (2010) 
proposes the change from caterpillar to butterfly as an example of a 
complex system. This is clearly a system where a change in one 
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component can initiate interactions difficult to predict, which, as the author 
states, can either die away or grow to modify the system and its behaviour. 
Cook (2001) refers to a system of systems to discuss the high scale and 
complexity that today can be found in a great variety of contexts. When 
studying complex systems, often its components should themselves be 
viewed as sub-systems of a larger system, which leads to a more adequate 
perspective of complexity and its sources of variability and unpredictability 
(Cook, 2001). Jackson (2010) notes that this perspective should be applied 
when discussing systems that, despite their ability to operate 
independently, are often faced with the need to coordinate their efforts 
towards a common goal, and therefore, interact as a broader system. 
Examples of this can be found in fire departments, which may operate 
separately, but also coordinate themselves locally, nationally or even 
internationally when faced with major accidents, or in the multitude of 
airplanes flying across the globe and coordinating with different air traffic 
control systems. 
3.1.5. Variability and uncertainty 
Fujita (2006a) states that no system can avoid changes. They occur 
continuously throughout the lifetime of the system and are driven both by 
internal (e.g. through people’s actions) and external (e.g. economic 
pressures) factors. Mansfield (2010) considers the influences that 
components exert on each other through their relations as the source of 
change in the system. The interactions amongst components generate 
pressures for change in the state of the system and of components 
themselves. Mansfield (2010) adds that because of its dynamics, complex 
systems are rarely in equilibrium. They change over time and their 
behaviour may emerge in many unexpected ways. Because of their 
propensity for change, Jackson (2010) refers to “complex adaptive 
systems”. Jackson (2010) considers that complexity in systems is also 
related to the need to constantly adapt to disruptions emanating from 
system pressures. Hence, complex systems are normally characterised by 
variability in time. 
Pressures amongst system components are themselves the result of 
pressures from the system’s environment. Svedung & Rasmussen (1998) 
refer to pressures generated by changes in public opinion and awareness, 
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political climate, market conditions, and the increasing pace of 
technological changes, and state that, in order to survive, systems must 
adapt to such changes in their environment. Changes in the environment 
initiate change (adaptation) processes within systems and, in return, the 
changes in the system will eventually produce changes in the environment. 
The shifting pressures between the system and its environment are the 
source of high dynamics and unpredictability. Axelrod & Cohen (1999) 
consider that because of the forces (pressures) within the system, which 
shape future events, cannot be added in a simple and linear manner, 
prediction in complex systems becomes very difficult. Jackson (2010) 
points out that in complex (adaptive) systems, history is irreversible and the 
future is often unpredictable. Once actions are taken within the system, 
chain reactions can be produced that cannot be undone. The 
unpredictability of complex systems increases as decisions and actions 
become difficult to trace back. As stated in the previous section, complex 
systems can develop changes across many different dimensions and 
therefore, they exhibit a non-linear behaviour. Leveson (2004) adds that 
some systems have developed such degrees of interactive complexity that 
even experts may have incomplete information about its behaviours. This 
generates uncertainty in operations of complex systems. As later 
approached in section 3.4, one of the aims of resilience engineering often 
discussed by Hollnagel et al (2006) regard the ability to cope with variability 
of system operations and uncertainty about possible outcomes. 
3.1.6. Intractability 
On the basis of complexity and its resulting patterns of change, Hollnagel 
(2009a) discusses tractable and intractable systems. The low complexity 
that characterises tractability provides the opportunity for a sufficiently 
thorough description of the system and its operation. Not only are there 
fewer components and details to be described, but also the relatively low 
dynamics of the system allows for the analysis process to be concluded 
and actions to be taken without compromising the validity of its outcome in 
view of the system’s state and condition. On the contrary, intractable 
systems incorporate the traits of complexity and therefore, operations tend 
to be underspecified (Hollnagel, 2009a). Table 3.1 summarises the main 
characteristics of tractable and intractable systems. 
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Table 3.1: Tractable and intractable systems (from Hollnagel, 2009a) 
 Tractable systems Intractable systems 
Number of details Descriptions are simple with few details 
Descriptions are elaborate 
with many details 
Comprehensibility Principles of functioning are known 
Principles of functioning are 
partly unknown 
Stability System does not change 
while being described 
System changes before 
description is completed 
Relation to other 
systems Independence Interdependence 
Controllability Easy to control Difficult to control 
 
The intractability of complex systems presents a major challenge for safety 
management. Within underspecified conditions, decisions must be made 
based on incomplete knowledge of operating principles and solutions must 
be reached within a timeframe compatible with the fast pace change of the 
system (Hollnagel, 2009a).  
3.2. Decision making 
The planning of engineering work is related to critical business decisions 
(the delivery of Network Rail’s service to its customers). This section 
explores basic concepts and perspectives on decision making, and places 
them within the context of complexity and unpredictability previously 
debated. 
3.2.1. Concepts 
Technology, in particular computerisation, has given information a growing 
importance in every work environment. Along with this transformation, 
making decisions has progressively become a necessary response to new 
demands, such as having to regulate, monitor or control parameters of 
industrial equipment. The prominence that human cognitive aspects have 
gained in the last few decades generated an interest from a wide range of 
scientific fields, even beyond those related to human factors, such as 
economics and business management. Crozier & Ranyard (1997) attribute 
this phenomenon to a combination of economic, social and technological 
developments that produced a situation where people have to make 
important decisions about every aspect of their lives, ranging from health 
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issues, family, career and education, among others. 
Wicklund & Brehm (1976) define cognition or cognitive elements as any 
knowledge one has about their environment or oneself. From this 
perspective, decision making can be broadly defined as the mental 
processes resulting in the selection of a course of action among several 
alternatives. In practice, Svenson (1996) defines decision making as the 
response to pressures generated by conflicting circumstances or differing 
goals that have to be negotiated and reconciled. The notion of conflict as 
the source of the need to decide has lead to the development of two 
important concepts: 
x Festinger (1985) describes this conflict as the source of cognitive 
dissonance. Festinger (1985) refers to dissonance as the existence of 
non-fitting knowledge (cognition) or opinion about the environment or 
about oneself. For instance, within the rail engineering work 
environment, a dissonance could be described as having to allocate 
resources to a given work item when such resources are unavailable or 
simply having more work items to schedule than the available access 
necessary to deliver it. Dissonance pressures the individual to search for 
a more suitable circumstance, which implies making choices. 
x In opposition to dissonance, Wicklund & Brehm (1976) refer to cognitive 
consonance when one element psychologically implies another, within 
one’s cultural or behavioural patterns, or experience. The authors 
mention psychological implication in regards to cognitions which are 
logically connected. For instance, allocating resources to one particular 
work item is consonant with knowing that such item is approved for 
delivery. 
In general terms, voting for a candidate is consonant with believing that this 
person has the necessary qualities to hold the office in question, whilst 
dissonance would be voting for a candidate knowing that such a person is 
unfit for the duties. 
Svenson (1996) presents two different approaches to the study of decisions 
making: 
x The structural research approach relates choices and their ratings to 
the input variables. This involves analysing aspects of decisions such as 
the possible maximum gains across different options and probabilities of 
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decision outcome. The author points out that under this perspective, no 
attempts are made to infer the psychological processes that occur at 
different stages between problem presentation and reaching a decision. 
x The process research approach focuses on these particular 
psychological aspects of decision making. The recognition and 
description of different stages from the conflicting circumstance to 
reaching a decision are envisaged by means of methods such as 
information search patterns and think aloud protocols. 
In contrast with a structure approach, Crozier & Ranyard (1997) consider 
three attributes of decisions when viewed as a process: 
x Reaching a decision acquires a dimension in time. Decisions are 
assumed to take a period of time to be reached, which could be minutes, 
hours or days. 
x Decision makers explore a range of possible strategies to reach 
decisions and adapt their decision rules to changing circumstances. 
x The representation of the problem at hand initially built by the decision 
maker evolves as the decision process develops. 
Svenson (1996) argues that a process perspective is essential for the 
exploration of regularities (invariant elements) in decision making. Svenson 
(1992) had previously advocated that beyond the analysis of pre-decision 
information gathering and processing stages, research on decision making 
should also focus on post-decision processes, which further emphasises 
the importance of a process approach. Within this context, Svenson (1996) 
introduces the four types of decision problems described in Table 3.2, 
which embed different levels of complexity. 
Table 3.2: The four types of decision problems (from Svenson, 1996) 
 Description 
Level 1 
Quick decisions that tend to recur to automatic and unconscious 
decisions. Decisions made based on previous experience 
(recognition-primed decisions - Kleine 1989 in Svenson 1996). 
Level 2 
The decision involves one or a few attributes but these are not 
generating any kind of conflict. The solution remains relatively 
obvious. 
Level 3 Decisions involving alternatives with conflicting goals. 




Svenson (1996) points out that these levels should not be interpreted as 
being isolated and that decision makers may refer to several levels within a 
broader decision process. “Lower level processes are also nested within 
higher level decision processes as sub-processes of the latter”. 
3.2.2. Distributed decision making 
Institutions are today required to make decisions regarding investments, 
research and development or the deployment of resources in complex and 
uncertain environments (Crozier & Ranyard, 1997). This means that 
beyond individual people, the way organisations reach solutions to their 
problems should also be considered. 
The concept of distributed decision making has been particularly relevant 
for research in organisational contexts and management. Schneeweiss 
(2003) describes this as the design and coordination of decisions 
connected within a broader decision process. Schneeweiss (2003) 
considers that the growing complexity of society can no longer be 
understood and governed by the paradigm of centralised decision making 
and that distributed decision making has become a predominant 
methodology of handling complex systems. Zeleny (1981) cites Stafford 
Beer in “Platform for change” (1975), where he considers that “the real 
decision making process involves a lot of people and the whole structure is 
redolent with feedback. At every decisive moment, of which there will be 
great many within the total decision, we range ahead and back and 
sideways”. Schneeweiss (2003) further considers that complex decision 
problems are solved by splitting them up into their components, either by a 
single individual through intellectual segregations and subsequent 
coordination, or by multiple individuals participating in some problem of 
mutual interest. 
Zeleny (1981) considers that it is only when people are faced with multiple 
objectives, criteria, functions and attributes that a decision making process 
emerges. Zeleny (1981) describes decision making as dynamic processes 
of information searching in many different directions. The information 
gathered is then assessed, reconsidered or discarded. This generates 
numerous sources of feedback, which in return, renews the information 
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search. “Man is a reluctant decision maker, not a swiftly calculating 
machine” (Zeleny, 1981). Zeleny (1981) proposes four generic stages for 
decision making processes: 
x The pre-decision stage regards the initial sense of conflict, tension or 
dissatisfaction that provides the motivation for a decision process to be 
initiated. This conflict emerges from the lack of satisfying or feasible 
alternatives in view of the existing circumstances or perceived scenarios. 
Zeleny (1981) points out that if a feasible and satisfying alternative is 
found then the conflict no longer exists and the decision process ceases. 
The author considers such circumstances quite rare and therefore, the 
effort towards resolving the conflict shifts to an attempt to minimise the 
conflicting aspects. This amounts to containing the conflict within an 
acceptable level. 
x As the process develops, partial decisions are made, which constitute 
a directional adjustment of the decision problem. Alternatives are 
discarded, new ones may be admitted and the remaining ones 
redefined. Overall, this generates a review of the conflicting elements, 
and thus, a redefinition of the problem at hand. Zeleny (1981) considers 
that two elements contribute to the development of partial decision 
processes: the prevalence of the pre-decision conflict and the post-
decision dissonance which emerges as confidence in the choice made is 
questioned. Svenson (1996) refers to this process as differentiation. 
Svenson (1996) advocates that the purpose of a decision process is not 
to simply fulfil the decision rules in question but rather to generate an 
alternative course of action sufficiently distinct from the remaining 
alternatives. This is achieved by restructuring the decision process 
according to the context and persons involved. 
x Through partial decision processes, the alternatives deemed feasible 
and the ideal scenario are progressively brought closer together, which 
eventually leads to an acceptable level of satisfaction and a final 
decision is reached. A partial decision differs from a final decision in the 
sense that in the latter case, the decision makers were able to reduce 
the post-decision dissonance to an acceptable level. At this point, Zeleny 
(1981) argues that there are few alternatives being pondered and these 
tend to be very similar. 
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x The post-decision stage consists of managing the dissonance 
emerging from making a choice. The decision makers review and 
reassess the process, as well as the decision rules applied. The process 
through which decision makers reinforce the attractiveness of the choice 
made and reduce the relevance of the remaining alternatives is referred 
to by Svenson (1996) as consolidation. The consolidation process that 
follows what becomes a final decision differs from the preceding ones in 
the sense that it achieves a satisfying level of confirmation of the choice 
made. 
Zeleny (1981) points out that every post-decision stage can be considered 
a pre-decision stage for a next step within a wider decision process. From 
this perspective, these four stages illustrate the process of decision making. 
The notion of partial decision introduces an iterative characteristic to the 
process that becomes increasingly relevant as problems become more 
complex. 
Svedung & Rasmussen (1998) apply this process perspective to decision 
making in risk management. A hierarchical system is described as one 
single decision making process, ranging from governance, down to the 
operational level where a given hazardous process must be carried out and 
controlled. The authors argue that such an approach is necessary to 
understand what initiates and drives decisions (partial decisions) at each 
hierarchical level of the system. From one level to the next, decisions are 
affected and shaped by different types of pressures, such as public 
opinions, political trends, company and market shifts and availability of 
resources. These pressures affect the way people at each level develop 
their decisions and decisions at each level affect decisions on the next one. 
As stated earlier in regards to complex systems (section 3.1.5), pressures 
are the source of changes in systems. This places decision making in the 
context of change in systems, as decision making processes are 
themselves triggered by conflicting and pressuring circumstances (Zeleny, 
1981 and Svenson, 1996). The relevancy of the model proposed by 
Svedung & Rasmussen (1998) will be further discussed in the context of 
safety in complex systems. 
For several research fields related to organisational issues, this remains an 
important subject, with relevant questions to be answered. As an example, 
the term “decision engineering” is today frequently used to describe 
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scientific efforts on the development of tools and techniques for informed 
operational and business decision making (Miller et al, 2009). 
3.3. Safety in complex systems 
As stated in the introduction, one of the focuses of this research is safety, in 
particular, resilience engineering as a safety management approach in 
complex systems. The aspects of system complexity previously discussed 
are of crucial importance for the field of safety management. As illustrated 
by the investigation into the NASA shuttle accidents (Marais et al, 2007), 
the uncertainty associated with complexity renders safety management 
equally complex. This section refers in more detail to the challenges that 
system complexity creates for the management of safety. 
3.3.1. Background on safety issues 
Safety is commonly defined as the absence of unacceptable risks (Hurst, 
1998). This implies that a system is able to achieve its goals without loss of 
life or material damage (Jackson, 2010). Owens & Leveson (2006) consider 
safety to be a control problem. The purpose of safety oriented activities is 
to eliminate risk and therefore, to control events or courses of action that 
could lead to unsafe circumstances and potential accidents. From this 
perspective, accidents are the consequence of “component failures, 
external disturbances, and/or dysfunctional interactions among system 
components” (Owens & Leveson, 2006 pp 8). According to Kirwan (1998), 
managing safety relates to decisions on all practices, roles and functions 
involved in preventing such failures and disturbances. It involves all aspects 
of how safety is achieved or how other activities are performed in a safe 
way. 
As already mentioned in the introduction (section 1.1), Hale et al (1998) 
argue that most of the current safety management practices and tools are 
rooted in the experience of earlier large scale organisations, in which 
changes would tend to be less frequent and of little magnitude. Strict 
regulations and standards applicable across all industrial activities were the 
core of safety management in organisations characterised by stable and 
well known operations. Hale et al (1998) further argue that “traditional” 
safety principles may be inadequate in the face of today’s complex and fast 
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pace changing organisations. Hale et al (1998) question whether safety can 
be managed through a careful analysis of past occurrences and prediction 
methods for what may be the consequences of each possible course of 
action. By the time such an approach produces a decision, the organisation 
may have shifted and the solution found may no longer be applicable or 
even safe. 
Because the pathways that convey people and goods also enable risks to 
travel, as the degree of economical, political and social interchange 
between states increases, disasters rapidly acquire the potential to cross 
boundaries (Boin et al, 2010). Leveson (2004) explains fast pace changes 
with the introduction of new technologies into systems. While in the early 
twentieth century, new technologies would take about 30 years to reach the 
market, this can today take three years and products may become obsolete 
in five years Leveson (2004). Dekker (2004) adds that although 
computational speed has drastically improved access to information and 
the ability to generate data, humans are unable to keep up with such 
evolutions. People cannot process and make sense of the volumes of 
information that currently flow across complex systems. This is the context 
in which high complexity can lead to an increased risk exposure, and as 
initially mentioned, it can create additional challenges for the management 
of safety. Within complex environments, safety cannot be merely chosen, 
rather it must be searched (Widalvsky, 2004). As later discussed (section 
3.4), this is also the context in which Hollnagel (2011a) places resilience 
engineering’s view on safety: The ability to succeed under varying 
conditions. 
3.3.2. The changing nature of accidents 
There is a common understanding of the term accident as being an 
unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstance, which leads to an 
undesired outcome, normally of loss or injury (Hollnagel, 2004). It is today 
widely recognised that dependence on technology has produced new and 
important sources of risk, and as a direct consequence, the nature of 
accidents has also shifted (Leveson, 2004). The scale that systems have 
attained creates the power to impact future generations through 
environmental pollution and genetic damage. As an example, Perrow 
(1999) mentions that activities such as the production of nuclear power, 
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chemical and biological derivates, or the transportation of hazardous 
materials, are today a common presence, even in the vicinity of populated 
areas. The catastrophic potential of these industries has become evident in 
past disasters like the Three Mile Island, Bhopal or Chernobyl. 
Leveson (2004) considers that complex systems cannot be managed under 
the assumption that accidents are produced by an uncontrolled and 
undesired release or transfer of energy between technical components. 
Technology is evolving faster than the methods to control and manage it, 
and consequently, unknown elements are introduced into system 
operations. Therefore, partially unknown operations must be taken into 
account as a contribution for the production of accidents in complex 
systems. Leveson (2004) further discusses the widespread use of 
computers and observes how this has created a potential for information 
loss, imprecision or incompleteness, which can lead to severe physical and 
financial losses. 
Within complex scenarios, risk does not emerge solely from the presence 
of toxic or explosive materials Perrow (1999). Examples of this can be 
found in railway accidents like Clapham Junction (Hidden, 1989) or 
Ladbroke Grove (HSE, 2000), among others. Perrow (1999) considers that 
high risk systems are characterised by an interacting tendency that can 
lead to unexpected combinations of events. This is described as a system 
characteristic, as opposed to one of components or operators. In 
accordance to what was previously defined as a complex system, Perrow 
(1999) also refers to interactive complexity in high risk systems. Due to the 
numerous possible combinations of events and even greater number of 
potential outcomes, the author considers this interactivity the source of 
“normal accidents”, in the sense that occurrences in complex environments 
must be considered inevitable. Accidents in complex environments tend to 
be the result of unpredicted interactions and thus, as supported by Owens 
& Leveson (2006), the spread of potentially harmful interactions throughout 
the system have to be controlled. 
As Leveson (2004) points out, accidents within complex environments tend 
to produce unpredicted chain reaction effects, which could rapidly reach 
intolerable proportions. Prevention of accidents requires a more proactive 
approach, in order to develop the ability to anticipate threats. Hindsight has 
become a benefit that complex systems may no longer afford. Weick & 
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Sutcliffe (2007) add that high risk technologies must be controlled by 
means other than trial and error learning, as in many cases, the first error 
may also be the last trial. The challenge at hand within complex scenarios, 
is linking events that are further away in time and space than what would 
normally be the case when managing risks purely derived from technical or 
operator failures (Hale et al, 1998). Within this context, there is clearly a 
need to innovate safety practices in order to contemplate new types of 
accident aetiology. 
3.3.3. High reliability 
High reliability gained relevancy in the field of safety, as certain types of 
organisations exhibited a progressive intolerance to failure, which made 
high standards performance an imperative (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). As 
stated earlier, there are today organisations in which the cost of failure can 
be so great that it must be prevented and contained “at all cost” (Leveson, 
2004). Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) refer to high reliability organisations (HRO) 
when the potential for error and disaster has become overwhelming and 
mention as examples, nuclear power stations, air traffic control systems 
and medical emergency teams, among others. This is also consistent with 
the notion of high risk systems and the concept of normal accidents, as 
discussed by Perrow (1999). Because these are aspects in which resilience 
engineering is also founded, a brief discussion on what constitutes a HRO 
was considered relevant. 
Reliability can be defined according to different concepts, depending on the 
domain to which it applies (O’Connor, 2002). Intuitively, we regard 
something as reliable when it meets certain expectations. These 
expectations can be defined in terms of durability, absence of failures, or 
generally, an expected level of performance (safety or otherwise). 
O’Connor (2002) defines reliability as the ability of an item to perform a 
required function under stated conditions and for a stated period of time. 
High reliability therefore, corresponds to a condition in which the desired 
level of performance is achieved and maintained under the specified 
conditions and within (or beyond) the given period of time. 
Several structural, cultural or technological features are mentioned by 
different authors as sources of high reliability. Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) 
consider that the uniqueness of these systems resides in their ability to 
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continually learn from successful and flawed endeavours, and adjust 
performance accordingly. The authors identify five principles at the origin of 
this behaviour and leading to high reliability: 
x HROs have a distinct preoccupation with failure. Any lapse is treated 
as a symptom that something in the system may be performing to less 
than perfect standards. HROs encourage error reporting, as they are 
aware that, no matter how small, failures can coincide and accumulate 
towards disastrous outcome. 
x HROs are reluctant to oversimplify operating scenarios. Although 
some degree of simplification is required so that people can maintain 
focus on key issues towards success, simplifying the context reduces 
perception. HROs learn to appreciate diversity of experience and 
scepticism. 
x HROs remain sensitive to operations. This means that the 
organisation is continuously aware of its front line and the events that 
affect it. This creates a situational awareness, which enables people to 
make the continuous adjustments that can prevent error accumulation. 
x HROs are committed to resilience in the sense that they recognise the 
importance of learning through experience and build on it. Reason 
(1997) uses the expression “learning culture” to define this commitment. 
x Finally, Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) consider that HROs are deferent to 
expertise. Such organisations aim to cultivate diversity as a way to 
increase ability to cope with complexity. This enables decisions to be 
made where the specific knowledge of events and expertise exists, 
regardless of their hierarchical position. 
Similarly, Hurst (1998) states that complex systems and hazardous 
technology can be safely controlled if appropriate design and management 
techniques are followed. The author considers the following four conditions 
as necessary to create and maintain safety within the standards of high 
reliability: 
x Leadership attributes a high priority status to safety and reliability 
x Levels of redundancy are sufficient to compensate for failures 
x Decentralised authority, strong organisational culture and continuous 
training successfully reduces error rates 
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x Effective organisational learning is achieved through trial and error 
processes and complemented by anticipation and simulation 
mechanisms for potential failures 
Hurst (1998) recognises that such conditions clearly overlap with the 
characteristics of organisations with strong safety cultures. O’Connor 
(2002) not only relates high reliability with safety culture issues, but also 
considers its implications for the management of quality in industry. As later 
discussed, many of the organisational aspects here described are also 
relevant for resilience engineering. 
3.3.4. Safety culture 
The increasing awareness of factors that shape the behaviour of people 
and their decisions, as well as their resulting impact on the safety of 
organisations, has lead to a growing interest in organisational culture and in 
particular, safety culture (Hale & Hovden, 1998). Hurst (1998) generally 
describes safety culture as a set of ideas and beliefs that all members of 
the organisation share about risk, accidents and health. These shared 
values, attitudes and patterns of behaviour give the organisation its 
particular character (“the way we do things around here”). 
Safety culture issues are today widely reported in the outcome of 
investigations into several major disasters such as the one of the Columbia 
space shuttle (Woods, 2003). However, as could be observed by the author 
of this thesis in the course of the work developed at Network Rail, a great 
deal of misunderstanding remains around the concept of safety culture. 
Although people often refer to the need to improve safety culture as if this 
constituted a concrete feature of the organisation, as pointed out by Hurst 
(1998), most aspects of safety culture are intangible even though they lead 
to tangible and observable manifestations. 
Similarly to high reliability issues, safety culture is also closely related to 
aspects of resilience engineering. Because of this overlap and the evident 
need to clarify the domain of this concept, some discussion on the subject 
was considered important. 
Both Kirwan (1998) and Hurst (1998) cite the Advisory Committee for the 




The safety culture of an organisation is the product of 
the individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety management (ACSNI, 
1993). 
Hurst (1998) further points out that this definition leads to consideration of 
two important elements as constituents of safety culture: The underlying 
beliefs and attitudes towards safety, which are expressed both at an 
individual and group level, and the tangible safety manifestations through 
which these beliefs and attitudes are expressed. The relevancy for the 
management of safety resides in the strong relations between these 
tangible manifestations and the underlying elements of the culture. In order 
to shape behaviours and decisions, safety management practices must 
focus on the underlying elements of safety culture, rather than their 
manifestations (Hurst, 1998). Turner & Pidgeon (1997) add that safety 
culture encompasses the gaps between what is formally determined by the 
safety management system and the non-formalised aspects of operations. 
These are the informal strategies put in place to manage “grey areas” (the 
gaps). These strategies constitute the tangible manifestations of safety 
culture and they are developed based on experience according to the 
beliefs in terms of what is safe and unsafe of those applying them (Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997). 
The challenge becomes then the development of strategies and methods to 
identify and act upon the existing beliefs and attitudes. The purpose of an 
organisation would be to incorporate into its safety management, features 
that work towards what Kirwan (1998) considers a positive safety culture. 
According to Kirwan (1998), organisations with a positive safety culture are 
characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared 
perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of 
the existing preventive measures. Hurst (1998) considers that a good 
(positive) safety culture results from adequate resources, good 
communications and a cooperation that ensures a balance between safety 
imperatives and production needs. The focus on communications and 
cooperation derives from the importance of group attitudes and processes 
to the management of safety (Kirwan, 1998). As noted above, factors 
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shaping decision making are crucial for safety culture and most decisions 
will involve at least two people and often more. Communications and group 
factors become dominant, as the set of values and attitudes (safety culture) 
greatly influences the quality of the information flows developed within the 
organisation (Kirwan, 1998). 
As observed by Jackson (2010), there are many different approaches to 
safety culture and the only certainty is that there are no right ones and no 
wrong ones. At each place in time and for each organisation, some 
methods to approach safety culture may be more adequate and efficient 
than others. 
3.3.5. Drift into failure 
The “drift into failure” is the process through which system operations are 
progressively brought closer to the limits of safety, in a constant adaptation 
to the changing pressures of their environment. Dekker (2004) considers 
this the “greatest residual risk” in today’s sociotechnical systems and 
defines it as an incremental movement towards the boundaries of a safety 
envelope. Rasmussen (1997) discusses a “natural migration of activities 
towards the boundary of acceptable performance”, which usually precedes 
major accidents. In analogous terms, Jackson (2010) discusses drift toward 
brittleness, while considering brittleness the opposite of resilience (section 
3.4.1). Above all, this concept places emphasis on the dynamic nature of 
system operations, as Cook & Rasmussen (2005) discuss within the 
context of patient safety in health care. 
Rasmussen (1997) places the routes of this migration in the degrees of 
freedom that individuals are left with for the management of their normal 
activities and for the decisions they are confronted with. Despite the 
constraints and objectives put in place by laws, rules and procedures, 
actors at all levels of the system are left with a “work space” within which 
they are required to make decisions and manage pressures. Dekker (2004) 
considers the scarcity of resources and competition the most relevant types 
of system pressures, which can drive an organisation and people within it, 
to push the limits of safe operations. Because commercial gains at 
boundaries (limits of system capacities) tend to be greater, systems are 
driven closer and closer to limits in order to achieve and maintain success 
within dynamic environments. An every-day example of this can be found in 
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the context of car driving: people tend to drive faster and often exceed 
speed limits to get to their destination faster and save time, but by doing so 
they increase the risk of causing or having an accident. Leveson et al 
(2004) discuss the NASA “faster, better, cheaper” approach, which clearly 
illustrates the severe impacts of system pressures. While facing pressures 
to cut costs and better justify their expenditures and missions, NASA 
accelerated its launching schedules, which reduced time necessary to 
perform required maintenance and shuttle testing. The fear for the survival 
of the space programme has eroded safety procedures. Woods (2003) 
comments in regards to the Columbia accident that NASA failed to balance 
safety with intense production pressure, which resulted in a pattern of drift 
towards failure. 
The key problem in dealing with the drift into failure of complex systems is 
the difficulty in perceiving the actual shift, as well as the proximity of safety 
boundaries during everyday operations (normal work). As Dekker (2006) 
points out, from one hand, safety boundaries are themselves dynamic, 
which increases the difficulty in maintaining perception of safety margins in 
relation to operations. On the other hand, there is a more or less implicit 
consensus amongst the members of the organisation, in regards to what is 
“normal work”. Any changes in common practices (the norm) are usually 
imperceptible, as they slowly and progressively accumulate towards a new 
adjustment to pressures. Previously, Dekker (2004) stated that uncertain 
technology and incomplete knowledge of the boundaries render people 
incapable of stopping the drift or even perceiving it. 
Dekker (2004) discusses the crash of Alaska Airlines 261 flight in 2000, as 
an illustration of drift into failure. Initial reports pointed to a mechanical 
failure (snap of the tail trim system), as a result of poor maintenance. 
However, thorough investigations revealed that for more than a decade, 
decisions made at all levels of the safety system contributed for this 
outcome. Decisions involving all hierarchical levels of safety, such as 
aviation regulators, airliner and manufacturer safety and maintenance 
committees, and maintenance crews, had progressively eroded safety 
barriers and brought the system closer to safety boundaries (and beyond). 
Dekker (2004) points out that only in hindsight, decisions such as extending 
the trim maintenance intervals appear to have jeopardised safety. The 
organisational complexity that surrounded such decision processes made it 
Literature 
63 
virtually impossible to detect the way in which the equally complex structure 
of safety barriers was being weakened at different levels of the system. 
The concept of drift into failure illustrates the challenges of managing safety 
in complex systems. The drift of systems is clearly associated with 
complexity and the ability to make informed decisions in view of the 
behaviours exhibit by the system. Complexity “blurs” visibility over system 
performance and what may seem an adequate decision or course of action, 
could be leading the system towards safety boundaries (Dekker, 2004). As 
earlier described, safety is about controlling the performance of systems 
(Leveson, 2006). The fact that systems may drift beyond the mechanisms 
and procedures intended to control their performance, suggests the need 
for safety approaches more appropriate to the demands of complex 
environments. 
3.3.6. A system approach to safety 
Hale & Hovden (1998) point out the importance of major accidents (e.g. 
Three Mile Island, Bhopal or Chernobyl) in the shift of safety management 
perspectives. Investigations into major occurrences of the 19070’s and 
1980’s concluded that the bureaucratic and strict safety structures in place 
could not account for causal factors that were found to be beyond human 
and technical failures (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). The perception of the 
widening gap between systems complexity and existing safety practices 
lead to the adoption of more flexible approaches, aiming to better respond 
to the fast pace changes and heterogeneity of modern organisations. To 
this end, Hale et al (1998) discuss the self-regulation and certification 
approaches initiated in the 1970’s. The principle at stake was that 
responsibility and accountability had to fall on those creating the risks, 
rather than governments and their agents issuing regulations and 
standards to control such risks. In line with this shift in safety practices, 
aviation and nuclear power are among the first industries to develop safety 
management systems. These systems constitute an organised approach to 
managing safety (Dijkstra, 2006), and beyond supporting specific safety 
needs, they facilitate the oversight role of national authorities.  
The development of self-regulating management systems incentivised 
organisations to investment in research directed at their specific safety 
endeavours. Hale et al (1998) mention the growing interest of companies in 
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developmental studies focusing on organisational design learning and 
management. Through such studies, safety research has gained interest in 
system theories, as a way to better understand complex synergies and 
combinations of events. Hale & Hovden (1998) refer to this as the “third age 
of safety”. After a first age, during which safety focused on purely technical 
issues (initial industrial contexts), a second age with strong emphasis on 
human factors (human error and information technology), this third age of 
safety focuses on risks emerging from interactions between system 
components. 
In terms of accident analysis, an approach to safety based on system 
theories allows more complex relationships between events to be 
considered and provides a way to look more deeply at why the events 
occurred (Leveson et al, 2003). Traditional models such as event trees, aim 
at building chains of events, either by placing those at the origin as route 
causes, or at the “sharp end” as immediate causes of accidents. System 
based models consider all events at the “sharp end” of the undesired 
outcome (Hollnagel, 2004). Although a timeline remains essential to 
understand occurrences, the focus is set on the relations between events, 
rather than their sequence in time. Events are considered as parts of the 
whole rather than distinct elements. Instead of looking at accidents as an 
end result, they are considered “emergent phenomena”, as they arise from 
the combination of the concurrent events (Hollnagel, 2004). 
The work of Rasmussen (1997) explains the relevancy of system views to 
understand safety in complex environments. Rasmussen (1997) refers to 
safety sociotechnical systems, which span across legislators, managers, 
work planners and operator levels. This model was earlier mentioned when 
discussing organisational decision making perspectives (Svedung & 




Figure 3.1: Sociotechnical system involved in risk management (from Rasmussen, 
1997) 
The control of hazardous processes relies on a series of laws, rules, 
instructions and procedures that are produced and applied throughout this 
system. Rasmussen (1997) argues that in order to address risks emerging 
from dynamic social contexts, the decisions made by politicians, safety 
officers, work planners and operators, as well as the pressures that 
constrain them, must be considered within a functional approach, as 
opposed to a structural decomposition into static elements. As earlier 
discussed, decisions are triggered by conflicting circumstances that 
pressure people towards making some kind of choice. Therefore, 
Rasmussen (1997) and later Svedung & Rasmussen (1998) maintain that 
risk management in complex systems requires understanding how 
pressures at each level affect decision making, and how decisions at one 
level affect decisions of the next one. An example of this can be found in 
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the response to the devastation caused by the hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
As Westrum (2006b) discusses, despite the availability of supplies and 
resources to relieve the victims, these were not used because of authority 
disputes or breakdowns in communication. The failure of the hierarchical 
structure and its communications led to a complete stall in the system. 
Whatever possible ways there might have been to minimise the damage to 
the system and enable it to recover its operation more quickly had failed. 
Leveson et al (2003) address the same hierarchical system perspective. 
They argue that the downstream decisions such as the ones represented in 
Figure 3.1, introduce the boundaries deemed necessary to carry out the 
hazardous process within acceptable safety limits. On the upstream flow, 
information on system performance is provided to the higher hierarchical 
levels, which will then support future decisions, as necessary. Leveson et al 
(2003), define this flow of information as a safety control loop. From this 
perspective, lack of control over the system may arise whenever the 
information flow is interrupted, inaccurate or is taking too much time, 
among other information related issues. The authors point out the 
relevancy of this concept, as systems become increasing dependent on 
information technologies. 
In light of a systems approach to safety, Leveson (2004) considers that 
many accidents attributed in a recent past to human error, would be more 
accurately described as the result of inadequate system and interface 
design. Models based on system theories consider accidents as arising 
from the interactions among system components and lead to the 
investigation of multiple causal factors and concurrent events (Leveson et 
al, 2003). Woods (2003) discusses the findings of the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board and points out the identification of “holes in the 
organisational decision making”. The organisational factors identified as 
causes for such holes were not considered unique to NASA and its 
programmes, but rather “generic vulnerabilities that have contributed to 
other failures and tragedies across other complex industrial settings”. 
The integration of system theories into safety management has led to the 
recognition of concurrent risk factors and system level interactions which 
would escape “traditional” safety methods that tend to decompose events 
into linear chains of events. Because the nature of accidents has shifted, 
safety measures such as the use of “redundancy”, are becoming ineffective 
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and in many cases, adding complexity to the system (Leveson, 2004). In 
this context, research on new ways of managing safety can be considered 
a crucial endeavour for the survival of today’s complex systems. A systemic 
approach to safety appears to be more adequate to the challenges of high 
complexity, as it focuses on the dynamic nature of system interactions and 
the non-linearity of its effects (Hollnagel, 2004). 
3.4. Resilience engineering 
Resilience engineering is considered a new approach to safety 
management that focuses on how to deal with complexity (Woods & 
Hollnagel, 2006). This approach is proposed as a framework for the 
improvement of rail engineering planning, in terms of its ability to cope with 
the challenges emerging from high complexity. 
Beyond the aspects of system complexity previously discussed, the global 
scenario of resource scarcity, environmental pollution and climate change 
is also put forward as a cause for many of the serious safety and security 
threats currently faced by societies. Boin et al (2010) distinguish such 
threats from “routine emergencies” such as fires and traffic accidents, and 
characterise them as “low-chance”, “high-impact” events that can 
compromise life sustaining systems and require governmental intervention 
under high uncertainty conditions. These are the circumstances in which 
resilience is highlighted as a possible solution for the sustainability, 
reliability and safety of systems (Boin et al, 2010 and Jackson, 2010). 
The concept of resilience covers many different matters (Westrum, 2006a) 
is used across many different scientific domains. Resilience is firmly based 
in the fields of engineering, biology and psychiatry (Gunderson et al 2002, 
Jackson 2010, Vugrin et al 2010, Boin et al 2010 and Holling 2010). While 
engineering applies this concept to materials and technical systems, 
biology focuses on living organisms and systems, and psychiatry aims at 
understanding resilience from an individual perspective (Boin et al, 2010). 
This section explores resilience engineering concepts and provides the 
theoretical background that justifies its use as a framework in the context of 




Resilience is generally interpreted as the ability to recover from or to resist 
being affected by some shock, insult or disturbance (Vugrin et al, 2010). 
Foremost, given that it regards the recovery after events, this concept must 
encompass a given timeline and therefore, should be regarded as a 
process rather than a given quality. Sutcliffe & Vogus (2003) refer to 
resilience as an emerging process in organisations, which develops 
through continually dealing with risks, stresses and strains. Within the same 
dynamic perspective, Westrum (2006a) considers three conditions as the 
fundamentals of resilient situations, which Jackson (2010) later 
paraphrases as follows: 
x Avoidance relates to the ability to foresee potential threats and prevent 
something bad from happening. 
x Survival implies that the system, while experiencing disturbance, 
maintains operations, even if partially incapacitated. This means that the 
system is able to cope with ongoing trouble and therefore, prevent 
something bad from becoming worse. 
x Recovery refers to the ability of the system to repair itself and regain 
desired performance after something bad has happened. 
Jackson (2010) regards resilience as the opposite of brittleness. In this 
sense, while the purpose of resilience in systems is achieving safety, 
brittleness leads to an unsafe condition of the system. Avoidance is clearly 
the ideal system condition but as earlier observed, total absence of error is 
unrealistic within indeterminate and complex scenarios (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007 and Leveson, 2004). Hence, an organisation needs to develop 
additional capabilities as, whenever avoidance mechanisms become 
insufficient to face conditions, survival abilities should be put into action and 
recovery the envisaged goal. Jackson (2010) considers that at least two of 
these three conditions must be met in order for resilience to be considered. 
The concept of resilience, as previously described, contemplates a wide 
range of possible applications. It is clearly a trans-disciplinary aspect in 
organisations (Jackson, 2010). This becomes evident not only in the range 
of professionals that participate in groups such as the Resilience 
Engineering Network but also in the diversity of definitions found in the 
literature. In order to explore the actual diversity of applications and build 
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an appropriate understanding of the concept for this research, a literature 
survey of definitions was conducted. Keeping in mind the context of 
sociotechnical systems as the focus of this research, this survey was 
limited to the frame of systems approaches to resilience. Table 3.3 
summarises the most relevant definitions found in the literature. For 
reasons of practicality, only more explicit definitions found in relevant 
systems literature were considered. The keywords also shown in this table 
are used as indication for resilience properties in systems. These will be 
further explained in the next sections and explored throughout this thesis in 
the context of rail engineering work. 
Table 3.3: Definitions of resilience 
Authors Definition Keywords 
Adger (2000) 
in Vugrin et al 
(2010) 
Ability of groups or communities to cope with 
external stresses and disturbances as a result 




in Vugrin et al 
(2010) 
Capability of a system to maintain its functions 
and structure in the face of internal and 
external change and to degrade gracefully 






Boin et al 
(2010) 
Ability to negotiate the flux (of events) without 
succumbing to it 
Negotiate 
Comfort (1999) 
in Vugrin et al 
(2010) 
Capacity to adapt existing resources and skills 





in Vugrin et al 
(2010) 




Fujita (2006b) Utilisation of system’s potential abilities 
(engineered features or acquired adaptive 
abilities) to the utmost extent and in a 










Strength of mutual reinforcement between 
processes, incorporating both the ability of a 
system to persist despite disruptions and the 






Hale & Heijer 
(2006a) 
Ability to steer the activities of the organisation 
so that it may sail close to the area where 
accidents will happen but always staying out of 









in Vugrin et al 
(2010) 
A measure of the persistence of systems and 
of their ability to absorb change and 
disturbance and still maintain the same 










Ability of an organisation to efficiently adjust to 
harmful influences rather than to shun or resist 
them 
Intrinsic ability of a system to react to and 
recover from disturbances at an early stage, 











The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its 
functioning prior to, during or following changes 
and disturbances, so that it can sustain 












Processes, disciplines and infrastructures that 
need to be in place to make sure that 
undesired events do not happen or that 










Leveson et al 
(2006) 
Ability of systems to prevent or adapt to 
changing conditions in order to maintain 







Continued willingness to drop one’s tools in the 







Maintenance of positive adjustment under 
challenging conditions 
Ability to absorb strain and preserve or improve 
functioning despite the presence of adversity 
Continuing ability to use internal and external 
resources successfully to resolve issues 
Capacity to rebound from adversity 










Vugrin et al 
(2010) 
Inherent strength and ability to be flexible and 















Vugrin et al 
(2010) 
Ability to resist, absorb, recover from or 
successfully adapt to adversity or a change in 
conditions 
Capacity of an organisation to recognise 
threats and hazards and make adjustments 
that will improve future protection efforts and 







Vugrin et al 
(2010) 
Ability to efficiently reduce both the magnitude 
and duration of the deviation from targeted 






Walker & Salt 
(2006) 
Ability of a system to absorb disturbance and 






Intrinsic ability of an organisation (system) to 
maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, 
which allows it to continue operations after a 











Ability to prevent something bad from 
happening, from becoming worse, or to recover 







Capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers 








A paradigm for safety management that 
focuses on how to help people cope with 







Ability of an organisation (system) to keep, or 
recover quickly to, a stable state, allowing it to 
continue operations during and after a major 
mishap or in the presence of continuous 
significant stresses 
Ability to have appropriate levels of resources 
(particularly reserves) that can react to sudden 














Several of the authors mentioned in Table 3.3 (Vugrin et al 2010, 
Gunderson et al 2002, Walker & Salt 2006, among others) distinguish two 
types of resilience, which reflect different views on how humans interact 
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with and manage the world around them (Walker & Salt, 2006): 
x Engineering resilience is considered a more “classical” view, 
emanating from physics models. It assumes a system exists around an 
equilibrium state and its resilience is defined in terms of the ability to 
resist departure from, or rapidly return to that equilibrium after significant 
disturbances (Holling, 2010). From this perspective, efforts aim at 
maintaining a degree of constancy in the system by containing its 
variability. 
x Ecological resilience assumes that systems can reorganise 
themselves and therefore, contemplates the possibility of systems 
shifting from one domain of stability to an entirely different one. In this 
sense, resilience is defined by the magnitude of disturbance that a 
system can absorb (avoid) before it shifts from one set of mutually 
reinforcing processes and structures to a new one (Gunderson et al, 
2002). The focus is set on the persistency of relations among parts of 
the system. Like many plants that bend with the wind instead of stiffly 
attempting to resist it, ecological resilience assumes the possibility of the 
system shifting to new equilibrium states in order to ensure its basic 
structure and function (Walker & salt, 2006). 
Following the conditions of Westrum (2006a), both perspectives 
contemplate some form of avoidance, survival and recovery and therefore, 
could be considered within the domain of resilience. On the one hand, 
engineering resilience aims primarily for avoidance capacities (anticipation 
of threats) and would resort to recovery (and perhaps survival) capabilities 
to ensure fast return to its known stability condition. On the other hand, 
ecological resilience maintains more tolerance in the face of threats and 
endeavours mostly for survival and recovery capacities as a way to deal 
with the resulting constant change. This constitutes a fundamental 
distinction between these perspectives: While the engineering perspective 
aims to achieve and maintain a condition of stability, the ecological 
perspective aims at creating capacity to cope with variability. 
Widalvsky (2004) considers that both perspectives constitute valid and 
useful safety approaches, depending on the type of organisation and its 
activities. In line with this view point, this research adopts as a working 
definition of resilience the one given by Hollnagel (2011a), which 
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contemplates both the engineering and ecological perspectives: 
The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning 
prior to, during or following changes and disturbances, 
so that it can sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions (pp xxxvi) 
In line with the principles enumerated by Westrum (2006a), Wreathall 
(2006) considers that the expression “resilience engineering” refers to the 
development and implementation of the tools necessary to achieve and 
maintain resilience in the system. As discussed by Jackson (2010), 
engineering is here used in a broad sense and contemplates all aspects 
and features used to generate (engineer) resilience in the system. Rather 
than referring to resilience engineering, Jackson (2010) talks about 
architecting resilient systems. 
The relevancy of the engineering and ecological approaches for the safety 
of organisations will be explored in the next section, in order to clarify the 
potential benefits of resilience engineering as a safety management 
approach. 
3.4.2. Stability versus flexibility 
Widalvsky (2004) suggests that the search for constancy that characterises 
the engineering perspective defines more appropriately a condition of 
stability, rather than resilience. Widalvsky (2004) further argues that, under 
stable conditions, the future is less uncertain. In such conditions, risks can 
be known, predicted and therefore, anticipated more easily. Hence, the 
ability to anticipate threats is closely related to the existence of some form 
of operational stability in the system. If there is a well known condition of 
equilibrium in which the organisation aims to remain, then safety 
management can be built around anticipation capabilities. This is the scope 
of safety measures such as fire drills, which aim to prepare people for a 
known threat. Safety management in HROs, such as nuclear power plants, 
is an example of this evolution: Safety regulations and measures were 
added cumulatively in the attempt to anticipate new dangers (Widalvsky, 
2004). Woods & Hollnagel (2006) consider that safety practices have 
always been dominated by hindsight in the sense that their focus was set 
on preventing undesired events from happening again. This path of 
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development was based on the experience of well known and stable 
system operations, as earlier pointed out by Hale et al (1998) 
in section 3.3.1. 
System complexity has lead organisations to consider other safety 
requirements, beyond the anticipation of known events. As discussed in 
section 3.3.2, organisations face today constant pressure and must be 
capable of adapting to rapidly changing environments (Marais et al, 2007). 
Safety management must accept and recognise variability in operations 
and can no longer solely rely on the predictability and anticipation of known 
threats (Leveson, 2004). The rapidly changing environment inherent to high 
complexity requires systems to be flexible in order to adjust to new 
environmental conditions (McDonald, 2006). Dealing with variability is 
clearly in line with the principles of the ecological perspective of resilience, 
rather than the engineering one (stability), as this perspective focuses on 
the development of means to manage change and its unpredictability 
(Widalvsky, 2004). The rationale for accepting variability, as opposed to 
enforcing stability, lies with life’s inherent uncertainty and complexity 
(Widalvsky, 2004). Management under complex conditions is necessarily 
based upon incomplete understanding, and in face of uncertainty, we are 
unlikely to attain a sufficient degree of anticipation (Gunderson et al, 2002). 
Widalvsky (2004) proposes the human body as an example of ecological 
resilience and its ability to cope with change. Rather than resisting 
aggressions from the environment, the human body takes on 
contaminations and builds on them to improve its immunity. 
As argued by Gunderson et al (2002), aiming for stability requires less 
effort than considering the potential unknown threats and the need for 
flexibility. Nevertheless, an absolute stable condition could only be 
achieved through perfect anticipation (Widalvsky, 2004). As discussed in 
section 3.2.2, in order to make decisions, no matter how complex or simple 
they might be, people are forced to simplify scenarios and make 
assumptions on a number of factors. Like people, organisations must 
assume that certain aspects of their operation and their environment 
remain stable, in order to reduce uncertainty and define possible courses of 
action and make a decision (Widalvsky, 2004 and Hollnagel, 2009a). Within 
this context, even when faced with high complexity and the uncertainty of 
constant change, organisations must find some form of stability on which to 
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ground their (safety) management decisions. It is only based on stability 
that the need for change and adjustment can be perceived (Widalvsky, 
2004). McDonald (2006) further explores this by discussing the relation of 
sociotechnical systems with their environment in terms of a balance 
between stability and flexibility. Achieving stability with the physical, social 
and economic elements of the operating environment is characterised as 
an otherwise positive or successful outcome. However, rather than a static 
condition, this stability constitutes a dynamic (therefore, flexible) equilibrium 
with the system’s environment. It is only by achieving such equilibrium and 
maintaining it (therefore, having stability) that undesired variability and its 
potential for failure can be detected. Maintaining stability requires the 
capacity to adjust (McDonald, 2006). Hence, both stability and flexibility 
must be considered for the safety of complex systems. 
The arguments presented in this section towards the ability to maintain 
stability and the ability to cope with variability, suggest that the engineering 
and the ecological perspective on resilience should be seen as 
complementary. As stated by the Resilience Engineering Network, 
resilience engineering looks for ways to enhance the ability of organisations 
to create processes that are robust yet flexible (retrieved from 
www.resilience-engineering.org on 13 April, 2009). Walker & salt (2006), 
suggest that while robustness is often associated with the image of a tree 
that resists firmly, flexibility is pictured as the plant that bends with the wind. 
Stability, as the ability to primarily avoid undesired events, provides the 
means for robustness. Accepting variability means maintaining a degree of 
flexibility necessary to deal with constant change. Hutter (2010) discusses 
resilience in the German public sector and refers to the need for strategies 
for dealing with natural hazards, which are both robust enough to deal with 
partly known and unknown contexts and simultaneously, flexible enough to 
manage “radical surprise”. Resilience engineering relates to achieving and 
maintaining a balance between the need for stability, in order to achieve 
avoidance, and flexibility as a way to develop survival and recovery 
capacities. McDonald (2006) places resilience in the successful 
management of a balance between aspects that reinforce stability and 
others that work towards flexibility. Table 3.4 summarises the main aspects 




Table 3.4: Aspects of stability versus flexibility (from McDonald, 2006) 
Stability Flexibility 
Formal procedures as a way to 
develop stronger routines and improve 
coordination 
Informal work practices are developed 
on the base of local autonomy and 
consolidate it 
Centralisation can increase reliability 
by reducing the variance induced by 
individual skills and experience 
Decentralisation is at the core of 
distributed decision making 
Standardisation facilitates and 
contributes to increased product quality 
Adjustability of product standards in 
response to market or operational 
feedback and acquired expertise 
Automation of routine or complex 
functions enforces standardisation 
(normally through the use of well tested 
technology) 
Technologies that enable appropriate 
human control, rather than 
constraining it (normally requires 
innovative technology) 
 
The challenge resides in the fact that although both stability and flexibility 
are needed to achieve and maintain resilience, at some point these might 
be contradictory objectives. For instance, organisations must realise when 
and how procedures should be made robust and what informal practices 
should be allowed to enrich local autonomy and response to operating 
variability (McDonald, 2006). The opposing nature of these organisational 
aspects will require trade-offs to be made. Where decisions are made to 
formalise, centralise or standardise, opportunities for informal practices, 
decentralisation and adjustability will have to be sacrificed. Grote et al 
(2009) discuss a demand for concurrent standardisation and flexibility. This 
is approached in detail in the next sections. 
3.4.3. Managing uncertainty 
The ability to cope with the variability and uncertainty that are inherent to 
complex operations is at the core of achieving and maintaining resilience 
(Hollnagel, 2011a). As shown in Table 3.3, definitions of resilience make 
frequent references to these abilities. Grote (2004) proposes two different 
approaches for the management of uncertainty in organisations, as 




Table 3.5: Two approaches to managing uncertainty in organisations (from Grote, 
2004) 
Minimising uncertainty Coping with uncertainty 
Complex central planning system Planning as resource for local action 
Reducing operative degrees of freedom 
through procedures and automation 
Maximising operative degrees of 
freedom through local (lateral) 
coordination and cooperation 
Disturbances are symptoms of 
inefficient system design and are to be 
avoided at all cost through heighten and 
cumulative control measures 
(regulations and procedures) 
Disturbances are opportunities for the 
use and enhancement of competencies 
and for system change 
Local dependence from centralised 
feed-forward control 
Local autonomy coordinated through 
feedback control 
 
Under well known operation scenarios and the stability conditions 
described in the previous section, safety management maintained reliance 
on the ability to prevent known threats and efforts were focused on 
thorough planning and monitoring of operations, as a way to minimise 
uncertainty. Rules and procedures aimed at minimising degrees of 
freedom to people at the front end of operations and any deviations from 
planned and prescribed processes were seen by management as the need 
for further planning and monitoring as the reinforcement of rules (Grote, 
2004). Hence, as shown in Table 3.5, this is regarded as a feed-forward 
approach. From this perspective, local actors are entirely dependent on 
feed-forward control through centralised decision making (Grote, 2004). 
The realisation of new accident aetiologies such as the ones emanating 
from high complexity and system interactions, as described in section 3.3.2, 
is at the origin of new approaches to the production of rules and 
procedures. As pointed out by Grote et al (2009), although rules may be 
generally regarded as useful guides for safe behaviour, there is a growing 
awareness that over-specification of procedures and incremental 
development of rules based on past experience goes against the need for 
flexible operating conditions that become necessary to deal with 
uncertainty. Within this context, the second approach in Table 3.5 aims at 
coping with uncertainty by enabling local control. From this perspective, 
control relies on local autonomy, as actors are given as many degrees of 
freedom as possible. Local actors become responsible for necessary 
adjustments to variability conditions. As Grote (2004) points out, within this 
operational context disturbances (momentary absence of stability) become 
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opportunities for use and expansion of individual competencies and for 
organisational innovation and change. 
Similar to the conclusions made in the previous section regarding the 
necessary balance between stability and flexibility, while some measure of 
centralised control is needed to ensure an efficient organisational and 
operational coordination, a certain degree of local autonomy is necessary 
to adjust tasks to ever changing operating conditions. Perrow (1999) 
discussed this based on the concept of couplings, which describes the 
strength or degree of interdependence between system components, 
subsystems or functions. Tight system couplings are typically found in 
continuous processing plants and other systems with a strong dependence 
on sequential operations. This reflects strong central control and very 
responsive relations between system components with little or no room for 
deviations from norms and procedures. Operational processes are 
intolerant to delays and to changes in sequence (Perrow, 1999). 
Conversely, loose couplings allow to a certain extent, parts of the system to 
perform according to their own logic and needs. Perrow (1999) illustrates 
this with aircraft manufacturing, where parts of the plane are manufactured 
separately and according to their own paces and processes but everything 
must be coordinated to achieve an efficient final assembly of the aircraft’s 
fuselage. As observed earlier in section 3.3.1, the majority of current safety 
practices remain strongly reliant on strict regulations and centralised 
control. The relatively high numbers of safety norms produced by regulators 
of sectors such as the air and rail industries illustrate this. Within this 
context, most complex systems are characterised by tight couplings 
(Perrow, 1999). 
Grote (2004) proposes the development of loose couplings as a way to 
balance the need for centralised coordination and reduced uncertainty, 
against the need for local autonomy to cope with the uncertainty of complex 
systems. Grote et al (2009) discuss the balance between standardisation 
and flexibility within the railway context through a more effective 
management of organisational routines and rules. Routines are described 
by the authors as the functional means through which organisations 
attempt to reduce uncertainty and manage complexity, by increasing 
stability, managerial control and legitimacy. Routines can provide simple 
“labels” for complex action patterns (Grote et al, 2009). In this sense, 
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routines constitute a form of planning and structuring of complex tasks. As 
illustrated in Table 3.5, planning is an important element in managing 
uncertainty, either by attempting to minimise it or to cope with it. 
3.4.4. Trade-offs 
One of the most common realisations is that we cannot have everything in 
life. The immediate consequence is that people are frequently confronted 
with the need to make choices that involve giving up on one thing in order 
to have the other. This is generally described as a trade-off. Hollnagel 
(2009a) gives this concept a different level of consideration and considers it 
as a constant presence in every aspect of decision making, both 
individually and collectively within the scope of sociotechnical systems. 
From this perspective, every decision reached by a person or an 
organisation gives shape to a trade-off of some kind. Within this frame of 
mind, this section clarifies the roots of trade-offs and its relevance for 
resilience engineering. 
As observed in section 3.2.2, organisations are today confronted with 
complex choices regarding the application of their resources (Crozier & 
Ranyard, 1997). For instance, if investments are to be made in technology, 
then other necessities will have to wait for new opportunities. In a simplistic 
way, Hollnagel (2009a) describes a decision according to three 
fundamental steps that are necessary to go from the external event that 
triggers the decision process, to its resulting course of action: 
x An evaluation of the current situation and the problem at hand 
x The selection of a given course of action from a range of options 
x The execution of the chosen course of action, which amounts to 
planning the response to the initial problem 
From this view point, trading-off is fundamentally generated during 
selection, as this step shapes the kind of choices made. It should be kept in 
mind that, as discussed by Zeleny (1981), a decision process is developed 
through an iteration of multiple partial decisions before a final decision is 
reached (section 3.2.2). As a consequence, even within this simple 
representation of a decision making process, within each evaluation, 
selection or execution step, several partial decisions must be considered, 
which themselves originate trade-offs. For instance, when evaluating, 
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decisions have to be made on what information is needed or when that 
information is sufficient to build a good enough understanding of the 
situation. This substantiates the importance of trade-offs. They occur not 
just as the outcome of a decision making process, but also as a shaping 
factor throughout this same process by means of partial decisions. 
Hollnagel (2009a) describes this as the process (with trade-offs at their 
core) through which people adjust their performance, aiming to match the 
perceived conditions. 
The scarcity of resources is at the origin of every trade-off (Woods, 2006a). 
Despite any other resource limitation, as pointed out by Hollnagel (2009a), 
everything takes a certain amount of time to be accomplished and 
everything takes place in time. Hence, for the large majority of situations, 
time can be considered the most crucial resource of all. When confronted 
with a task and the need to decide, capacity limitations most often refer to 
the inability to be fast enough within the time available (Hollnagel, 2009a). 
According to Hollnagel (2009a), this places two opposed concepts at the 
core of trade-offs: 
x The need for Efficiency, in the sense that something is achieved with 
minimum expenditure of resources (in particular time), results from the 
insurmountable scarcity of resources (Hollnagel, 2009a). Because of this 
scarcity, tasks and decision making experiences pressure to keep 
resource utilisation to a minimum at all times. As noted by Woods (2003) 
in regards to the Columbia accident, under production pressure people 
develop shortcuts in reasoning, which leads to decisions being made 
based on assumptions. Although higher efficiency may be achieved, 
such shortcuts increase uncertainty and unpredictability (Hollnagel, 
2009a). 
x Conversely, Thoroughness stands for the ability to accomplish a given 
objective with disregard to any limitation. This implies that before an 
activity is carried out, there is sufficient confidence that all the resources 
and conditions necessary to achieve the intended outcome are in place 
(Hollnagel, 2009a). Hypothetically, this represents the possibility of 
carrying decision making processes through as much iteration (partial 
decisions) as desired. In practice, when carrying out rail engineering 
work, setting up site safety barriers and signs constitutes a 
precondition that aims to guaranty (or improve probability) that 
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work will be delivered safely. 
Hollnagel (2009a) refers to this as the Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off 
(ETTO) principle. Other authors, such as Dekker (2004), refer to a trade-off 
between safety and performance. While thoroughness, in principle, works 
towards safety by improving on preconditions necessary to avoid undesired 
results (achieve success), efficiency is devoted to performance 
improvement. From this, it follows that the ETTO principle is concerned with 
balancing conflicting goals, belonging to the domain of either 
thoroughness/safety or of efficiency/performance. The use of checklists 
constitutes a good example of this balancing act: By going through the 
checklist before taxiing to the runway, the pilot is reinforcing thoroughness 
(Hollnagel, 2009a). The checklist aims to improve certainty that the desired 
outcome (safety of take off and flight) will be achieved. Because a certain 
amount of time is needed to go through the checklists, efficiency is 
sacrificed.  
As pointed out by Hollnagel (2009a) it rarely (if ever) is possible to be both 
thorough and efficient at the same time. Woods (2006a) illustrates this fact 
by the “faster, better, cheaper” policy adopted by NASA and its contribution 
to the Columbia accident. As observed in section 3.3.5, the Columbia 
accident can be broadly attributed to NASA’s failure in balancing safety 
against intense production pressure, which resulted in a pattern of drift 
towards failure. While complexity and a fragmented problem solving 
process hindered the ability to develop sufficient awareness of local and 
global conditions, pressures for performance led people to trade-off in 
favour of efficiency (Woods, 2003). Based on this same observation, 
Dekker (2004) intrinsically relates trade-offs with the drift into failure of 
complex systems. As illustrated by the Columbia accident, when trading-off 
favours efficiency beyond the capacities of the system, a drift into failure 
may occur. 
From a resilience engineering perspective, the essence of a trade-off 
resides in the balance between as much efficiency as possible, so as to 
maintain operations close to safety boundaries, and the thoroughness 
necessary to ensure that such boundaries are not crossed (Woods, 2006a). 
In this regard, two capabilities are fundamental for trade-offs to contribute 
to resilience:  
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x People require information to support their decisions. Progress on safety 
ultimately depends on providing workers and managers with information 
about changing vulnerabilities (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). Only then 
people can develop awareness of how much pressure for efficiency the 
system can sustain and when it is time to ponder with more 
thoroughness on the information available, or even to search for 
additional information (sacrifice decisions). 
x Organisations need to develop ways of monitoring safety boundaries. As 
pointed out by Woods (2006a), systems need to maintain awareness 
and responsiveness to evidence of any potential shifting of decision 
criteria, which might lead the system across safety limits. 
Woods (2006a) further points out that from a resilience perspective, the 
difficulty in balancing trade-offs (“ETTOing”) is that thoroughness and 
therefore, attention to safety limits, is most necessary when performance 
pressures are higher. This means that precisely when they are most 
needed to respond to such heighten pressures, resources must be 
“sacrificed” to monitor and control the dynamics between system 
performance and safety boundaries. This is where resilience engineering 
should be placed. 
3.4.5. Functional resonance 
The theoretical foundations of functional resonance were firstly introduced 
by Hollnagel (2004). This concept was developed within the scope of a 
non-linear and dynamic approach to the safety of complex sociotechnical 
systems. Rather than the static analysis of processes or components and 
their sequences in time, the concept of function used conveys aspects of 
system performance. For the purpose of this discussion a function is 
regarded as a set of actions that a system performs towards the 
achievement of a given aim (Woltjer, 2009). From discussions at FRAM 
workshops (Functional Resonance Analysis Method – section 4.11.2), a 
function was generally described as something that transforms the state of 
the system. 
The phenomenon of resonance in system operations is related to the fact 
that performance in complex environments is inherently variable in time. 
Variability can either be the result of short-term fluctuations on resources, 
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demands or working conditions, among others, or slower and longer-term 
changes such as those depending on economical and commercial 
relations. Hollnagel (2004) places the slow drifts of systems towards “new 
norms and emerging tacit standards” within this context and considers as 
an example, the NASA processes of drift into failure (Woods, 2003). 
As discussed in section 3.1.6, operations in complex systems are normally 
underspecified. Thus, carrying out tasks requires tools and formal 
procedures to be adapted to meet unforeseen (or unforeseeable) operating 
conditions. Approximate adjustments that are made by people at all levels 
of organisations (aiming to match operating conditions) must also be 
considered as sources of variability. As observed by Hollnagel (2009a), in 
the large majority of cases, these adjustments lead to successful outcomes 
and only rarely result in undesired events such as incidents and failures. 
This is clearly demonstrated by most accident rates in complex 
sociotechnical systems, which are typically beyond 10-6 occurrences per 
number of events (Amalberti et al, 2005). Hence, performance variability 
must be regarded as a useful resource, as it normally leads to success and 
only rarely, to failure. The processes that lead to success and failure are 
essentially the same, only their outcome is different, as “failure is the flip 
side of success” (Hollnagel, 2006). 
Failure emerges when local variability produces insufficient or inappropriate 
adjustments to the variability of the environment (Hollnagel, 2006). It should 
be kept in mind that in view of the definitions given in section 3.1.1, for each 
system function, the remaining ones constitute its operating environment. 
This is systematised in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Performance variability and resonance (adapted from Hollnagel, 2008) 
Literature 
84 
The variability of a number of functions (represented by thinner lines) may 
reinforce each other (resonate – represented by the thicker line) and 
exceed limits of system capacities (represented by dashed), which are also 
subject to variability. Thus, the thicker line in Figure 3.2 should be seen as 
the sum of the thinner lines. Functional resonance results from unforeseen 
interactions between the normal variability of functions. Normal variability of 
functions are weak signals and the resonance effect they may produce is 
the detectable signal, which may or may not exceed system capacities 
(Hollnagel, 2004). 
Functional resonance emphasises the dynamic nature and non-linearity of 
performance in complex systems (Hollnagel, 2008). Based on this concept, 
accident analysis derives from an understanding of both “normal” and 
unusual functional relations in the system. Rather than aiming to eliminate 
variability, safety is built around the control of its sources and preventing it 
from assuming harmful proportions (Hollnagel, 2004). A system is in control 
if it is able to minimise to a manageable degree or eliminate undesired 
variability, or at least, that which is expected to exceed system capabilities 
(Hollnagel & Woods, 2006). The challenge then resides in providing people 
and organisations with tools to monitor not only sources of variability from 
within the system and its environment, but also changes of performance 
conditions that can lead to variations of system capabilities. 
3.4.6. Measuring resilience 
If the purpose of resilience engineering is to develop mechanisms and 
processes that can enhance system resilience (section 3.4.1), than 
adequate measurement becomes fundamental, as a way to monitor the 
success of such mechanisms and processes. 
As pointed out by Hollnagel & Woods (2006), resilience, like safety, is 
something that a system “does” rather than something that it “has”. This 
observation highlights the emergence as well as the process nature of 
resilience. It is a characteristic of how a system performs through time, as 
opposed to a quality that, once acquired, remains (Hollnagel & Woods, 
2006). This means that any means of measuring resilience must also be 
able to capture this dynamic nature of the concept through some integration 
over time. The concept of “drift into failure” (section 3.3.5) clearly 
contemplates the dynamic nature of systems. However, as pointed out by 
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Hollnagel & Woods (2006), the notion of safety boundaries is only 
metaphorical and thus, gaining perception of proximity or measuring a 
“distance” between operations and such limits becomes unrealistic. 
Resilience cannot be measured by means of verifications such as the 
adherence to standards and rules. A measure of resilience must be in 
direct relation with how a system performs, and how capable it is in 
monitoring and controlling performance throughout a given period. In this 
sense, Hollnagel & Woods (2006) consider that only the potential for 
resilience can be measured and not resilience itself. Only the processes the 
system develops towards resilience can be assessed in time. If a system 
experiences failure, it can still exhibit resilience in the form of survival and 
recovery from that failure. Conversely, if a system experiences success, it 
does not mean it will keep on doing so. This is why Hollnagel & Woods 
(2006) consider that a “constant sense of unease" is necessary for a 
system to maintain resilience, as this prevents complacency. 
The broadness of the resilience concept is implicit in its various definitions 
and can be perceived from the keywords mentioned in Table 3.3 (section 
3.4.1). Hence, resilience parameters or inferable criteria must be able to 
capture a great diversity of system features (Hollnagel, 2011a). Hollnagel et 
al (2006) and Jackson (2010) provide ample descriptions for resilience 
characteristics based on recognisable system aspects of system 
performance. In particular, Wreathall (2006) summarises characteristics for 
what could be considered a resilient system, and Hale & Heijer, (2006b) 
and Hale et al (2006) discuss possible topics for measuring and auditing 
resilience. These are shown in Table 3.6 as characteristics for resilient and 
non resilient systems. 
Table 3.6: Characteristics of resilient and non resilient systems (from Wreathall 
2006, Hale & Heijer 2006b and Hale et al 2006) 
Resilient system Non resilient system 
Top level commitment: Management 
recognises human performance concerns 
and tries to continuously and extensively 
address them 
Defences erode under production 
pressures 
Just culture: support on reporting of 
issues upwards through the organisation 
yet not adopting culpability attribution 
behaviours 
Safety is not built as inherently as 
possible into the system and the 




Learning culture: willingness to respond 
to events not with denial but through repair 
and reform 
There is not a high enough 
devotion to safety above or 
alongside other system goals 
Awareness: Data gathering that provides 
management with insights about various 
aspects of performance 
There is a failure to revise risk 
assessments appropriately as new 
evidence accumulates 
Preparedness: The organisation actively 
anticipates problems and prepares for 
them (constant sense of unease, Hollnagel 
& Woods 2006) 
Past good performance is taken as 
a reason for future confidence about 
risk control (complacency) 
Opacity: The organisation is aware of the 
boundaries and knows how close it is to 
the edge in terms of degraded defences 
and barriers 
Fragmented problem solving 
clouds the big picture 
Buffering capacity: Ability to adapt to 
new or complex problems without 
disrupting overall functionality. It requires 
that people are able to make decisions 
without having to wait on management 
instructions 
The organisation responds stiffly 
and slowly to changing demands 
and is not able to cope with 
unexpected situations 
Flexibility: Ability of the system to 
restructure itself in response to external 
changes or pressures 
Tolerance: how the system behaves near 
a boundary – slowly degrades or quickly 
collapses when pressure exceeds 
adaptive capacity 
Breakdown at boundaries 
impedes communication and 
coordination, which do not have 
sufficient richness and redundancy 
 
From the characteristics in Table 3.6, Hollnagel & Woods (2006) highlight 
three characteristics as fundamental abilities of a resilient system. These 
characteristics are aligned with the three conditions of resilient situations 
approached by Westrum (2006a): 
x Being prepared provides the ability to avoid something bad from 
happening. 
x Being flexible becomes fundamental to ensure survival under varying 
conditions and degraded modes. 
x Being adaptive supports quick recovery from disruptions and regain of 
desired performance. 
Although this constitutes useful guidance towards measuring and 
monitoring resilience, as discussed by Westrum (2006a), it still raises a 
number of questions regarding how these capabilities should be embedded 
in the system in order for it to be considered a resilient one. For instance, 
the type of events that a system must be capable of avoiding, under what 
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circumstances should it be flexible and how fast should it be capable of 
recovering, among others. 
Within the literature sources consulted on the subject of resilience, several 
other proposals are put forward as potential sources of measurement. 
Sutcliffe & Vogus (2003) consider that resilience requires the presence of 
latent resources that can be activated or recombined as new situations and 
challenges arise. Therefore, measuring the amount of latent resources, 
whether this is time, financial, or technical resource, may be one approach 
to measuring resilience. This still raises questions regarding the amount of 
latent resources necessary to face each new different challenge. Widalvsky 
(2004) argues that resilience is the ability to be vitally prepared for adversity 
and that this requires improving overall capability in a wide range of areas 
such as investigation, learning and acting, even when not knowing what will 
be called to act upon. Vugrin et al (2010) consider that the measurement of 
system resilience involves two components. The first is a systemic impact 
which is defined as the difference between a targeted and an actual system 
performance, following a disruptive event. The second component is the 
total recovery effort, which stands for the amount of resources expended 
during recovery processes, following the given disruption. 
More recently, Hollnagel (2011a) proposes four main capabilities (“four 
cornerstones of resilience”), which derive from the definition given in Table 
3.3 (section 3.4.1): 
x Knowing what to do corresponds to the ability to address the “actual” 
and respond to regular or irregular disruptions by adjusting function to 
existing conditions. 
x Knowing what to look for corresponds to the ability to address the 
“critical” by monitoring both the system and the environment for what 
could become a threat in the immediate time frame. 
x Knowing what to expect corresponds to the ability to address the 
“potential” longer term threats, anticipate opportunities for changes in 
the system and identify sources of disruption and pressure and their 
consequences for system operations. 
x Knowing what has happened corresponds to the ability to address the 
“factual” by learning from experiences of both successes and failures. 
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If by definition these four cornerstones characterise a resilient system then 
the scope of resilience engineering is to develop and manage the 
corresponding capabilities in the system. Based on these four capabilities, 
Hollnagel (2011b) proposes a Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) as a way to 
manage resilience in system. An example of a RAG is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Example of a Resilience Analysis Grid - RAG (from Hollnagel, 2009b) 
The management of resilience should be based on a balance between the 
four capabilities, as shown in Figure 3.3. This does not imply that all four 
capabilities should exist in the same proportion. As mentioned by Hollnagel 
(2011b), while for systems like a fire brigade, the ability to respond to the 
actual may be more important than to consider the potential, for others 
such as sales organisation, the ability to anticipate may be just as important 
as responding. 
The development of this grid is based on the production of four sets of 
questions that can adequately represent each of the four capabilities 
according to the specifics of the operational and organisational context 
under analysis. Generic sets of questions are proposed by Hollnagel 
(2011b). These sets of questions can then be answered with the support of 
other methods such as interviews or group discussions with subject matter 
experts, in order to produce a quantified or semi-quantified assessment of 
issues raised in the questions asked. This requires context dependent 
approaches that can relate the consideration of these capabilities at a 
system high level with operational level and concrete aspects of system 
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performance. Each domain or organisation may require its own specific set 
of tools and methods, whether these might be existing ones such as 
performance monitoring data, or new ones that need to be brought about to 
consider the requisites of a dynamic and non linear system perspective 
(Hollnagel, 2011a). 
3.5. Planning and scheduling 
As earlier described in section 2.2, the planning system is responsible for 
critical business decisions that directly affect Network Rail’s relations with 
its customers. The impact of planning on the safety and reliability of the 
engineering work delivered on the infrastructure was also mentioned in the 
introduction. Dietrich & Jochum (2004) present a number of high risk 
contexts in which several references are made to aspects of planning and 
their importance for the safety of operations. In particular, Rooij (2004) 
discusses the investigation, negotiation and planning stages in the salvage 
process of the Russian submarine Kursk, and Remmer (2004) discusses 
an accident during the construction of a highway bridge in which insufficient 
and deficient planning of work were identified as direct causes. In relation 
to organisational resilience, McDonald (2006) discusses several aspects of 
planning within the field of aircraft maintenance. This section explores the 
importance of planning and scheduling from the perspective of both 
business and organisational decision making and the safety and reliability 
of rail engineering work. 
3.5.1. Defining planning and scheduling 
In essence, planning is related to the unavoidable finite nature of 
resources. Because materials, time and money (among others) are always 
limited and therefore, cannot be made available whenever desired, 
priorities must be anticipated so that resources can be allocated 
accordingly. Increasingly complex organisational endeavours require 
equally complex work devoted to the forecasting of possible scenarios, so 
that resources and people are made available, either as a primary course 
of action or a contingency solution. Jorna & Kiewiet (2007) define planning 
and scheduling as the assigning of different kinds of entities, taking into 
account different constraints and working towards minimising or maximising 
various goal functions. From a human factors perspective, Pinedo (2009) 
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considers these activities as forms of decision making supported by 
mathematical techniques and heuristic methods that allocate limited 
resources in view of the organisational goals. 
In the tradition of the manufacturing industry, planning and scheduling have 
been approached from a relatively strict technical perspective (McCarthy & 
Wilson, 2001a). More recently, the high complexity organisational contexts 
in which frequently planning and scheduling tasks are performed has 
encouraged research aiming to explore other aspects such as human and 
organisational factors in this particular field. This has led to a more holistic 
view of planning and scheduling (McCarthy & Wilson, 2001a). Jorna et al 
(2005) provide an example of this research tendency by investigating 
planning in the Dutch Railroad Company based on the relation between the 
cognitive aspects, the organisational aspects and the support of computer 
based systems. 
3.5.2. Decision making in planning 
The role of humans in planning and scheduling has gained relevance over 
recent years. It is today recognised that improving on such functions in 
organisations requires more than dealing with mathematical problems. At 
all levels of planning and scheduling, processes still rely on people to make 
decisions and thus, understanding decision making, its constraints and 
contributing factors, becomes a fundamental step in improving the quality of 
planning and scheduling. In particular, naturalistic decision making 
approaches have been frequently used in relation to planning and 
scheduling contexts (Roland et al, 2011). 
The attempts to replace human participation in planning and scheduling by 
computer based systems have often added new complexities to planning 
and scheduling tasks. Roland et al (2011) found that planners rely on 
overall knowledge of the business to solve decision problems and on 
efficient access to information to accurately interpret the state of affairs and 
planning scenarios. Although recent systems have succeeded in facilitating 
access to information, the nature of planning tasks remains the same. Only 
people can make decisions in the face of ever-changing environments 
using information and knowledge about the current situation, perceptions 
about the future and balancing a range of pressures and demands 
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(McCarthy & Wilson, 2001a). Given its strong emphasis on decision 
making, the aspects previously described in section 3.2, in particular 
regarding distributed decision making, have a critical impact on planning 
and scheduling. 
3.5.3. Collaborative planning 
Within large scale complex systems such as the railway industry, it has 
been frequently observed that planning functions extend beyond the strict 
boundaries of organisations (McCarthy & Wilson, 2001a). The survival of 
companies requires more than ever the recognition and close interaction 
with multileveled supply chains and customers. This has been referred to in 
recent literature as collaborative planning. Windischer et al (2009) identify 
the following characteristics as determining of collaborative planning 
processes: 
x Communication of anticipated events by relating any uncertain 
information on probable occurrences and their likelihood. 
x Knowledge of reference field characteristics through the exchange of 
information regarding operating conditions. 
x Agreement on common goals and commitment to achieving such 
goals 
x Agreement on any deviations from original plan through the negotiation 
of alternatives. 
x Minimise restrictions on degrees of freedom in decision making by 
recognising planning adequacy. 
x Monitor the execution of the agreed plan and diagnose and 
disseminate any discrepancies between the plan and actual situation. 
x Coordinate opportunistic planning through explicit decision and 
agreement, and dissemination of information on resulting deviations 
from original plan. 




3.5.4. Managing pressures and conflicts in planning 
Planning is often surrounded by organisational conflicts. The way in which 
higher level plans are developed and how these determine production 
targets and the allocation of resources are often judged as unrealistic by 
those with visibility of problems at lower levels (McCarthy & Wilson, 2001a). 
This encourages deviations from prescribed schedules and practices that 
are often hidden from higher levels of the organisation. Within the planning 
of rail engineering work these conflicts are embodied by the increased 
volume of work necessary to respond to the enhanced capacity of the 
infrastructure against the reduced resources to deliver that work, in 
particular access to the infrastructure. The fact that decision making 
processes are triggered by conflicting circumstances (section 3.2) and the 
incidence of conflicts in planning reinforces the importance of decision 
making in planning and scheduling. 
3.5.5. Managing uncertainty in planning 
In line with the arguments presented in section 3.4.3, like rules and 
routines, planning can also be placed in the context of managing 
uncertainty, as it builds on foreseeable aspects of the business to anticipate 
needs (Grote et al, 2009). Crawford & Wiers (2001) discuss the instability 
and complexity of the environment as sources of uncertainty in planning 
and scheduling. The unstable conditions of the environment are mentioned 
as causes for the need to adjust or override agreed plans and schedules, 
which add to the instability and complexity of the planning and scheduling 
tasks at hand. Jorna et al (2005) make reference to the need to re-plan in 
view of unforeseen changes in operating conditions within the context of rail 
traffic control. They conclude that visibility and situation awareness are 
fundamental to support planning decisions, which requires adequate 
feedback both from within planning and from operations. Within this scope, 
Vernon (2001) describes two different types of feedback: 
x Feedback to support the development of the plan, which supports 
planning decisions that aim to anticipate what work may be feasible 
given the available resources and what may exceed capacities. 
x Feedback from operations that can relate how the plan is being or was 
carried out and report any deviations from it. 
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Although within a considerably different context (a manufacturing industry), 
Vernon (2001) highlights the importance of solid interactions between 
planning and operations as a way to guaranty reliable and efficient 
feedback sources. These interactions are described as fundamental for an 
efficient response from planning to operational needs. 
The fact that planning is often built around continuous and discrete 
processes (an intrinsic characteristic of decision making processes, as 
discussed in section 3.2) increases complexity of planning and scheduling 
activities (Vernon, 2001). Crawford & Wiers (2001) present two different 
sources of uncertainty: 
x Internal uncertainty originates not only from breakdown in the system, 
but mostly from inadequate perceptions of the company regarding 
operational timings and processes. 
x External uncertainty was related to the need to initiate operational 
processes before details of work orders from customers were fully 
known and changes in dates (supply or delivery dates) or incorrect 
outputs at different levels of the supply chain. 
3.6. Summary of literature 
This chapter introduced the areas of literature relevant to support the 
investigation of planning in rail engineering and the application of resilience 
engineering concepts in this context. Section 3.1 identifies features of high 
complexity compatible with the description of rail engineering planning 
developed in chapter 2. The variability and uncertainty inherent to complex 
environments was highlighted and the concept of intractability introduced 
some its consequences to system operations (Hollnagel 2009a). The 
underspecification of operations in complex systems is identified as one of 
the most relevant aspects. The fact that operations are partly unknown, not 
only contributes to uncertainty, but it also generates the need for 
approximate adjustments to meet unforeseen operating conditions 
(Hollnagel, 2009a). 
The concept of distributed decision making was placed in the context of 
complex sociotechnical systems (Schneeweiss, 2003) and described as the 
core element of planning and scheduling activities (Roland et al, 2011). As 
pointed out by McCarthy & Wilson (2001a), only people can make 
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decisions in the face of ever-changing environments, such as those in 
which complex sociotechnical systems operate (Fujita, 2006a). As 
described in chapter 2, the wide range of resources and expertise involved 
in delivering an operational railway have generated strong 
interdependencies between train operators, Network Rail and engineering 
contractors, among others. As will later be discussed (section 5.2), decision 
making processes are today distributed across a multitude of stakeholders 
both from within Network Rail and the wider industry. This distributed 
nature of decision making is at the origin of the concept of collaborative 
planning described in section 3.5.3 (Windischer et al, 2009). The 
understanding of the role of decision making processes in planning was 
particularly important for the definition of performance indicators for rail 
engineering planning and for the subsequent quantitative analysis of 
planning data (analysis of planning archives as discussed in section 4.7). 
Literature on resilience engineering demonstrates the importance of 
understanding interactions, not just within the system under analysis, but 
also those occurring between the system and its operation environment 
(McDonald, 2006). Keeping in mind that the focus of this research is the 
engineering planning system, the remaining engineering features and 
functions within Network Rail stand as the immediate environment with 
which planning interacts. This immediate environment was described in 
chapter 2 together with the main planning features. Apart from the 
investigation of resilience in planning and its measurement, this knowledge 
supported the study of planning as a complex system and the 
understanding of its sources of variability and uncertainty. In particular, 
given that resilience is a property of the system which emerges from the 
way in which it performs (Hollnagel & Woods, 2006), understanding 
planning performance becomes an important research scope. 
In view of the research objectives stated in section 1.2, Table 3.7 
summarises the main research questions derived from the literature. Given 
the exploratory nature of the work in this thesis, other questions were 





Table 3.7: Main research questions derived from literature 
Objective 1 
x How is the planning process framed within Network Rail’s 
organisational structure and within the rail industry? 
x What are the boundaries of planning? 
x What are the main trends of planning performance? 
Objective 2 
x What are the main constraints to planners’ decision making? 
x What are the main resources used by planners to deal with 
constraints?  
x How do the planning process and its organisational structure 
support or hinder decision making processes? 
Objective 3 
x What are the main trends in work delivery performance? 
x What are the different trends in the relations between planning 
and work delivery? 
Objective 4 
x How does variability and uncertainty express itself in the planning 
system? 
x What are the sources of resilience in planning? 
Objective 5 
x What aspects of planning performance can potentially support the 
development of resilience indicators? 




4. Research methods 
This chapter provides a description of the research methods used, in order 
to build a comprehensive and overall view of the project and its rationale. 
Based on the research context (chapter 2) and the literature background 
provided, a system framework was initially developed in order to place the 
engineering planning system within its wider organisational context. The 
research methods are then detailed. For each method, the specific 
research activities are described (within a table format) and traced back to 
the main objectives stated in the introduction. 
4.1. System framework 
The impact of planning on business decisions was clarified in chapter 2. 
From a resilience engineering point of view, this requires considering 
interactions between the planning system and business decision making 
functions as relevant research elements. This is also in line with the 
systems approach to safety as proposed by Rasmussen (1997) and 
previously illustrated in section 3.3.6. Following this same perspective, 
Figure 4.1 systematises the system framework proposed for this project 
and traces the planning system within its wider organisational scope. The 
development of this framework was based on the initial familiarisation work 
and contacts with daily work activities at Network Rail, and was verified 
against organisational diagrams available within the company’s data 
systems. In order to make this illustration comprehensible, the hierarchical 
structure depicted was simplified by restricting it to the functions and 
system components with which planning can develop potentially relevant 
interactions. Boxes represent such components and functions and a brief 
description of their nature is provided in the bullet points alongside. 
Interactions are represented by arrows. Where these are predominantly 
based on negotiations two-way arrows are used to express the bidirectional 




Figure 4.1: Systems framework to illustrate content and context of research 
This research focuses on the engineering planning system, which from 
Figure 4.1, can be considered a sub-system of engineering. In the same 
way, the engineering function can be described as a sub-system of 
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Network Rail’s organisational structure and of the wider hierarchical 
structure of the rail industry. 
As discussed in section 3.1.1, the boundaries of a system are determined 
by the interactions considered and the scope of its description and analysis 
(Hollnagel, 2009a). In line with this notion, the interactions marked with 
numbers in Figure 4.1 are considered to be within the scope of this 
research and as determinants of the planning system boundaries: 
1) Safety regulations and standards that work delivery must comply with 
and therefore, planning must enforce. For instance, this means that 
planning must contemplate the need to set up the necessary site 
protection arrangements before work can commence. 
2) Maintenance, renewals and enhancement work packs details, in line 
with both maintenance standards and investment plans. 
3) Network access negotiations with TOCs and the resulting volume of 
access available for engineering work. 
4) Reconciliation and negotiation of work envisaged for delivery and the 
available volume of engineering access. 
5) Development of work delivery plans, allocation of resources and 
verification against resources availability (including access). 
6) Feedback on success or failure of delivery, and on condition of 
infrastructure assets. 
4.2. Participant observation 
As stated in the introduction, the planning of rail engineering work remains 
relatively unexplored, particularly when considering its important role in 
critical business decisions and impact on the service Network Rail provides 
to its customers, as this directly depends on the conditions and 
performance of the infrastructure. From a methodological point of view, the 
low level of previous knowledge developed on planning justified an 
emphasis on exploratory work, in order to achieve adequate familiarisation 
with various structures, roles and functions involved in planning, as well as 
identifying its critical issues and problems. The full time presence of the 
author at Network Rail’s central offices, as a member of the Ergonomics 
National Specialist Team (NST), itself placed functionally within 
Engineering, facilitated access to data at all levels of the organisation and 
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offered the necessary conditions for ample exploratory studies. This 
presence and the daily contact with numerous railway activities that it made 
possible, led to the development of research methods around the 
perspective of a participant observer. 
Given the importance of participating, listening and observing daily 
activities, in particular for the development of the interview processes, the 
methods used in the course of this research can be considered as of an 
ethnographic nature. As stated by Hammersley & Atkinson (2007), 
participation and observation are necessary conditions for ethnographic 
studies. The following aspects of the methods used in this research are 
consistent with what Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) describe as features of 
ethnographic work and the perspective of a participant observer: 
x All studies developed focused on everyday contexts (“in the field”), as 
opposed to conditions created or simulated by the researcher. 
x A diverse range of data sources was used and data collection was 
relatively unstructured in the sense that it did not originate in a fixed and 
detailed research design. This is perceptible in the interview processes 
(familiarisation and semi-structured interviews - sections 4.3 and 4.5). 
Both the design of interviews and the analysis of its data were grounded 
on the participative and observational work and therefore, are strongly 
context dependent. 
x All methods aimed at facilitating in-depth analysis of issues, in contrast 
to large scale studies. In this sense, the interviews and questionnaire 
(section 4.10) approaches used relatively small samples and data 
analysis was strongly oriented to qualitative methods. The analysis of 
planning meeting minutes (section 4.7.1) favoured the interpretation of 
the identified sequences of planning activities, rather than the 
quantification of any aspects. Although archival data analysis, including 
safety data, was aimed at developing a more quantitative approach, the 
investigation of control logs (section 4.8) greatly relied on interpretative 
work and focussed on descriptive rather than inferential statistics. 
This methodological approach clearly contributed to more in-depth 
understanding of planning and its problems, and allowed for its 
interpretation in view of the larger system context. However, despite the 
support of formal methodological approaches, at some points access to 
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information was possible merely by the presence and participation of the 
author in meetings or other daily work activities of the Ergonomics NST, 
such as contributing to other on-going projects in which the team was 
involved. As pointed out by Murphy (2002), this creates difficulties in tracing 
back sources of information and reproducing a clear methodological 
approach. 
4.3. Research conceptual framework 
With the approach of participant observation as a main methodological 
background, several other steps were developed towards achieving the 
main goals stated in section 1.2. As argued in section 2.3, the purpose of 
the planning process is to produce information that can support a safe and 
efficient delivery of engineering work. Thus, investigating resilience in 
planning must also be placed in perspective of the way in which planning 
supports work delivery. Within this frame, research methods aimed to 
develop an in-depth understanding of planning whilst interpreting its main 
issues in view of their relations and potential impacts on work delivery. This 
approach would then support investigation of resilience in planning.  
The three chapters presenting results derived from of several methods 
emphasise this orientation of the research methods: 
x Understanding engineering planning (Chapter 5) 
x Understanding engineering work delivery (Chapter 6) 
x Understanding and measuring resilience in planning (Chapter 7) 
Figure 4.2 shows the different methodological steps developed in this 




Figure 4.2: Research conceptual framework 
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The arrows in Figure 4.2 illustrate how methods used earlier in the project 
supported the following ones, leading to the understanding of the three 
main data areas. A basic description for each method is given in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter and where relevant, additional details 
are provided in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
4.4. Familiarisation interviews 
Familiarisation interviews used an open structure, aiming to capture key 
aspects in both planning and work delivery on broad topics of discussion. 




x Broad description of engineering planning (1) 
x Initial steps towards identifying critical human factors and 
organisational issues (2) by supporting the development of the 
semi-structured interview process 
x Understand the point of view of stakeholders on planning (3) 
 
4.4.1. Familiarisation interview with planning 
One interview was carried out with a senior planning manager at NAU. 
This particular contact was suggested by members of the Ergonomics 
Team as a planning expert. The person in question had several decades of 
experience in planning and a “life time” of work in the railway industry. This 
interview formed the base of initial contacts with the planning organisation 
and its members, and provided an overall understanding of the process and 
its main issues. 
The documents produced by Network Rail for the management of planning 
were used as guidance in this first step. In particular the business process 
document PL0056 (Work & possession planning for the railway 
infrastructure – ref. NR/SP/MTC/0056) provided an overview of roles and 
the range of steps involved in planning. This document presented a set of 
17 formal meetings as the core of the planning process. Through these 
meetings, engineering work is progressively detailed towards its delivery. 
The interviewee was asked to describe planning “step-by-step”, following 
the process embodied in these 17 meetings. Information was collected on 
the base of a “paper and pencil” register of the main characteristics given 
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by the interviewee for each of these 17 meetings. Diagrams of the planning 
structure taken from Network Rail internal working documents were 
provided by the interviewee and also used to write down additional details 
regarding the its overall organisation. The following specific objectives were 
considered for the interview: 
x To better understand the formal planning process and the roles played 
by each of the stakeholders.  
x Understand the information flows and identify the main interactions 
within the planning process and between planning and its operating 
environment. 
4.4.2. Familiarisation interviews with planning stakeholders 
A total of 10 interviews were carried out, oriented towards obtaining 
support information and general guidance. The purpose was to capture the 
views of people dealing with the output produced by the planning 
organisation (delivery plan published in the WONs). Three different roles 
were considered relevant, which in practice, can be considered as the “end 
consumers” of planning:  
x PICOPs are responsible for the management of the “engineering side” of 
delivery. Three PICOPs from London Bridge MDU were interviewed. 
x Signallers are responsible for implementing all operations and must 
coordinate with PICOPs during engineering work. Signallers are the 
individuals granting the PICOP access to the infrastructure and 
guaranteeing that all the necessary safety conditions to carry out work 
on the line are met. Two signallers from London Bridge signal box and 
four from Liverpool Street signalling centre were interviewed. 
x Route controllers oversee all aspects of operations and therefore, must 
be kept informed on the development of any on-going work delivery, 
including incidents or irregular occurrences. Control centres maintain 
records on all aspects potentially affecting operations, which include 
registers on requests for late changes (proposed after T-6) submitted by 
the planning system. One manager from Anglia route control was 
interviewed. 
Interviewees were asked to comment on the main issues regarding the 
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output produced by the planning organisation and its impacts on work 
delivery. A “paper and pencil” register of information was also used for 
these interviews. No specific structure or questionnaire was developed for 
these interviews but three major topics were used as guidance: 
x What are your views on the planning process? What do you know about 
it? 
x Does planning support you in performing your duties? What are the 
good and bad things you see in it? What information would you consider 
useful as a plan? 
x Any additional comments 
4.5. Semi-structured interviews with planners 
Engineering planning remains a relatively unexplored area of the business. 
Although familiarisation interviews provided initial guidance, a more 
thorough and oriented approach was needed to clearly identify planning 
problems and general issues. In line with the concepts discussed in section 
3.5, this should aim to explore aspects of system complexity in planning 




Detailed description of the planning system (1) 
Identification of main issues and understanding what problems are 
experienced by planners (2) (3) 
Develop an initial understanding of the scope for resilience in 
planning (4) 
Understanding the relations between planning and other areas of 
the business related to engineering, in particular the impacts of 
planning on work delivery (6) 
 
The purpose of this interview process was to investigate and explain 
planning activities and their main problems. This is in line with the approach 
of participant observation previously described (section 4.2), and with the 
principles of grounded theory in qualitative research, as the method and the 
analysis of the data obtained were constructed from the “immersion” of the 
researcher in the context under study (Hayes, 2000). Stratton (1997) further 
considers that even when a constructivist approach is used (building on 
methods as knowledge and data accumulates), some kind of framework or 
theory about the context under analysis is necessary to perceive and 
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understand that context. From this perspective, the outcome of the 
familiarisation interviews was used as a framework, not only to develop the 
structure of these interviews, but also to trace back the meaningfulness of 
the subsequent analysis process. 
15 semi-structured interviews were carried out with members of the 
planning organisation based on the 10 topics of discussion shown in Table 
4.1. These topics were mainly derived from the outcomes of the 
familiarisation interview with NAU planning manager and consultation with 
subject matter experts within the Ergonomics Team. 
Table 4.1: Questions generated for interviews with planners 
1 Can you tell me about your job (daily tasks, duties)? 
2 Can you explain the planning process from your point of view? How would you describe your influence/role in the process? 
3 How often would you say your job changes? How does it change? Have the tools changed? The information sources or formats? The decision-making? 
4 
Do you normally feel confident regarding the outcome of the planning 
activities in which you take part? Can you identify any recurrent 
uncertainties that you are faced with? (If so) How do they manifest 
themselves? How do you deal with them? Do you look to obtain feedback? 
How do you ensure you have reached your goal? 
5 What would you say are your main skills and competencies? Do you feel they improve with your job experience? 
6 
How would you describe the overall set of rules and procedures applicable 
to the planning process? Are there any which you would consider to have a 
particularly significant impact over the planning process (safety critically or 
otherwise)? Do you feel these rules and procedures support you in the 
performance of your duties? 
7 
What type of information do you use most? How important is it in your job? 
What sources you mainly use? Would you consider that the production of 
information for others is an important part of your job? 
8 
What do you consider the current major challenges to be for track work 
delivery? How does the planning process respond to those challenges? In 
particular, what are your views in the way changes in the planning emerge 
and how they are managed? 
9 
What does resilience mean to you? Considering resilience as a property 
that enables the system (engineering work) to resist and recover from 
unexpected variations and pressures from its environment, how would you 
characterise the planning and work delivery processes in these terms? 
10 
Throughout your professional experience in this area, what do you consider 
the major achievement within the planning process? What success stories 
come to your mind? What failures? 
 
Interviewees were selected based on recommendations and contacts 
provided by the NAU planning manager. As a complement to these 
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contacts, the initial aim was to interview people for each existing planning 
job and, where possible, from different regions of the country. However, 
because job titles and roles were found to vary significantly from one part of 
the country to another, this sampling method could not be used. Using 
Network Rail’s internal address book, emails were sent to all people in 
identifiable planning jobs. Based on received responses, attempts were 
made to schedule meetings for interviewing, giving priority to either jobs 
described by the NAU planning manager as more relevant, or to those on 
which little information was available. Overall, the aim was to cover as 
thoroughly as possible: 
x Different levels of the planning process (long, medium and short term) 
x The key planning jobs and functions 
x Different geographical structures of planning 
Interviews were audio recorded for later transcription and analysis. A 
tabular analysis approach (Tukey, 1977) was developed for data analysis, 
using the 10 topics as an initial grouping structure. This process gave way 
to a more systematic organisation of information, which, following the 
approach outlined by Stratton (1997) in terms of attribution, supported the 
extraction of recurrent issues in the interviews, as well as disparities. To 
ensure the accuracy of data, the information extracted from recordings was 
reviewed by the researcher and whenever necessary, the person 
interviewed was contacted again for additional clarification. This gave way 
to an iterative process of analysis and revision, which allowed further detail 
on significant issues. 
This iterative reviewing also informed upcoming interviews. Although the 10 
topics of discussion were maintained throughout the entire process, 
significant issues were highlighted and used for additional discussions with 
other interviewees to verify their pertinence and further develop them. This 
approach did not necessarily increase the duration of interviews as the 
added information improved familiarisation with planners’ terminology and 
personal views, which helped to make discussions more focused. Again, 
this is consistent with a grounded approach, as interviews were oriented by 
inductive principles, rather than deductive ones (Hayes, 2000). 
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4.6. Observations of engineering work delivery 
Observation of real work contexts was earlier described as a fundamental 
research approach. Following up on processes of work delivery contributed 
to the understanding of what work details and needs must be anticipated 
and thus foreseen by planning. Together with the knowledge on planning, 




Understanding the impacts of planning on work delivery (3) and 
what could define successful planning (6) 
 
Observations of work delivery provided opportunity for familiarisation with 
processes and broad issues, mainly around the following activities: 
x Taking possession of the line and setting up of protection 
arrangements 
x Control of train and machine movements in, out and within 
possession 
x Hand back of line possession and removal of protection arrangements 
Observations were carried out during site visits made by the researcher 
and other members of the Ergonomics Team, in cooperation with trials for 
new engineering work protection arrangements (see Schock 2010). In total, 
7 different trial scenarios and 2 “rule book” possessions were visited. Each 
of these scenarios provided from five to seven hours of observation. 
Observations were centred on the roles of the PICOP and signaller and 
oriented by recording of incoming and outgoing communications during 
these activities. Hence, although some time was spent out on site (on the 
line), observations were mostly carried out in the PICOPs’ office within the 
MDU facilities or within the signal box for signaller observations. Whenever 
communications were taking place, their time and duration were registered 
in an Excel spreadsheet, together with a broad description of the purpose 
of communication. Purpose was normally deduced from the information 
transmitted. Whenever clarifications on the contents of communication 
were necessary, the people being observed were queried on the issues, 
once communication terminated. These trials were also an opportunity to 
carry out informal and open interviews with people performing these duties. 
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4.7. Planning archives analysis 
Archival information gave access to a historical perspective of planning. As 
discussed in section 3.5.2, decision making plays a crucial role in planning 
and scheduling activities. The analysis of records on all decisions reached 
in the process of building work items into an Annual Integrated Work Plan 
(AIWP), and in their detailing towards delivery, produced valuable insight 
on planning performance. Using a similar approach to archives on work 
delivery, planning performance trends were then investigated against 
delivery performance. Keeping in mind that planning must aim at supporting 




Understand (1) and Assess planning performance (3) and identify 
performance trends in planning that could indicate higher or lower 
degrees of success (4) 
 
An overview of the contents of engineering data available within Network 
Rail systems, together with insight provided by planners during the 
interviews, identified two main sources with potential for a retrospective 
analysis of different aspects of planning performance: Planning meeting 
minutes and Possession Planning System (PPS). While meeting minutes 
provided a relatively small sample of data but with extensive details on 
changes made and their actual sequence throughout the planning process, 
PPS provided higher level and less detailed information but on a systematic 
and national base to produce performance comparisons. These sources 
were earlier described in section 2.4. 
4.7.1. Planning meeting minutes 
Meeting minutes contain a detailed record of all changes from one planning 
meeting to the next. The Analysis of these records supported the 
reconstruction of the sequence of planning changes in detail. The level of 
detail available made it possible to rebuild the decision making processes 
leading up to the sequences of planning changes for any given possession 
and its worksites. At each planning meeting, based on printouts from the 
Possession Planning System (PPS) which resemble the contents of the 
WON (Appendix 1), planners noted all the additions, amendments and 
cancellations to the listed items. 
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The decision processes traced back were represented as a timeline within 
an Excel spreadsheet, as illustrated in Appendix 3. Following the 
perspective of Kirwan (1998), this could be considered a task analysis 
approach that can contribute to understanding the implications of decision 
making for safety management. Hence, despite the difficulty in processing 
hand written information, due to occasional lack of clarity in presentation 
and writing, there was ample added value in this approach towards better 
understanding of planning. 
Given the level of detail involved in this analysis and the time necessary to 
process all the information, this approach was developed based on data 
regarding a part of the planning process and for one section of track within 
a given engineering area. As each ADPU is required to maintain these 
records within lever arch files for a period of several years, a sampling 
method was necessary to filter the volume of information available. The 
support of the Milton Keynes ADPU was fundamental for this process. 
Informal discussions and consultations with planners at this ADPU provided 
the necessary initial guidance for the sampling of a relevant period of time 
and of appropriate stages within the planning process. Planners were 
asked to identify any outstanding periods of the year for planning, whether 
by having to face higher demands or increasing problems, or having to plan 
for higher volumes or more complex work. 
4.7.2. Possession Planning System 
Although providing fewer details, PPS maintains records for all changes 
made to possessions and worksites formally submitted to planning at 
national level. The fact that it is a software database allowed a simpler and 
more systematic data collection. Records for all the changes made for the 
planning of three different delivery weeks and at national level, were 
extracted from this system to quantify several aspects of planning 
performance. This supported the identification of planning trends by 
comparison amongst the different geographical structures of planning. 
The records extracted from PPS essentially consisted of a list of the inputs 
made (created, amended or deleted) together with the corresponding 
parameter (details, Blocked line, route, isolations and on-track 
requirements) and the entry date. The information extracted was 
considered sufficient to respond to the stated objectives, as it gave way to a 
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quantification of the main types of changes and the calculation of the 
duration of planning for each possession and worksite. 
Table 4.2 recalls the types of information previously described in section 
2.4.1 (Table 2.3) and introduces three other parameters used to quantify 
the duration of planning. 
Table 4.2: parameters used for the analysis of PPS data 
Planning changes 
Details 
Additional remarks regarding traffic (time and head codes of 
engineering trains scheduled for a given possession) or any 
specific work details (key staff contact numbers, critical safety or 
deliverability issues) 
Blocked line Line which will be blocked to train services during possession (up 
or down line, fast or slow line, among other designations) 
Route Section of route on which work will be taking place and therefore, 
will be blocked to train services 
Isolation 
Input only required for worksite entries, providing details for electric 




Input only required for worksite entries, providing details of any on-
track machinery that will be operating within the given worksite 
Duration of planning 
Created The number of weeks before delivery at which the referenced item 
was inputted into PPS 
Closed The number of weeks before delivery at which the referenced item 
registered the last change in PPS 
Duration of 
planning 
The number of weeks during which the item was undergoing 
planning, calculated as the difference between the week of 
creation and the week of closure 
 
The parameters and their respective input were listed by columns in Excel. 
Figure 4.3 represents the columns created and their contents. To better 
illustrate the data produced, Appendix 4 shows an extract from the tables 




Figure 4.3: Excel structure of PPS historic data 
The quantification of the listed data was achieved by means of Visual Basic 
programming. The program was designed to count not only the number of 
worksites associated with each possession extracted, but also the numbers 
and types of changes made to each of these. Using the dates for the first 
and last entries, the duration of planning of each item was then calculated 
in the same spreadsheet. The counts made by the Visual Basic 
programming were registered in a table within the same Excel Workbook. 
Table 4.3 represents the structure of the tables generated in Excel. The 
Visual Basic program would generate the count corresponding to each 
parameter and for each of the WON areas (listed across the columns to the 
right in the Excel worksheet). 
Table 4.3: Structure of the tables generated by the Visual Basic programming 
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The quotients between the changes made (amendments and deletions) 
and each parameter created, provided a ratio of the volume of changes 
that could be used to compare all areas. The overall volume of change 
gave the number of amendments and deletions against all items, blocks 
and routes created (plus isolations and on-track requirements for 
worksites). The number of changes per possession or worksite reflects the 
amendments made to the traffic and general remarks or other specific 
delivery information, as detailed above in Table 4.2. An estimate for the 
total number of worksites planned by each area was produced, based on 
the product of the number of possessions published by the number of 
worksites per possession in the sample. This offered an overview of the 
volume of planning work carried out by each area. 
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The identification given to each worksite was also extracted from PPS, as it 
provided a broad description of the type of work to be delivered. Although 
this broad engineering identification gave little information regarding the 
actual planning of each type of work, this was thought to provide an 
additional basis for comparison between areas. The different types of work 
initially extracted from PPS were then grouped into major categories in 
order to facilitate analysis. This grouping aimed to distinguish different 
degrees of planning complexity rather than types of work from an 
engineering perspective. To this purpose, it was assumed as a basic 
principle, that the more resources are required and the larger is the scale 
and complexity of a type of work, the more complex its planning tends be. 
For instance, according to this principle, structures and major projects work 
is assumed to impose more demands on planning rather than inspection 
and patrolling work. Table 4.4 establishes the correspondence between the 
different types of work identified in PPS and the major categories created 
on the base of this principle. The familiarisation work previously carried out 
(interviews and observations) and the understanding of engineering work it 
provided supported the creation of these categories. 
Table 4.4: Categories for the type of work planned 
Major 
categories Type of work Description 
Asset related 
work 
Ballast work Work involving cleaning and replenishing or 
replacement of ballast 
Cable work Repairing or replacement of electrical or 
signalling cables 
E&P work Work involving installation or repairing of 
electrical and power supply systems 
OHL work Work on the Over Head Line electrical 
equipment 
Rail changing Small scale rail renewal 
Rail stressing Management of continuous welded rail 
stress 
S&C 
maintenance Maintenance of line Switches and Crossings 
S&C work Renewal or installation of line Switches and Crossings 
S&T work Work on Signalling and Telecoms equipment 
Stone blowing 
Clearing of ballast to prevent it from blocking 
the movement of points or causing other 
damage to assets 
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Patrolling Line walk-through work by maintenance 
P-way inspection Inspection of Permanent-Way (line) assets 
URFDO 
inspection 
Inspection of rail condition by means of 





Work in stations, usually affecting platforms 
or substantial structural modifications, 
requiring protection of the line 
Structures work Work on structural elements on or near the line such as bridges 




Work related to major projects that involves 
the finishing of details on renewed assets 
and clearing of project areas 
Preparatory work 
Work carried out in relation to projects 
aiming to prepare areas for major work 
(clearing access points, delivering materials, 
among others) 
Survey work 
Work normally associated with major 
projects that aims at collecting site 
information necessary to support detailed 
planning of delivery 
Major 
projects 
Major projects Major asset renewals or constructions 
Re-signalling 
work Replacement of signalling assets 
Non-asset 
related work 
Litter & graffiti Clearing and cleaning of the line and line 
side 
Vegetation 
clearance Clearing of vegetation on or near the line 
Off-track work Work carried out near the line (line-side) and therefore, requiring protection arrangements 
 
4.7.3. PossMan 
PossMan also manages planning information, in particular, engineering 
details that are necessary to coordinate delivery of work within the 
possession (i.e. train and machine movements, among others). Despite the 
relevance of such information, PossMan only records the final 
arrangements for delivery, which means that the detail of decisions and 
changes made during this stage cannot be traced back. Also the extraction 
of data from PossMan required editing privileges, which could not be 
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granted to non-planning staff. Hence, PossMan was consulted on different 
occasions, aiming to better understand the type of support it provided to the 
last stages of planning, but it was not considered as a primary data source. 
A sample of the contents of PossMan which were made available for 
consultation is shown in Appendix 5. 
4.8. Safety data analysis 
As observed in section 2.3, the purpose of engineering planning is to 
produce information that can support an organised, safe and efficient work 
delivery. Hence, the success of planning can only be interpreted in view of 
the support it provides to delivery. Safety data sources were investigated in 
order to assess the extent of the impacts of planning on work delivery. 
Together with planning archival data, this supported the investigation of 
different trends in the relations between planning and work delivery based 
on a geographical comparison amongst areas. 
Specific 
objectives 
Understand the impacts of planning on delivery and support the 
understanding of planning performance (1) (3) 
 
In collaboration with work carried out by the Ergonomics Team for on-going 
engineering projects (TOP - Track Occupancy Permit, in Schock, 2010), 
safety data sources had already been studied by the researcher, focusing 
on the identification of human factors issues as causal factors for 
possession irregularities and incidents. The outcome of this study was 
included in confidential reports submitted by the Rail Human Factors Group 
of the University of Nottingham to Network Rail. The work developed then, 
recognised control logs as the most suitable data source. As with many 
safety data systems in the large majority of industries, very little attention is 
devoted to causality factors such as human factors issues and system level 
interactions. As a consequence, most planning implications for the safety of 
track work delivery are overlooked in the safety records of the rail industry. 
Hence, despite the increased difficulty in interpreting free text descriptions 
of events and the potential ambiguity of such sources, in most cases, 
control logs provided enough information on events for tracing back to 
relevant planning issues. The contents of control logs are illustrated in 
Appendix 6. 
Control logs concerning possession failures were extracted from Network 
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Rail’s data systems. The structure under which control logs are published 
provided four sections with potential relevance for this scope: 
x Irregular working – Maintenance 
x Irregular working – Investment 
x Irregular working – NDS 
x Significant possession problems 
Most work delivery failures are registered under the “possession problems” 
section. The remaining three sections, although specifically dedicated to 
the register of irregular work, were considered useful, as often the 
description of irregularities would provide details on planning related causal 
factors. 
Because of their free text format, control logs frequently contain insufficient 
information to develop a thorough causal analysis and in particular, to 
clearly identify planning related issues. In order to make the most use of the 
information available, two different levels of coding were used to distinguish 
between what were clearly stated facts and the interpretation of log 
contents: 
x A first level classified clearly stated facts drawn from logs in terms of 
cause and outcome of the described events. 
x A second level of coding was used to classify planning issues that 
could be deducted in light of the overall understanding of engineering 
work. 
The second level of coding provided a less meticulous classification 
method. However, based on the understanding of the railways already 
acquired, the interpretation of control logs contents was considered 
sufficient to produce useful insights on planning issues. As earlier 
discussed, this is in line with the principles of ethnographic studies and the 
inherent interpretative work. Whenever information was deemed 
insufficient, logs were classified as being non-related to planning or 
providing insufficient evidence to support any such relation. Table 4.5 




Table 4.5: Categories created for the analysis of control logs 
Causes (first 
level) Description 
Planning failure Control log clearly identifies the insufficiency of planning as the main or an immediate cause for possession failure 
Equipment failure Track equipment and machinery or train failures 
Extreme weather Possession disruptions caused by severe weather 
Staff shortage Severe possession staff absences 
Points run 
through 
Damage to points caused by irregularities during the 
movement of engineering trains and on-track plant within the 
possession 
Cable damage Damage caused whilst carrying out other work such as digging or ballast work 
Other asset 
damage 
Damage to other infrastructure assets in course of unrelated 
work 
Late start 
Possession is taken or work is started late due to late running 
service trains or late arrival of staff or engineering machinery, 
among others 





Possession extended beyond its duration 
Additional work Additional work was needed to repair or recover from original possession failure 
Work cancellation Work planned for possession cancelled as a consequence of the failure 
Problem 
mitigated Possession failure was adequately recovered 
Planning issues 
(second level) Description 




Failures caused by poor planning of possession 
arrangements 
Staff rosters Rostering of staff Inadequate to possession needs 
Haulage / 
machine routing 
Poor planning of routes for engineering or on-track plant into 
or out from possession, or even within possession 
Haulage / 
machine planning 
Equipment supplied to possession not according to 
possession requirements 
Non related / no 
evidence No evidence of planning related failures 
 
Given the time necessary to extract information and categorise it, a more 
extensive analysis of control logs was not viable within the timeframe 
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available. To complement the outcome of control logs analysis, numbers of 
possession failures were extracted from the Asset Incident Trends 
database. As mentioned in section 2.4, this database provides information 
on a wide range of events that more or less directly affect the condition of 
assets, including occurrences during possession of the line. Of the 51 types 
of incidents recorded by this database, the ones shown in Table 4.6 were 
considered most relevant to describe the occurrence of possession delivery 
related incidents. 
Table 4.6: Possession delivery incidents taken from asset incident trends to 
support control log analysis 
Code Type of incident Description 
106A Track Patrols & related possessions 
Incidents related to maintenance inspections 
107A Possession over-run 
and related faults 
Failures which caused possessions to run 
beyond their available access time 
107B Possession work left incomplete 
Incidents which led to possessions being handed 
back to operation with planned work incomplete 
 
As shown by the descriptions given in Table 4.6, this database does not 
explicitly refer to any planning related issues. However analysis was 
considered useful to support area comparisons in relation to planning data. 
4.8.1. The Christmas period of 2007 
During the Christmas period each year, the rail engineering organisation 
plans for an increased time of access, taking advantage of a reduction in 
passenger numbers that characterises this holiday season. This often 
represents a unique opportunity to deliver complex work and major projects 
that require the possession of the line during several consecutive days 
(blockade). 
In particular, the Christmas of 2007 (ORR, 2008) was described as the 
most intensive period of engineering activity in the history of the railways 
since privatisation. Amongst all the planned work, three major possession 
overruns occurred, causing serious disruptions to train services. Given the 
volume of work delivered throughout the country within this period of time 
and the complexity of some of the projects involved, this was considered a 
valuable opportunity for the investigation of the impacts of planning on 
delivery under conditions of extreme production pressure. 
Research methods 
119 
The overruns occurred at Rugby, Liverpool Street and Shields Junction, 
Glasgow. The focus was set on the events taking place at Rugby, where 
the work being delivered was not only particularly complex, but also critical 
for its impact on the most important rail route in the country (West Coast 
Main line) and the enhanced timetable that was due to come in place in 
January 2008. While special attention was be given to the Rugby project, 
events taking place throughout the country and in particular within the 
Liverpool Street and shields Junction projects, were also investigated to 
provide a description of the overall national delivery programme for that 
period. 
Control logs were used as a main source of data for the analysis of events 
which, from the start of this intensive period of engineering work led to the 
overruns. The relevant logs were extracted from national information 
systems and used to build a timeline of events. The formal report on the 
investigation carried out by the Office of Rail Regulation – ORR (2008) was 
also used as a source for additional details on occurrences and to identify 
relevant actions taken by Network Rail and the stakeholders involved in the 
project. 
4.9. Infrastructure and asset data analysis 
As earlier mentioned (section 2.1), the UK rail industry possesses a wide 
diversity of infrastructure profiles and traffic characteristics. This diversity is 
likely to impact differently on planning, not just in terms of the volume of 
engineering work to be planned, but also in terms of the constraints and 
options for access to the infrastructure. Archival data from engineering 
statistics provided insights on the different infrastructure profiles of the 
national rail network. The analysis of this data against planning and work 
delivery data complemented the investigation of planning performance 
trends and the understanding of relations between planning and delivery. 
Specific 
objectives 
Understand the influence of different infrastructure profiles on the 
volume and type of work planned (1) (3) 
 
Network Rail’s Engineering Information Team provided guidance on 
possible sources of data to support the investigation of the disparities 
between geographical areas in terms of infrastructure profile. Two different 
aspects were analysed: The complexity of the infrastructure and an 
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estimate for the volume of emergency maintenance work as a source 
of disruption to planned work. As earlier stated in section 2.2, emergency 
maintenance work is a major source of disruption, not only for train 
services, but also for planned engineering work. Often work that has gone 
through the planning process is thrown out close to its date of delivery 
because engineering interventions with higher priority have emerged. Three 
different data sources were used: 
x Asset incident trends provided an extensive range of quantitative data. 
Numbers for categories of incidents, other than the ones previously used 
to complement safety data, were extracted to support an estimate of the 
unplanned maintenance interventions required in each area. 
x The equated track mileage together with asset counts aimed to 
provide an overview for the profile of the infrastructure in each area, in 
terms of the number, type and concentration of assets. 
4.9.1. Incident categories taken from asset incident trends 
From the 51 types of incidents classified, 14 were considered more likely to 
result in the need for maintenance emergency responses and thus be a 
potential source of disruption to planning. This selection was made based 
on the description of each type of incident and in view of the general 
knowledge already acquired regarding rail engineering. Apart from 
equipment failures, two other types of incidents were included. The incident 
type designated as “TSR due to condition of track” was considered 
particularly relevant. Temporary Speed Restrictions are put in place by 
delivery units whenever there is an inability to respond to maintenance 
requirements that affect normal operation. These were considered useful 
data to assess the capability of delivery units to respond to maintenance 
needs in light of the resources available to them (including available 
access). Weather related incidents were also used in order to understand 
the serious impact that severe weather may have on the infrastructure and 
how this may vary from area to area. 
Table 4.7 shows the 14 types of incidents that were considered to have a 
more direct relation with either planning or delivery. 
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Table 4.7: Asset incidents taken from asset incident trends to support comparison 
of different infrastructure profiles 
Code Type of incident Description 
101 Points failures Apart from mechanical failures, this also includes loss of signalling detection of points 
104A TSR due to Condition of Track 
Temporary speed restrictions applied when the 
condition of track does not meet the standards 
required for line speed 
104B Track faults General plain track faults including broken rails 
104C Gauge corner 
cracking 
Metal fatigue cracking occurring on the running 






Unspecified incidents for which there is a causal 
relation with infrastructure assets 
110A Severe weather Weather impact on infrastructure beyond design 
capability 
110B Other weather Weather impact on infrastructure or network 
operation 
201 OLE/Third rail faults 
Incidents related to electrification, either with 
Overhead Line Equipment or with third rail 
301A Signal failures General signalling equipment faults 
301B Track circuit failures 
Failure of a track circuit or associated equipment 
302A 
Signalling system 
and power supply 
failures 
Power failure related faults 
302B Other signal 
equipment failures 
Failure of signalling systems 
303 Telecoms failures Failure of track side or in-cab communication 
systems 
304 Cable faults Failure of signalling and communications cabling 
 
Engineering areas were compared based on the average number of 
incidents for each of the categories in Table 4.7. For the same 14 
categories, the total number of incidents per period and by areas was 
extracted from the database for the year 2008/2009. This provided an 
overview of the variability of occurrences throughout the year and how 
these variability patterns changed from area to area. 
4.9.2. Asset data 
Complexity was assessed by means of Equated Track Miles (ETM) and 
asset counts. As a basic principle emanating from maintenance standards, 
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the more assets there are and higher their concentration per mile of track in 
a given area, the more maintenance work is required. By definition, it can 
be assumed that an area with a higher ETM will be responsible for the 
planning of higher volumes of maintenance work than an area with a lower 
ETM. 
Although the number of assets by section of track is contemplated in the 
calculation of ETM, having additional information on the actual type and 
number of assets was considered useful to better understand possible 
impacts on planning. The two most recent counts were obtained from the 
Engineering Information National Specialist Team, which corresponded to 
periods 3 and period 4 for the year 2009/2010. Although this time scale 
represented a sample entirely different from the one used for the other data 
sources, according to the Engineering Information NST, despite being 
refreshed every period, the contents of these counts do not vary 
significantly. For the periods concerned, the majority of the Delivery Units 
show variations of less than 0.5%. Thus, the disparity of timescales with the 
rest of the data sources used in this research was not considered a 
problem. Similar to ETM data, asset counts were provided by delivery unit 
and then summed to produce numbers for engineering and WON areas. 
Asset data were supported by the identification of differences between 
areas in terms of infrastructure profile. These differences were then 
discussed in view of the outcome of asset incidents analysis, in order to 
study possible relations between the profile of the infrastructure and the 
occurrence of incidents.  
4.10. Questionnaire 
This method constituted a source of subjective assessment for two different 
thesis topics. While part 1 of the questionnaire focused on the assessment 
of resilience factors in planning, section 2 focused on the further evaluation 
of the planning issues identified throughout the interview processes. 
Although integrated within the same questionnaire different basic methods 
were used in the development of each questionnaire section. The 
questionnaire used is shown in Appendix 7. 
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4.10.1. Development of part 1 of the questionnaire 
As debated in section 3.6, literature provided ample support for the 
definition of rail engineering planning as a complex sociotechnical system. 
Section 3.4 defined resilience engineering as a safety management 
approach with particular relevance for such high complexity domains, as it 
focuses on better coping with variability and uncertainty. A range of related 
concepts were also introduced as potential measurable aspects of 
resilience. These concepts were used to develop a subjective assessment 
approach, aiming to better understand how resilience may express itself in 
rail engineering planning and investigate possible means of measuring it. 
Specific 
objectives 
Support the definition of resilience factors in engineering planning 
(4) and investigate potential means of measuring resilience (5) 
 
The first section of the questionnaire addressed both objectives 4 and 5. It 
was used to test a set of statements, derived from resilience literature and 
an in-depth understanding of rail engineering planning, as to their 
meaningfulness as measurements for resilience in planning. The responses 
were used in turn to assess the extent of resilience within the rail 
engineering planning process. 
Mendonça (2008) referred to the concepts provided by Woods (2006a) and 
Wreathall (2006) as a starting point towards measuring resilient 
performance. He developed a framework for measurement factors which 
was then analysed in view of observational data regarding the restoration of 
infrastructures in New York City, following the attacks on 11 September, 
2001. In line with this approach, the most recurrent keywords and notions 
found in the definitions presented in section 3.4.1 (Table 3.3) were used as 
grounds for the investigation of resilience measures within engineering 
planning. Table 4.8 includes these concepts and provides a description. 
Table 4.8: Resilience concepts taken from relevant literature 
Concepts Description 
Ability to adapt to 
changing conditions  
The system has to be flexible enough to respond to 
external changes and pressures 
Ability to cope with 
complexity 
The system must be capable of maintaining normal 
operation whilst coping with changing conditions 
Ability to manage 
continuous stresses 
The system must be capable of maintaining normal 
operation, even when submitted to extreme pressure 
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Ability to respond to 
problems by 
anticipations 
Preparedness - The system must be able to react 
before problems cause any disruption to normal 
operation 
Ability to recover 
quickly to a dynamic 
stability 
The system must be capable of recovering normal 
operations with minimal impact on performance, once 
disruptions occur (survival) 
Learning culture 
Willingness to respond to events by reforming and 
adapting as opposed to denying the need for change. 
System does not give in to complacency 
Just culture 
Support on reporting of issues throughout the 
organisation avoiding behaviours of culpability 
attribution 
Ability to steer activities The system must be able to control activities regardless 
of operating conditions 
Appropriate level of 
information about 
performance 
Awareness - The system must make available to its 
management appropriate levels of information regarding 
performance 
Appropriate level of 
resources 
System must maintain availability of resources 
necessary  to respond to all operation requirements 
Communication and 
coordination 
Flows of information facilitate distributed decision 
making. problem solving is not fragmented 
High enough devotion 
to safety 
Safety must be considered alongside other system 
goals 
Buffering capacity 
The system must have available the resources 
necessary to respond to arising problems and complex 
issues 
 
An initial set of 30 statements was developed, aiming to embrace all the 
perspectives given by the factors in Table 4.8 within the context of 
engineering planning. This initial group of statements was peer reviewed by 
six members of the Network Rail Ergonomics Team. As people not familiar 
(or with little contact) with the notions of organisational resilience and yet 
knowledgeable on a wide range of aspects of rail operations, this provided 
a test for the comprehensiveness of the statements, as well as their 
meaningfulness concerning the intended concepts. This gave rise to an 
iterative process of revision and piloting that was concluded when the 
format of each question was found to be strongly related to the underlying 
resilience concepts. The initial set was brought down to the 22 statements 




Table 4.9: Final set of statements for part 1 of the questionnaire 
Proposed statements Resilience concepts 
I can adjust my way of working according to 
external pressures 
Ability to manage continuous 
stresses 
I have the information necessary to deal with 
unexpected situations 
Ability to adapt to changing 
conditions  
I have enough time to do my planning thoroughly 
Appropriate level of resources 
I have all the information I need to do my work 
I can solve problems even when pressured to 
deliver fast results 
Ability to manage continuous 
stresses 
I can solve problems even when faced with 
unexpected situations 
Ability to respond to problems 
by anticipations 
I have the information needed to detect potential 
planning failures 
Appropriate level of 
information about 
performance 
I can communicate my decisions promptly to those 
that rely on them Communication and 
coordination I have the support of my manager to make 
decisions 
I feel in control of my work activities 
Ability to steer activities 
I manage to finish whatever plans I start 
I take into account a balance between safety and 
efficiency in my planning decisions 
High enough devotion to 
safety 
I can detect failures or errors in my planning before 
they create problems 
Ability to recover quickly to a 
dynamic stability 
I can identify when my planning decisions are 
pushing the boundaries of safe performance Ability to respond to problems 
by anticipations I assess the potential safety impacts for each of my 
planning decisions 
I have a clear picture of how my planning 
contributes to the building of an integrated national 
delivery plan 
Ability to cope with complexity 
I have enough time to reflect on my planning 
Buffering capacity 
I am encouraged to reflect on my planning 
I receive feedback on the outcome of my planning 
Learning culture 
I revise my planning whenever new information 
arises 
Because something has always gone well before, I 
feel confident that it will continue to go well in the 
future 
My management does not blame me for any poor 
outcome of my planning Just culture 
 
Planners were asked to give their rating on a Likert scale of six levels (1-
Strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-Slightly disagree, 4-Slightly agree, 5-
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Agree, 6-Strongly agree). No neutral (middle) point was provided in order to 
force choice. 
The outcome of delivering this section was then submitted to a principal 
components analysis (Kline, 1994), in order to reduce the set of 22 
statements into a coherent subset of more or less independent factors. 
These factors were then discussed as a possible source of measure for 
resilience in planning. The specific methods used in this process are 
outlined in chapter 7 (Resilience in planning). 
4.10.2. Principal components analysis 
Part 1 of the questionnaire provided an assessment of aspects derived 
from resilience engineering literature. Principal components analysis was 
used as an approach to reduce these aspects to a set of factors, which 
could be more easily managed and assessed within the scope of planning 
performance. The meaningfulness and applicability of the extracted 
components as measurable aspects was investigated in order to better 
understand resilience in rail engineering planning and its sources. 
Specific 
objectives 
Improve knowledge and investigate methods on resilience 
engineering and related concepts (4) (5) (6)  
 
Principal component analysis, in comparison with factor analysis aims to 
reduce a large set of items into a coherent subset of more or less 
independent factors. When comparing these two methods, the fact that 
principal components analysis takes into consideration all the variance in 
the observed items, rather than just the co-variance (Tabachnick & Fidell 
2007), was considered a more suitable approach for the goals set out in 
this study. 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used as a 
support for all the necessary statistical methods. The main advantage in the 
use of this software resides in the ability to rapidly test a large number of 
different component extraction solutions. In total, 10 different principal 
components solutions were tested from the original set of data of part 1 of 
the questionnaire. The criteria used for the selection of the most suitable 
solution and the methods used for the interpretation of the extracted 
components are discussed in chapter 7. 
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Following the principles of the analysis of historic data, the comparison of 
different geographical regions was used to identify possible trends on the 
extracted components. SPSS was used to compute new variables that 
reproduced each of the extracted components.  
4.10.3. Development of part 2 of the questionnaire 
Part 2 of the questionnaire was developed based on the main issues 
emerging from the semi-structured interview process. Having identified 
these issues and understood their sources and relevance for the scope of 
this research in terms of studying resilience in the planning system 
(approached in section 7.1), the aim was to assess the impact of these 
issues on the performance of planners in a larger sample. This not only 
contributed for the better understanding of planning, but it also supported 
the investigation of resilience and its sources. 
Specific 
objectives 
Identify the magnitude of planning problems and better understand 
their sources (2) (3) in order to understand how resilience 
engineering can be an useful approach for the success of planning 
(4) (5) 
 
Table 4.10 summarises the relevant issues to clarify the support used for 
the development of this questionnaire section. These issues are discussed 
in detail in section 5.2. 
Table 4.10: Aspects supporting the development of statement for part 2 of the 
questionnaire 
Aspects Description 
Management of planning 
changes 
Managing planning changes emerged as the most 
critical aspect in planning. Each change was found 
to have a planning decision at its origin 
Organisational and 
geographical barriers 
The performance of the planning system greatly 
relies on the relations between different 
organisational and geographical structures 
Variability of inputs to the 
planning process 
Planners have to manage and deal with a great 
diversity of sources of information to support their 
decision processes 
Formal and informal flows 
of information 
While a formal flow of information supports 
negotiations are between numerous organisations 
across the industry planners rely on informal 






The great diversity of sources of information and the 
complexity of planning system weakens planners 
ability to foresee the outcome of their decision 
making 
Planning experience Experience and overall understanding of how the rail 
industry operates helps to recognise when and what 
information is required to support a given decision 
Reliable work relations 
within the planning 
organisation 
Work relations support informal discussion of issues 
and improves access to information 
Understanding the impact 
of decisions on delivery 
Understanding the constrains and needs of work 
delivery improves planners ability to anticipate and 
solve potential problems 
Development of 
contingencies 
Contingencies (spare time or extra capacity) are 
integrated into planning to minimise the risk of 
delivery failure 
 
Using the interviews as a foundation, a set of questions was developed and 
submitted to the same iterative process as the one used for the first section 
of the questionnaire (peer reviewing by six members of the Network Rail 
Ergonomics Team). Planners were asked to rate each of the statements in 
Table 4.11 according to how much they felt these influenced their 
performance. A rating scale of six levels was also used in this section 
(1-Not at all, 2-Very little, 3-Little, 4-Some, 5-Much, 6-Totally). 
Table 4.11: Set of statements for part 2 of the questionnaire 
Mark how you feel the following factors influence your performance as a planner 
1 The organisational division of planning units (NDS, NAU, II, IM…) 
2 The range of inputs (formats, type of information and timings) to the planning 
process 
3 Difficulties in obtaining accurate information 
4 Working with incomplete or inaccurate information 
5 Planning experience 
6 Geographical knowledge of the railways 
7 Having trustworthy work contacts within the planning organisation 
8 Informal flow of information by means of phone calls, e-mails 
9 Informal face-to-face discussion of issues 
10 Understanding the impact of planning decisions on delivery 
 
Following the descriptions later given in section 7.1 and summarised here 
in Table 4.10, it became evident that while some of the aspects were 
presented by planners as having a negative impact on their performance, 
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others were considered to contribute positively. This means that while 
some of the derived statements in Table 4.11 will aim at assessing a 
negative impact on performance, others will be directed to the assessment 
of more positive influences. For instance, “having difficulties in obtaining 
accurate information”, if rated highly by planners, will clearly represent a 
negative impact on performance. Conversely, statements like “geographical 
knowledge of the railways”, if rated highly, will suggest that having such 
knowledge facilitates performance. Within this scope, and according to the 
descriptions in Table 4.10, while statements 1 to 4 are aimed at the 
assessment of negative influences on performance, the remaining 
statements are targeted at more positive contributions. 
4.10.4. Questionnaire implementation and delivery 
The questionnaire was implemented in each of the territory and area 
delivery planning units in the country. Following the description provided in 
section 2.3, this amounted to 21 different locations (5 TDPUs and 16 
ADPUs), which constituted an estimated population of 210 planners (due to 
ongoing reorganisation processes no exact numbers were available). 
In order to ensure the desired levels of response and due to time 
constraints, meetings were arranged with each planning unit during which 
the questionnaire was distributed and collected upon completion. Meetings 
were initiated with an introduction of the research scope and the specific 
purposes of the questionnaire. Whenever possible, brief discussions with 
planners followed the completion of the questionnaire, which provided the 
opportunity to collect informal feedback on the relevance of the 
questionnaire. 
In some units, the number of respondents was limited by absences due to 
leave of absence or unforeseen work issues that required part of the teams 
to be away from their location at the time of the visits. Also 6 of the existing 
21 planning units did not reply to the initial requests for meetings and in 
particular, an arranged meeting with an area planning unit had to be 
cancelled by the unit manager, which voided any possibility of gathering 
data for the Sussex region. In total, 105 planners responded to the 
questionnaire (50% of the estimated population of respondents). There is 
no reason to suppose that this is a biased sample, nor that they do not 
represent the views across the whole planner population. 
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4.11. International resilience workgroups 
Resilience engineering is a recent field of research with little application to 
date in the railway context. Within the scope of participating in the 
development of this discipline, scientific workshops and other working 
meetings were attended. These activities led to the integration of the author 
in an international working group on the development of resilience 
engineering. These group discussions supported the development of the 




Improve knowledge and investigate methods on resilience 
engineering and related concepts (4) (5) (6)  
4.11.1. Participation in workgroups 
Participation at the advanced course on resilience engineering (22-24 July, 
2009) offered a wide range of opportunities to debate on resilience 
concepts and methods with other experts. The course took place relatively 
late in the duration of this project. Nevertheless, given its focus on 
managing and measuring resilience and the opportunity to explore these 
aspects based on concrete cases, this course provided valuable support for 
various stages of research and became crucial in the development of the 
questionnaire process. A considerable part of the knowledge acquired in 
this course was put to practice in the work described by Ferreira et al 
(2011). 
Three annual workshops (2008, 2009 and 2010) dedicated to the 
development of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) were 
attended. Based on the concept of functional resonance introduced in 
section 3.4.5, this tool supports the analysis of complex sociotechnical 
systems. The initial designation was “Functional Resonance Accident 
Model”, as it targeted the investigation of events retrospectively (Hollnagel, 
2004). More recently, this tool has evolved towards a prospective 
application in risk assessment and system monitoring, which accounts for 
the use of the designation “Functional Resonance Analysis Method”. The 
use of FRAM in this research followed this latter approach, aiming to 
support the investigation of interactions within the planning system, based 
on the understanding of the existing flows of information and decision 
making processes. This work was then presented and debated with the 
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international group attending workshops, which provided additional input for 
the “FRAMing” of the planning system. The experimental work developed 
with FRAM is documented in Section 7.3. 
4.11.2. Function Resonance Analysis Method - FRAM 
FRAM is essentially a non-linear analysis tool in the sense that it aims to 
reproduce concurrent phenomenon in the system, rather than building 
cause-effect sequences of events in time. As outlined in section 3.4.5, 
FRAM is based on the principle that accidents in complex sociotechnical 
systems are produced by unexpected combinations (resonance) of “normal 
performance” variability. Hence system safety can be achieved by 
understanding and controlling (damping) sources of variability. 
Understanding ETTOs and the decision making processes that these 
shape, plays a crucial role in preventing undesired sources of variability. 
Trade-offs are at the core of every performance adjustment that people 
develop, aiming to match the perceived operating conditions (section 
3.4.4). Therefore, ETTOs are both a response to, and a source of variability 
(Hollnagel, 2004). 
FRAM is based on four basic principles, which were earlier explained in 
section 3.4.5: 
x Success and failure are equivalent in the sense that they both emerge 
from performance variability. 
x Variability becomes necessary as a way for people to adjust tools and 
procedures to match operating conditions. 
x Emergence of either success or failure is not the direct result of 
variability within a given task or function, but rather to the unexpected 
combination of variability from multiple functions. 
x The unexpected “amplified” effects of interactions between different 
sources of variability are at the origin of the phenomenon described by 
functional resonance. 
The fundamental step in the use of this method is the identification and 
description of functions. In line with the concept described in section 3.4.5, 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the functional unit of a FRAM. Each function is defined 
by six descriptors (time, control, output, resource, precondition and input), 
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as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4: Functional unit of FRAM (from Hollnagel, 2008) 
Potential sources of variability are then investigated, guided by the 
identification of context dependent human, technological and organisational 
aspects. Similar to the approach used by CREAM (Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Assessment Method, Hollnagel 1998), FRAM uses Common 
Performance Conditions (CPCs) as descriptors for the relevant context. 
While CREAM would aim to describe scenarios more focused on task 
performance, FRAM CPCs are intended for the description of the context in 
which system functions are produced. Throughout the three FRAM 
workshops attended by the researcher, different proposals were discussed 
in terms of the designation and use of CPCs, depending on the context of 
application. One of the earliest researches dedicated to the application of 
FRAM, Woltjer (2009), made use of the CPCs shown in Table 4.12. A 
description for each CPC is also given, based on work presented by 
Besnard (2008). 




Roles and responsibilities of team members, additional staff 
support, availability of communication systems and other 




Quality of training provided to operators, familiarisation with 




Efficiency and accuracy of information flows and processes by 








Human-machine interface in general, including information 
available on control panels, computerised workstations, and 
operational support provided by specific decision aids 
Availability of 
procedures 
Procedures and plans include operating and emergency 




Nature of physical working conditions such as ambient 
lighting, glare on screens, noise from alarms, interruptions 




Number of tasks a person is required to pursue or attend to at 
the same time (evaluating effects of actions, sampling 
information, assessing goals etc.) 
Available time Time available to carry out a task; corresponds to how well task execution is synchronised to process dynamics 
Circadian rhythm, 
stress 
Time of day (or night) describes the time when the task is 
carried out, in particular whether the person is adjusted to 
current time (circadian rhythm). 
Team 
collaboration 
Quality of collaboration between crew members, including 
overlap between official and unofficial structure, level of trust, 
and general social climate 
Organisational 
quality 
Quality of roles and responsibilities of team members, 
additional support, communication systems, Safety 
Management System, instructions and guidelines for 
externally oriented activities, role of external agencies, etc 
 
The analysis of performance conditions is not intended as a way to identify 
direct causes of failures but rather characterise sources of variability within 
functions. The potential variability of functions is then assessed by means 
of a qualitative rating of CPCs. The scales used in this process may also 
vary according to the context of application and the level of discrimination 
necessary for the scope of analysis. Although no specific examples were 
presented, workshop discussions led to admit that sources of variability 
may be identified by means other that the use of CPCs. 
The graphical representation of functions as hexagons becomes useful for 
the remaining steps of FRAM. Using the six aspects of functions (time, 
control, output, resource, precondition and input), system interactions are 
studied, aiming to identify potential sources of resonance. For instance, the 
output of a function may be the input, a precondition or even enforce a 
control aspect of another function in the system. The purpose of CPCs is to 
help identify interactions in which the sources of the variability in one 
function may impact on the performance of another. This amounts to 
consider when, for instance, an output of a function is rated as insufficient 
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inappropriate or unpredictable, which functions to which this output is linked 
may be affected and how. 
This process may also lead to the identification of possible damping 
sources for undesired variability. As an example, if resources for a given 
function are rated as “more than necessary”, it could indicate the existence 
of a “spare capacity” that could operate as a damping barrier. To this 
purpose, Hollnagel (2004) describes four categories of barriers to be 
considered within the scope of FRAM: 
x Physical barrier systems are intended to block or prevent the 
movement of mass, energy or information. These are commonly the role 
of structures such as walls and fences, or safety belts. 
x Functional barrier systems recreate preconditions that must be met 
prior to carrying out a given task or action. Interlocking systems (such as 
those used in railway signaling) and passwords are included in this 
category. 
x Symbolic barrier systems include all types of indications and 
information (signs, checklists, among others) regarding the limitations 
and constraints to be taken into account when carrying out a given task 
or action. 
x Incorporeal barrier systems are also referred to as immaterial barriers, 
as they are not physically present in any form. They include all types of 
ethical principles, rules and laws. 
The process of investigating possible connections between functions, for 
the identification of both potential undesired variability sources and barriers, 
is referred to as an instantiation of FRAM. As later exemplified in Figure 7.7 
(section 7.3), this corresponds to linking functions using their six aspects. 
4.12. Summary of research methods 
Research methods were introduced with regard to their specific objectives, 
and the research issues they intend to address. These methods and the 
way in which they are structured are reflected in the research conceptual 
framework given in Figure 4.2. Methods aim to respond to the research 
objectives earlier stated and in particular, investigate the main research 
questions, as detailed in Table 3.7. This is summarised in Table 4.13. 
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Table 4.13: Summary of research questions and methods 








x How is the planning process 
framed within Network Rail’s 
organisational structure and within 
the rail industry? 
x What are the boundaries of 
planning? 
x What are the main trends of 
planning performance? 
x Analysis of planning 
documentation and business 
process 
x Planning familiarisation 
interview 
x Semi-structured interviews 








x What are the main constraints to 
planners’ decision making? 
x What are the main resources used 
by planners to deal with 
constraints? 
x How do the planning process and 
its organisational structure support 
or hinder decision making 
processes? 
x Planning familiarisation 
interview 
x Familiarisation interviews with 
planning stakeholders 








x What are the main trends in work 
delivery performance? 
x What are the different trends in the 
relations between planning and 
work delivery? 
x Familiarisation interviews with 
planning stakeholders 
x Planning archival data analysis 
x Safety data analysis 
x Infrastructure archival data 
analysis 









x How does variability and 
uncertainty express itself in the 
planning system? 
x What are the sources of resilience 
in planning? 
x Analysis of interviews data from 
a resilience perspective 
x Archival data from a system 
perspective 
x Questionnaire 
x Functional analysis (Functional 










x What aspects of planning 
performance can potentially 
support the development of 
resilience indicators? 
x How can resilience in rail 
engineering planning be 
monitored? 
x Archival data from a system 
perspective 
x Questionnaire 
x Cooperation with international 
resilience workgroups 
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5. Understanding engineering planning 
This Chapter describes the results obtained through the methods described 
in Chapter 4, relating to the description of planning, its organisational 
features and to the identification of main planning issues. Based on the 
arguments from the literature presented in section 3.6, the main purposes 
of this chapter are to explain high complexity in planning and describe its 
decision making processes. Qualitative data from interviews adds to the 
description of planning developed in section 2.3 and identifies sources of 
variability and uncertainty, as well as their impacts on planners’ decision 
making. Planning human and organisational factors are also described. The 
quantitative analysis of planning archival data supports the identification of 
performance indicators and a subsequent investigation of different 
performance trends in planning, based on a geographical comparison. 
Objectives Questions Methods 
1) Develop a 
description of the 
rail engineering 
planning system 
as a complex 
sociotechnical 
system. 
2) Identify the critical 
human and 
organisational 
factors of the rail 
engineering 
planning system. 
x How is the planning process 
framed within Network Rail’s 
organisational structure and within 
the rail industry? 
x What are the boundaries of 
planning? 
x What are the main trends of 
planning performance? 
x What are the main constraints to 
planners’ decision making? 
x What are the main resources used 
by planners to deal with 
constraints? 
x How do the planning process and 
its organisational structure support 











5.1. Familiarisation interview 
As stated earlier in the methods chapter, this interview was carried out with 
a senior planning manager at NAU. This was the initial contact with the 
planning organisation and its members, and provided grounds for the 
subsequent analysis methods. 
Overall, the interviewee described the planning process as a sequence of 
three stages, formally designated as long-term, medium-term and short-
Understanding engineering planning 
137 
term planning and emphasised Infrastructure Investments (II) and 
Infrastructure Maintenance (IM) as the two main organisational functions 
involved in planning. An overview of the three stages was given, focusing 
on their goals and timings within the overall planning process. The 
explanations given by this planner formed the base of the outline of the 
planning organisation and process earlier presented in sections 2.2 and 
2.3. Additional details on the outcome of this interview are given here. 
5.1.1. Long-term planning 
This period of planning provided a “foot print” for access opportunities to 
the network. At this stage, no details were established concerning the 
actual work to be delivered and when. This “foot print” was built based on 
the feedback provided by Network Rail engineering inspections and 
patrolling to the network, which provided a general scope of the required 
maintenance works. Business plans were also used to establish potential 
renewals and major projects. An approximate prioritisation for these work 
packs was also provided, although these were mostly based on 
assumptions and “best guesses” rather than accurate information on the 
status of the infrastructure. This stage of planning would be concluded with 
the issuing of the version 1 of the Rules of the Route (RotR), which 
constituted the first draft for access proposals. The Territory Delivery 
Planning Units (TDPU) were responsible for gathering and requesting all 
work proposals from stakeholders (maintenance, investments and other 
engineering stakeholders). 
5.1.2. Medium-term planning 
During this stage, the access opportunities previously created would be 
discussed in more detail and area teams would propose work to be slotted 
into the available access. Through this process, TDPUs build the Annual 
Integrated Work Plan (AIWP) as a broad scope national plan of delivery. At 
QT-38 (38 weeks before delivery), a formal meeting would take place to 
handover the upcoming quarter of the AIWP to the ADPUs. Meanwhile, 
new requirements for work and access would still be proposed and 
attempts made to incorporate them into the AIWP through negotiations with 
TOCs and engineering. These negotiations were formalised by the NAU via 
the publication of the version 2 of RotR. Although formally only two versions 
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of the RotR are considered, the NAU issued three versions as follows: 
x RotR V1: initial proposal based on which the NAU would get first 
responses from counterparts. 
x RotR V2: Amendments were introduced based on the responses 
previously collected and re-issued as a new version for consultation. 
x RotR V3: After collecting new responses on the amendments (V2) a 
formal decision was made and published as V3. 
Based on more detailed work contents, critical resources such as haulage 
would be allocated and potential conflicts were highlighted, in particular 
regarding the routes for engineering trains. At QT-45, a meeting would be 
held to review and finalise the resource allocation. The interviewee 
mentioned that in a way, this meeting would create a problem, as it 
requested from the National Delivery Service (NDS) more resources than 
those available. Meetings at T-32 and T-31 would be held almost 
exclusively to solve and check for such problems by addressing conflicts 
based on known work priorities. It was stated that the expertise of the Area 
Delivery Planning Managers (ADPM) played a crucial role in these 
decisions, as possessions were re-arranged to try and meet the needs of 
all the industry partners as best as possible. 
5.1.3. Short-term planning 
This stage was mostly based on verifications and confirmations of work 
details. Changes to work plans would be more and more discouraged and 
would only be accepted when safety issues were involved. Depending on 
the changes proposed and their timing, different control change processes 
and authorisations would be required, as described in the Business 
Process Document PL0086 – Work & possession planning for the railway 
infrastructure: Change control (NR/SP/MTC/0086). The interviewee added 
that change control represented one of the major challenges for the 
planning organisation, mostly due to the lack of specific criteria, beyond the 
principle that no changes other than safety critical ones should be 
accepted. The acceptance or refusal of work depended mostly on decision 
makers and their interpretation of this principle. 
It was also mentioned that planning in this period becomes more localised 
(area level and delivery units) and that differences between regions 
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become more relevant, in particular the way in which planning meetings 
and decisions are managed. It was the interviewee’s opinion that different 
practices in managing PICOP briefings (last formal planning meeting) might 
be one of the main causes for different levels of delivery performance 
throughout the country. 
During the entire planning process, information would be transmitted in 
many different ways. E-mail played a fundamental role, as it provided 
traceable and auditable records. Many informal discussions would take 
place to solve particular problems but formal agreements would always be 
demanded at each planning meeting. 
In general, the West Coast Modernisation Programme was mentioned as 
an example that gathered particular strong competences and good 
practices around a common goal (a major renewal project). This was 
considered particularly relevant during the allocation and prioritisation of 
work and resources at T-32 and T-31 meetings and the way in which 
information was transmitted regarding late changes, and during PICOP 
briefings where local practices tend to be more evident. The planning of 
work under this programme was developed by a structure independent 
from the national organisation, which created particularly favourable 
conditions for good communication and team interactions. According to this 
source, at T+1 (week after delivery), when a review of work delivered would 
be carried out, the common practice at national level would be to simply 
review undelivered work and propose its rescheduling. Under the West 
Coast Programme, not only reported problems would be discussed, but 
also any other particular events that could potentially contribute to a 
successful delivery of forthcoming work. 
5.2. Semi-structured interviews 
As stated in the methods chapter (section 4.5), this interview process 
aimed at further exploring the outcome of the familiarisation interview with 
the NAU senior planning manager. Approximately 16 hours of recordings 
were made for the 15 interviews. Depending on how interviewees 
elaborated on each subject, the duration of interviews varied from about 50 
minutes up to nearly 2 hours. 
The time in between scheduled interviews gave the opportunity to listen to 
Understanding engineering planning 
140 
recordings from one interview to the next. This was fundamental for the 
iterative review process discussed earlier in section 4.5. When 6 interviews 
were completed and the respective recordings had been transcribed, it 
became clear that answers given to the first four topics would tend to 
converge to two broader topics of discussion. This was attributed to some 
difficulty in having interviewees elaborating on these topics as much as 
initially foreseen. Although the 10 questions were maintained throughout 
the 15 interviews, the tabular analysis process was restructured into eight 
different groups, as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Question topics and correspondence to tabular analysis topics 
1 Can you tell me about your job (daily tasks, duties)? Job description 
and functions in 
the planning 
process 2 
Can you explain the planning process from your point of 
view? How would you describe your influence/role in the 
process? 
3 
How often would you say your job changes? How does it 
change? Have the tools changed? The information 
sources or formats? The decision making? 
Job variability 






Do you normally feel confident regarding the outcome of 
the planning activities in which you take part? Can you 
identify any recurrent uncertainties that you are faced 
with? (If so) How do they manifest themselves? How do 
you deal with them? Do you look to obtain feedback? 
How do you ensure you have reached your goal? 
5 
What would you say are your main skills and 
competencies? Do you feel they improve with your job 
experience? 
Skills and job 
experience 
6 
How would you describe the overall set of rules and 
procedures applicable to the planning process? Are there 
any which you would consider to have a particularly 
significant impact over the planning process (safety 
critically or otherwise)? Do you feel these rules and 





What type of information do you use most? How 
important is it in your job? What sources you mainly use? 
Would you consider that the production of information for 





What do you consider to be the current major challenges 
for track work delivery? How does the planning process 
respond to those challenges? In particular, what are your 
views in the way changes in the planning emerge and 
how they’re managed? 
Challenges for 
the future of the 
system 
9 
What does resilience mean to you? Considering 
resilience as a property that enables the system 
(engineering work) to resist and recover from unexpected 
variations and pressures from its environment, how 
would you characterise the planning and work delivery 
processes in these terms? 
Resilience 
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10 
Throughout your professional experience in this area, 
what do you consider the major achievement within the 
planning process? What success stories come to your 
mind? What failures? 
Major ups and 




Following a note on the characteristics of the sample interviewed, this 
section presents information under each of these eight topics. All the 
information that would not suit any of the topics was registered as 
additional notes. Quotes from the interviews relevant for each topic are 
given at the end of each sub-section within a table format. 
5.2.1. Characteristics of the sample 
The age of interviewees ranged from late 20’s to 50’s, with an average 
placed between 30 and 35 years old. Even the younger planners had at 
least 3 years of experience in planning and the majority had 10 or more 
years of experience in different roles and levels of the rail industry. 
5.2.2. Job description and functions in the planning process 
Table 5.2 provides a list of the 15 interviewees by formal job identification, 
together with a brief description. From the familiarisation interview, area 
planning level was identified as the most critical stage. In addition, the NAU 
senior planner mostly provided contacts for either area or territory unit 
managers, as he considered that these people could provide insight on a 
wider range of issues and if necessary, managers could direct to members 
of their teams for other interviews. This accounts for the fact that one third 
of the interviewees are ADPMs. 
Table 5.2: Jobs for which interviews were carried out 
Job title Description Interviewees 
Territory delivery planning 
manager Manages TDPUs 1 
Area delivery planning 
manager Manages ADPUs 5 
Work optimisation analyst Review possession arrangements 
and resource allocation (territory) 1 
Integrated planning 
manager 




Verify work details and support 
final arrangements for delivery 
(Area) 
2 




Critical resource allocation 
(Territory) 1 
Track section manager Detailed planning of worksites (MDU) 1 
Senior planning & delivery 
manager 




Collate worksites into possessions 
and support final arrangements for 
delivery (Area) 
1 
Territory plant coordinator Verification of resource allocation 1 
 
Despite the different roles of the people interviewed, some common tasks 
or functions were found. Mainly, all planners interviewed consider as part of 
their duties to monitor compliance with procedures and verify accordance 
between access, resources and work requirements at their respective 
planning level. 
The management of change and dealing with the change control processes 
were rarely referred as being part of the job. Regardless of other 
discussions on this subject, attending to planning changes was only 
mentioned by three planners within the description of their duties. Only one 
explicit mention to “policing the requests for late changes” was made. 
Given that plan changes have a strong impact over planners activities (later 
discussed in this section), it would be expected to have this mentioned 
more often as a main focus of their job. 
Interviewees in planning managing positions pointed out as one of their 
main functions the monitoring of the overall development of planning 
(“looking at the bigger picture”) and supporting decisions towards achieving 
a nationally integrated plan that responds to the industry’s needs. In 
particular, area planning managers (two of the interviewees) expressed this 
need as a way to maintain control over financial aspects because of their 
relation with contractors. Senior managers (three interviewees) also added 
as part of their functions the “buffering and mediating of relations” between 
their team and the other counterparts in the planning system. 
5.2.3. Job variability and levels of confidence 
It was recognised by all planners interviewed that the core elements of jobs 
in planning have not changed over the last few years. However, at least 
half of the interviewees referred to the frequent process and organisational 
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changes as an obstacle to the development of adequate expertise and solid 
working relations. At least four interviewees stated that knowing the people 
they work with constitutes a fundamental resource to anticipate issues and 
work proactively. In particular, one planner stated that it took him/her some 
five years to develop confidence in the job and the required relations. 
Dealing with uncertainty and unpredictability was recognised by all 
interviewees as part of the daily activity in planning (discussion on topic 4). 
Six of these planners characterised uncertainty as a major obstruction to 
reliable planning. This factor is managed, whenever possible, by working 
on contingency solutions and being prepared for anything that might require 
rebuilding plans. Job experience and overall understanding of the railways 
were considered crucial by the majority of planners, not only to explore 
different possible contingencies (i.e. different ways of delivering work) but 
also to adequately integrate these within the planning process (i.e. 
anticipate and solve potential conflicts). Regarding work relations and 
knowing the people they work with, planners, particularly those at the front 
end (APMs and PPAs), are aware that some contractors tend to be less 
reliable deliverers than others. For instance, depending on their experience 
with a given contractor, they account for more or less recovery time at the 
end of the possession as a buffer for potential problems (plan for 
contingency). 
Planning changes were mentioned by all interviewees as the main cause of 
variability and unpredictability of the job, as well as the main obstruction to 
having confidence in the work they produce. Planners recognised that more 
than their ability to develop a robust plan, unpredictability and variability 
affected the performance of the planning organisation as a whole. The 
majority of planners tended to consider that changes are mostly originated 
by priorities that emanate from company board level, which themselves can 
cause budgets for work packs already undergoing planning not being 
approved or changed. At least three planners alluded to the image of a 
puzzle to refer to the nationally integrated plan: Optimising resource 
allocation both locally and nationally, means that all work to be delivered 
has been fitted together in an integrated plan, like in a finished puzzle. 
Changing work in the plan is like changing a piece of the puzzle, which 
means that the remaining pieces do not fit as well, resources will be 
wasted, or a new puzzle has to be designed (re-planning). Six planners 
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referred to these problems as knock-on effects that impact on the entire 
planning structure and are beyond any control of planners. One planner at 
long-term level considered that changes in this period have a more 
strategic nature, such as reprioritising work packs or de-scoping work for 
lack budget or access, as opposed to short-term planning where issues are 
about conflicts or failures that could occur in the immediate timeframe (this 
week, tomorrow or even on the night). 
In addition, planners at short-term mentioned the need to manage 
unforeseeable changes generated by work delivery failures, which can 
require the rescheduling of work items. One interviewee mentioned that 
difficulties in getting the requested access to deliver planned cyclic 
maintenance leads to work being carried out under emergency 
circumstances as assets eventually start failing, which also contributes to 
the knock-on effects previously mentioned. One area level planning 
manager mentioned that possession coordinators used to receive around 
80 change control forms per week for an average of approximately 160 
worksites planned. However, pressure exerted over possession managers 
and delivery units to invest on timely planning has contributed to a 
substantial reduction of Possession Change Control Forms (PCCFs) 
submitted. An ADPM referred having to deal with between 10 and 30 
changes, from T6 down to delivery, which have little to do with safety of the 
line or operational priorities. 











x Uncertainty plays a significant role and experience is fundamental to deal 
with it. but it can be demoralising having to re-do everything (as a 
response to changes) 
x The fact that there are planning teams working parallel to each other 
creates grey areas in terms who should be doing what 
x We know that some contractors usually fail in terms of reliability of their 
work and for that we need to account for problem recovery time at the end 
of the possession (plan for contingency) 
x After RotR changes occur not because the plan is not robust enough but 
because the company changes its priorities, budgets are not approved or 
approved late and failures at delivery produce a knock-on effect. These 
are all external factors that we cannot control 
x We have to manually cross check our plan against every version of RotR 
to make sure they're aligned. There is no way to mitigate mismatches 
apart from checking. Anything could go wrong (high uncertainty) 
x When going to functions (stakeholders) regarding the work they intend to 
develop for upcoming timetable year, information tends to differ a lot and 
often not in a controlled format. You trust the people and go to them rather 
than the process or the system 
x Contractors are allowed to plan with little detail and to change things at 
their convenience 
x At some point it comes down to a judgement call as to whether or not the 
detail provided with work banks is solid enough to go ahead 
x Because the requested access to deliver planned cyclic maintenance is 
not granted much of it ends up being solved under emergency 
possessions. this causes a knock-on effect of late changes 
5.2.4. Skills and job experience 
Experience and overall industry knowledge were mentioned by all planners 
as an important resource to realise what information is required at each 
step to support planning decisions (discussion on topic 5). According to 
planners, this enables an understanding of what the impact of planning 
decisions might be on the “day of the race”. Particularly in regards to the 
role of possession coordinator, two interviewees considered that having a 
minimum of experience in the rail sector is fundamental to develop a 
perception of what resources different jobs may require and of the 
constraints and limitations that must be taken into account. 
Referring to skills and competence in general, three planners considered 
that the organisation has not always been able to “allocate the right people 
to the right job”. One planner mentioned that frequent reorganisations do 
not allow sufficient time for new people to be adequately trained for new 
jobs. As a result, often people have little knowledge regarding the area for 
which they are planning for, or do not understand the capacities and 
limitations of machinery they are requesting. Overall, the planning 
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organisation was described as operating in “silos” and hampering any 
ability to share expertise and good practices. 
Experience also becomes relevant for the building of solid relationships 
with stakeholders (II, IM, customers, contractors and operations, among 
others). As previously mentioned, by knowing how people work and 
respond under different circumstances, planners are able to anticipate 
potential problems. In addition, these relationships establish levels of 
confidence and mutual trust that support informal discussion of issues and 
problem solving. 
Overall, the following attributes were mentioned as being important to 
achieve good planning: 
x Ability to communicate and work with different people and under 
different challenging circumstances, such as time pressure or 
uncertainty of information 
x Ability to uphold decisions during discussions with stakeholders and 
customers 
x Having a clear perception of one’s role and objectives within the 
planning process 
x Good geographical knowledge of the territory 
x Being able to adequately plan and manage a diary 
Two main types of background experience were identified amongst the 
interviewed planners: 
x An operations background, mostly acquired through signalling 
experience 
x An engineering background that is usually related to previous work with 
contractors and trackside work as PICOP, ES or COSS 
Although throughout interviews all planners recognised that background 
greatly influences the way in which they prioritise issues and make 
decisions, more detailed information is required to understand its real 
impact over the planning process as a whole. 











x It's taken me some 5 years to gain confidence in the job 
x Planning requires flexibility to respond to different people and situations 
x Being able to communicate and working with other people and properly 
build your arguments to deal with confrontation 
x Experience and understanding of the industry is fundamental to know 
what information to look for and to use as support for decisions. 
Understand what the impact of things might be 
x A lot of it is understanding how long it takes to deliver a job 
x Often people work in silos and don't have the right understanding of the 
commercial aspects or other business related issues. to actually 
understand what their decisions might affect 
x The majority of the planning managers have a signalling background. 
Some lack the experience  that allows them to understand how a renewals 
is delivered 
5.2.5. Rules and procedures 
The business process PL0056 was considered by all people interviewed to 
be a major contributor to the integrity of planning (discussion on topic 6). 
Having this formal support, planners were able to impose common 
milestones and deadlines to stakeholders. All interviewees described this 
as a gradual process through which they had to force stakeholders to 
provide the right information at the right time, or face access being denied. 
Although PL0056 was useful to enforce a “working to one way” at national 
level, none of the planners use the document as guidance for their daily 
work. Only the key meetings, the documents that must be produced, and 
the timelines are used to impose minimum requirements to stakeholders. 
Three people stated that failing to comply with the planning process was 
one of the major factors contributing to the erosion of planning robustness. 
One planner added that the control of change (PL0086 and Planning 
Change Control Forms - PCCFs) has reduced the amount of late changes 
and has brought in accountability for ones actions and decisions. 
When discussing Rules and procedures as whole, people at short-term 
planning (possession and worksite planning) mentioned difficulties in 
keeping up to date with frequent changes to the rulebook and 
understanding how those changes actually affect their activities. All 
planners in managing positions (TDPMs, ADPMs and PDMs) added that 
following procedures and rules is a safeguard when facing conflicts with 
stakeholders. Despite this support, most ADPMs interviewed referred that 
on occasions, they had been confronted with instructions from higher 
management levels (route management or maintenance directors) to agree 
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on late changes to the plan, mostly in the sense of accepting additional 
work, which was then described as business critical. 
It was stated by one planner that peoples' common practices, although 
based upon knowledge of the rules, are often based on an inaccurate 
interpretation, which can lead to serious consequences. At least four 
planners felt that rules and procedures might be inapplicable in view of the 
complexity of some scenarios and that “common sense” and experience 










x As a manager, following procedure is a safeguard 
x Rules and procedures do not adjust to reality but to have a common 
ground for everyone to work to is fundamental 
x There's often abusive use of rules through interpretations according to 
their own convenience 
x In all the time the PL56 is been in place, I have never referred to it. it 
hasn't really helped with our problems from TT-80 
x Throughout my experience (7 years in planning) late changes in the plan 
have never been limited to safety of the line. A decision should be made 
as to whether keep trying to push that as a procedure or just admit that 
changes will have to be accepted even after T-6 
5.2.6. Information and communication 
All interviewees pointed out information and communication channels as a 
crucial resource for planning. One ADPM stated that this job consisted of 
collecting and delivering information for 90% - 95% of the day. Two 
different trends in information problems were identified: 
x At long-term planning, issues with information are mostly related to the 
great diversity of formats and sources that have to be dealt with, as well 
as the differences in time lines of functions inputting to work packs. 
Three of the planners interviewed referred to this high variability in 
information as a major cause of time loss and of some frustration due to 
the duplication of work which it often incurs. 
x Within short-term planning, in particular at pre-possession stages, the 
lack of up-to-date and accurate information and frequent uncontrolled 
late changes are the main cause for concern. One planner at this level 
considered that communication between planning, onsite staff (PICOP), 
control and operations managers can greatly improve reliability and 
efficiency of work delivery. Several planners stated that having accurate 
and prompt information at this level can prevent a possession from 
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overrunning or even incurring in serious losses or injuries. 
There is a consensus amongst all planners towards the fact that the 
organisation is able to generate the necessary information to develop a 
reliable and detailed plan. However, planners were also unanimous when 
considering that the way that information is made available and processed 
does not support them adequately. All interviewees mentioned the frequent 
need to cross check and chase accurate information. The following main 
issues were mentioned by the majority of interviewees as causes for this 
lack of support: 
x A lack of feedback information from outside ones team prevents 
planners from developing any kind of visibility over planning 
performance as whole. Planners often mentioned not knowing what 
happens to planned work beyond their own sphere of intervention, as 
constant changes at all levels are the only certainty. 
x Stakeholders tend to deliver incomplete information and often late in the 
process. This inputs frequent changes and generates conflicts, which 
planners have to manage having little visibility over priorities and 
criticality of each work pack. The use of a great variety of information 
formats adds to the difficulty in integrating work packs. 
x Information is often imprecise and requires cross-checking of details 
from different sources. Issues usually have to be chased, which 
dramatically increases the amount of communications needed 
(particularly e-mailing) and the risk of planning failure. To avoid missing 
critical details, planners tend to consider all information as valuable until 
proven otherwise. 
x The use of different IT systems throughout the process that yet do not 
exchange data among themselves imposes a constant need to 
“translate” information from one system to the other. When changes are 
imported to the plan, information has to be updated into several systems 
individually. Some of the properties of these systems may not be aligned 
with the actual constraints and needs of planners, due to specific 
methods and organisations of work that vary amongst territories and 
areas, even within compliance with the process. One planner added that 
supporting planning with adequate information systems would 
considerably reduce the need for meeting attendance and 
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communication, which the sole purpose is often to cross check 
information. 
x Each function within the organisation has its own timings and business 
pressures to deal with, which do not necessarily align with planning 
commitments. This alignment becomes more difficult as planners have 
to deal with suppliers (contractors) and customers (TOCs), which 
inevitably have different business goals from Network Rail. 
Planners demonstrated being aware of the fact that at some point, making 
decisions comes down to a judgement call as to whether or not the 
information provided is solid enough to go ahead with planning. They try to 
mitigate poor quality information issues by developing solid relations with 
people working with stakeholders (namely TOCs) they feel they can rely on. 
All planners valued these work relations and more often resort to them, 
rather than relying on the formal communication channels. Informal 
discussion of issues is common practice but although highly valued, it is not 
seen as something that could replace the importance of formal agreements 
and documentation of decisions. Emphasis was given to the importance of 
keeping accurate records of all information formally brought into planning 
meetings as evidence and safeguard. This way of working strengthened 
relations between planning teams and some stakeholders, and was 
mentioned by all planners as a significant contribute to solving complex 
issues and adding robustness to planning. The following circumstances 
were mentioned as examples of this: 
x Improved cooperation and communication between TDPU and ADPU 
created an ability to anticipate problems and follow up on the planning of 
complex jobs with more accurate and detailed information to support it. 
x When solving planning conflicts and dealing with complex issues, having 
operations control, contractors or even TOC’s sitting through final 
planning meetings helped with better contingency planning. 
x Better detailed information for PICOP’s has contributed to improvements 
on possession performance and a decrease of irregularities. Initiatives 
such as granting PICOP access to network drives where possession 
details are stored and updated or publishing possession details under 
the general instructions of the WON were mentioned as successful 
approaches. 











x There's no information regarding the planning as whole. there's no 
visibility of the other levels 
x Information that helps anticipate could mean the difference between 
overrunning or not or someone being killed or not 
x Decisions and actions are usually initiated based on trusted informal 
communication channels 
x The lack of information and communication through integration of change 
creates problems for decision and prioritisation of issues 
x There's a lot of e-mailing and communication (with NAU...) that would not 
be required if it would not be for the need to cross check data. information 
has to be chased 
x As ADPM 90% - 95% of the day is spent on collecting and passing on 
information 
x When having to coordinate territory level requirements with other 
territories it is difficult to know who is your counterpart in those other 
territories to which you ought to be talking to 
x We usually work with specific contact persons, internally and externally. 
we know who takes care of what and where 
x Having a ROS (Resource Optimisation Specialist) and PCMR (Program 
Control Manager for Resources) allows planning to start requesting 
precise information from costumers and stakeholders a lot sooner in the 
process. Having this information from all 5 territories gives way to a more 
robust national plan 
x More specific walkouts that can provide detailed support information for 
planning are needed to reduce the chances for changes 
x We know that often new trains are late planned without that being 
discussed with us which often disrupts worksites that have gone through 
the planning procedure 
x We have to go back and request more details and review information on 
work banks. there's usually meetings to obtain detailed work banks 
x TDPU and ADPU as whole are working a lot more closely, mostly due to 
improved communications and decisions. this allows a much better 
understanding of the plan and supports a much more efficient problem 
solving 
x Issues that access planning teams (at territory level) see as a potential 
problem for possession delivery are straight on communicated and 
discussed 
x For very complex jobs, NDS and/or  LOMs (Local Operations Managers) 
could be invited to participate in planning meetings held specifically for 
that job 
x Information like level of priority, budget and risks for delivery are not 
integrated into planning 
x Through the complex relations between Network Rail and stakeholders, 
details of information and the actual priority of requests gets lost 
x The whole planning organisations discusses what to do in the 
infrastructure but they only involve the person that is actually in charge of 
it when they want access or not even then 
x We usually have to chase information although people will come to us 
because they need us to sort things out for them 
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5.2.7. Challenges for the future of the system 
The ability to respond to the demands brought in by the new timetables 
(2008 enhanced timetables, particularly in the West Coast Mainline) was 
pointed out by all planners as the major challenge ahead. Several concerns 
were raised regarding the preparedness of the organisation to deliver the 
necessary volume of engineering maintenance and enhancement projects 
under considerably reduced access time. Some planners provided further 
explanation of this by adding what they saw as requirements to achieve 
this: 
x Empowerment of front line staff (at delivery level) to make decisions and 
manage contingencies, as well as having people committing to the 
changes that need to be made to the planning process 
x Network Rail being able to be more present on site and better enforce 
the delivery of contracted work within schedule and plan 
x Eliminate organisational barriers (not working in “silos”) and 
fragmentation of key processes 
x Achieve better integration at national level (local problems versus route, 
national or political commitments) 
x Having people attending planning meetings and prepare for them 
accordingly 
x All planners referred to having people delivering the right kind of 
information at each level of planning. This includes improving the quality 
of the information provided by site visits, in order to support detailed 
worksite planning and prevent the need to solve issues on the night 
x Development of training and corporate induction programs for planners 
in order to improve competency and overall understanding of the 
organisation 











x Network Rail being able to be on site and enforcing work delivery. Making 
sure contractors work as they should 
x EEA (Efficient Engineering Access) changes. For resource planning it 
should improve because potentially there will be more mid-week use of 
haulage as opposed to massive use of resources during weekends. It may 
become more balanced 
x Having people delivering the right kind of information 
x How to put the big picture in the right frame (local problems versus route 
problems and national or political commitments) 
x Getting people to attend meetings and properly prepare for them 
5.2.8. Resilience 
The majority of the planners showed little awareness of the concept of 
resilience, when questioned about its meaning. However, after a brief 
description of the research field of resilience engineering, all interviewees 
related resilience to the way in which the system is able to reliably and 
efficiently manage planning changes. The organisational barriers with 
which the planning process operates, attributed by planners to its division 
between investments and maintenance as well as territory and area level 
teams, was mentioned by all interviewees as “an obstacle to planning 
efficiency and reliability”. 
Three planners associated resilience with the ability of people in planning to 
deal with adversities created by business and operation pressures. The 
planning organisation operates under considerable exposure to business 
and operation pressures, as it deals directly with critical decisions regarding 
the delivery of Network Rail’s service to its customers. Planners generally 
expressed this pressure through the need to solve conflicts created by 
insufficient access to respond to all maintenance and enhancement work 
needed. All interviewees recognised having experienced pressures from 
stakeholders to get their requests prioritised through planning and optimise 
resource availability to deliver the job in question. Given that often 
stakeholders are unable to meet planning requirements, planners are also 
pressured to facilitate procedures and allow jobs to go through. 
Planners made several observations regarding the reliability and efficiency 
of planning. The following issues were considered more relevant as 
contributing positively to this end: 
x Having a Resource Optimisation Specialist (ROS) at TDPU level has 
allowed planning to start requesting precise information from customers 
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and stakeholders a lot sooner in the process. The integration of this 
information from all five territories contributes to a more robust national 
plan. 
x The adoption of more standardised blocking points for possessions 
(using the same track mileage whenever possible) contributes to a more 
structured local knowledge and better understanding of local constraints 
whenever possessions have to be reviewed to incorporate new 
worksites. 
x For area possession planning, attending depots planning meetings gave 
way to a better understanding of work scopes and needs, and allowed 
for problems to be discussed within an engineering forum. 
On the other hand, the following issues were mentioned as deterrents to 
reliability and efficiency of planning: 
x In addition to the previously mentioned organisational barriers, 
numerous obstacles to communication were mentioned. In particular, 
two planners referred to the need to formalise all decisions involving 
TOCs through NAU as an obstacle.  
x Incompatibilities between the Annual Integrated Work Plan (AIWP) and 
RotR may occur, despite the thorough cross-checks carried out at 
different stages of planning. Such mismatches can compromise work 
delivery and credibility with customers. Due to the high frequency of 
changes, planners often have to rebuild plans two or three times over 
x Long-term planning used to consist on an outline of access and within 
that, work items were slotted. Currently the process states that higher 
level of detail should be developed earlier on, which means that changes 
later imposed cause more disruptions to plan and even access (RotR) is 
frequently changed 
x Project teams (Investments) tend to bring contractors in as late as 
possible as a way to reduce costs. This means that when project teams 
start negotiating terms with contractors, delivery arrangements already 
agreed with planning are bound to require change. 
x When conflicts arise, the information necessary to prioritise work and 
make decisions on what should go ahead and what should be rejected is 
often not available 
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Because of insufficient track access opportunities for all work demands, 
investments and maintenance compete with each other for priority. 
Planners stated that the fragmentation of the process is the main cause for 
this competition, leading to occasional conflicts and tensions, as each team 
attempts to minimise the impacts of business and operation pressures over 
their own performance. Nevertheless, most planners recognised that the 
adoption of a national integrating process, together with improved informal 










x There is already some resilience in the system, greatly on the account of 
the people in it 
x To have knowledgeable people capable and empowered to make 
decisions. It has to be given to the right people at the right job 
x Because of the gaps and misses when cross checking AIWP against RotR 
people don't get killed on track but we lose work and credibility with our 
customers. we end up re-do the whole thing 2 or 3 times because of 
constant changes 
x Changes affect our safety but we manage that by facing up to people who 
impose on us inappropriate change 
x We can’t have the necessary information to actually prioritise work and 
make decisions on what should go ahead and what should be reject when 
conflicts arise and work packs compete for access 
x We develop a robust plan but cannot accommodate change 
x Having a ROS (Resource Optimisation Specialist) allows planning to start 
requesting precise information from costumers and stakeholders a lot 
sooner in the process. Having this information from all five territories gives 
way to a more robust national plan 
x Project teams are unable to plan to the process because they tend to 
bring contractors in as late as possible as a way to cut costs 
x Historically, to get access sorted out has been the priority and resources 
were to be looked at after that was resolved. Since the introduction of 
ROSs progressively resources are being worked on together with access. 
Initially, it was necessary to run after the access planners and try to keep 
up with then but now team work practices are arising 
5.2.9. Major ups and downs of the planning process 
None of the planners mentioned any significant event as a breakdown or 
major failure of the planning organisation (discussion on topic 10). Those 
that worked under the “West Coast Programme” described the splitting up 
of access from possession planning and between territory and area level 
independent teams as a setback for the efficiency and reliability of the 
planning organisation. One of the planners in question stated that without 
the structure that existed under West Coast, the amount of work and the 
level of integration of jobs within access opportunities would have never 
been achieved. 
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Overall people interviewed considered that the planning organisation has 
improved more or less continuously. The following issues were mentioned 
as major steps forward for the planning organisation: 
x Formalising a process that establishes a “one way” of doing things at 
national level 
x Bringing in-house critical roles for safety and efficiency of work delivery 
(PICOPs) 











x To have one single team planning, developing and delivering the plan 
was far better than the current process. It provided a much bigger sense 
of ownership and accountability (West Coast Programme planning team) 
x West Coast project operated outside the national process. When the WC 
project was delivered the board decided to bring it all under one single 
national process. This was due to happen in 2006 but the project would 
not be delivered on time and a plea to the board was made to extend the 
one single team way of work 
x No training and poor corporate induction often results in low levels of 
competency in planning 
x When under Railtrack the management of major projects was brought in-
house because of problems with contractors, each possession manager 
would have 2 contractors under its supervision on a regular basis. Major 
projects management then started to include contingency plans and 
everything necessary to make sure that work was completed. When the 
in-house project management was implemented they found that there 
were problems both on the side of contractors and Railtrack (50/50) 
5.3. Planning archival data 
This section approaches the analysis of planning performance by looking at 
possible differences between areas in terms of the changes made and the 
duration of planning. As described in section 4.7, two different steps were 
considered. Meeting minutes were initially used to develop an 
understanding of the planning sequence and PPS provided data for the 
identification of planning trends in different geographical divisions. Prior to 
the presentation of data on each of these steps, details on the sampling 
methods are also provided. Section 5.3.1 discusses the sampling of 
meeting minutes and section 5.3.3 explains the extraction of PPS data. 
5.3.1. Sampling of meeting minutes 
The purpose of this approach was to develop a timeline of planning in order 
Understanding engineering planning 
157 
to capture the sequence and different types of changes made to 
possessions and worksites, as work is further detailed towards delivery 
date. As observed in section 4.7.1, this approach could only address part of 
the planning process and a particular section of track. Planners from Milton 
Keynes ADPU recommended the period of planning extending from the 
Area Development Meeting (ADM - 32 weeks before delivery) down to 
delivery as the most relevant one. This formed the core of ADPUs’ planning 
responsibilities. Keeping in mind that during the familiarisation interview, 
planning at area level was also described as the most critical period, the 
sampling of these stages of planning were considered appropriate. 
Regarding particular periods of the year, the feedback obtained from 
planners did not provide sufficient criteria for the selection a particular 
timing. Overall, planners considered that planning activities have no 
outstanding periods throughout the year. For the reasons earlier presented 
in section 4.8.1, the planning of work for the Christmas period of 2007 was 
considered a pertinent starting point for this analysis. 
Because these meeting minutes use no specific format or method, each 
planner tends to record information in a slightly different way. Despite this 
variability, the majority of notes taken concerned changes made to timings 
and locations of work, which could be easily interpreted on the base of a 
minimum of familiarity with the industry terminology. Regarding other types 
of changes to possessions or worksites, such as work or movement details, 
referring to the support of planners whenever clarification was necessary, 
enabled the interpretation of all the coding formats found in the course of 
this study. In addition, whenever records were unclear, it was also possible 
to check the information in the minutes against records inputted into PPS 
using the reference numbers of each work item. 
Following the outcome of discussions at Milton Keynes ADPU, meeting 
minutes for the planning of work to be delivered in the Euston to Madeley 
section (MD101) during week 39 (from 22 to 28 December 2007) were 
considered a valid sample. The following planning meetings were surveyed 
for this given week: 
x 32 weeks before delivery (ADM) 
x 14 weeks before delivery (T-14) 
x 6 weeks before delivery (T-6) 
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x 3 weeks before delivery (T-3) 
x 1 week before delivery T-1) 
The “data freeze” created prior to each meeting was transcribed into an 
Excel spreadsheet. The notes taken by planners and showing on the kept 
records were then added on the file against the corresponding data freeze. 
This gave way to the identification of the changes proposed and agreed in 
the course of a meeting, as well as those discussed in between two 
consecutive planning stages. This amounted to a comparison between 
input and output from one meeting to the next. In total, nine separate 
timeframes were analysed (the output of T-3 matched the input to T-1). The 
following types of changes were identified: 
x Creation or deletion (cancellation) of possessions and worksites, and 
any changes regarding the possession managers or details about the 
type of work within a worksite. 
x Blocked lines added or deleted (cancelled) from a possession or a 
worksite, and any changes made to their time, date or location. 
x Changes to the limits (extension or shortening back) of worksites and to 
their protection locations. 
x Creation or deletion (cancellation) of electric isolations associated to 
worksites, and any changes made to their time, date or location. 
x Introduction of general remarks. Depending on the areas and type of 
work being planned, these consist on specific possession delivery 
details such as contacts for key staff, critical delivery timings or 
equipment on site, among others. 
x Introduction of traffic remarks. These provide the identification and 
times for any machinery or engineering trains operating within the 
possession. 
5.3.2. The planning sequence 
During the planning period analysed and for the area studied (Euston to 
Madeley) with resource to meeting minutes, a total of 41 possessions and 
164 worksites were undergoing planning. Table 5.3 shows the number of 
items registered at the start and finish of this period. These figures show 
that four additional possessions were created while three were cancelled 
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and that 63 worksites were created against 33 cancelled. 
Table 5.3: Changes from T-32 (ADM) to T-1 
Po
s 
Initial number of Possession 37 
Final number of Possessions 38 
Total number of Possessions planned 41 
W
S 
Initial number of Worksites 101 
Final number of Worksites 131 
Total number of Worksites planned 164 
 
Table 5.4 summarises the categories of changes identified throughout the 
planning stages analysed. In total, 705 changes were made during this 
period. Approximately 66% of these were changes to worksites (468 
changes to worksites against 237 to possessions). 








Possession created  4 
Possession cancelled 3 
New Blocked line 53 
Cancelled Blocked line 30 
Block location amended 32 
Block Time & Date amended 47 
Traffic remarks 13 






Worksite created 63 
Worksite cancelled 33 
Worksite limits amended (mileage) 43 
Details of work amended (including linkage to possession) 169 
Details for engineering trains (i.e. times) 18 
Electric isolation created 14 
Electric isolation cancelled 6 
Electric isolation amended 17 
Worksite protection location created 16 
Worksite protection location cancelled 12 
Worksite protection location amended 77 
Total number of changes 705 
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The creation, deletion and changes to possessions are mostly associated 
with the type of work, duration and location for the worksites linked to that 
particular possession.  In particular, traffic and general remarks are added 
as work delivery within worksites becomes more detailed. Thus, most 
possession changes reflect changes made to worksites and to the delivery 
details for their work contents. 
The sequences of changes identified during this planning period, indicate 
that decisions to include larger areas within items were reversed at a later 
planning stage in the sense that these same items were then shortened 
back. These sequences not only suggest a need to review or even reverse 
planning decisions, but they also support the uncertainty and 
unpredictability aspects identified throughout the interview process. In the 
light of the evidence given by planners during these interviews and the 
information collected through the observation of planning meetings, the 
following sequences of changes can be considered as indicators of 
uncertainty and unpredictability in planning decision processes: 
x Three possessions were maintained all the way through delivery but 
were never linked to any worksites. This suggests that access was 
created to deliver work, which subsequently did not receive approval. In 
particular, one of these three possessions was disruptive to train 
operation and was created within the analysed planning period at 
approximately T-31 weeks (after ADM meeting). 
x Three worksites were submitted to mileage changes at least twice 
within this planning period and other two were submitted at least three 
times to this type of change. This indicates that either the work contents 
or their details of delivery were considerably modified consecutively. 
x Six possessions were submitted to changes to the location of their 
blocks at least twice and other seven possessions were submitted to 
this type of change three or more times. One possession had changes 
to its blocks at least six times within this planning period. 
x Of the 33 worksites cancelled, five were created within the planning 
period analysed. 
Table 5.5 shows the previously described categories grouped into major 
types of changes. This table provides an overview of the main trends of 
planning decisions. 
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Table 5.5: Major types of changes by percentage 
Time and date changes 7% 
Limits changes (line blocks, protection locations and mileages) 37% 
Isolation changes 5% 
Worksite details of work 24% 
New item creations and item cancellations 15% 
Other changes (Traffic and other details, General remarks and 
engineering trains) 11% 
 
Within these last 32 weeks of planning, 15% of the identified changes were 
creating or cancelling items. Although approximately 40% of this type of 
changes was proposed at the ADM stage, this shows that throughout the 
short-term planning fundamental changes to engineering access are still 
occurring, whilst planners attempt to focus on providing specific details to 
support work delivery. This can also account for the relatively large 
proportion of changes regarding the limits of possessions and worksites 
(37%). As the work items are added or cancelled, the areas to be taken 
under possession also tend to change. 
Information obtained from Anglia route control centre supports this 
conclusion. As later discussed in section 6.1.4, the Anglia control centre 
manager stated that for week 43 (from January 4 to 11), 17 requests for 
late changes were registered, of which 11 requests concerned 
amendments to existing possessions, including changes to isolations, 
possession limits and additional work, and the remaining six requests were 
for additional possessions. 
5.3.3. Extraction of data from PPS 
The previous step, although focusing on a specific time and location, 
provided a detailed timeline of planning changes. The goal at this stage 
was to produce a sample of quantified planning data that would cover all 
geographical areas and for the largest possible time scale. Using audit 
privileges, records of planning history were extracted from PPS onto Excel 
spreadsheets. Data was used to produce parameters as described in Table 
4.2. 
Data from PPS can be obtained by searching its historic records using 
geographical references and dates. However, this would require an in-
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depth understanding of the method according to which the rail network is 
divided and organised, in addition to a detailed knowledge of the national 
territory. In order to extract data from PPS more practically, reference 
numbers for possessions and worksites were obtained from previously 
published WONs. By referring to the WONs, it not only became easier to 
limit data to a precise week, but also the known geographical structures 
(described in the framework) could be used. 
Although the analysis of meeting minutes provided useful insights on 
planning performance and the management of changes, no criteria were 
identified to support further data sampling. The decision was to randomly 
select WONs from weeks within the timeframe of data available. At the time 
of this study, the widest possible timeframe made available by Network 
Rail’s online records was the second semester of the year 2008/2009 (from 
29-03-2008 to 28-03-2009). Given that there are 11 different WONs 
published nationally for each week of the year, the volume of data to be 
process for every week sampled constituted the main limitation for the 
sampling method. A sample size of three weeks was considered a 
reasonable compromise between the largest possible sample and the time 
necessary to process and analyse data. 
Possession reference numbers were taken from each of the 11 WONs 
published nationally and inputted to PPS in order to extract their history and 
the one of every linked worksite. The following three weeks were randomly 
selected: 
x Week 16: from 12-07-08 to 18-07-08 
x Week 24: from 06-09-08 to 12-09-08 
x Week 36: from 29-11-08 to 05-12-08 
A minimum of 10 possessions from each WON and all the linked worksites, 
was established. It is estimated that around 300 possessions are planned 
for each week and approximately 15000 per year. This means that the 
analysis of 330 possessions (10 from each of the 11 WONs and for each of 
the three weeks) represent 36% of the total 900 possessions that 
predictably were planned for the three weeks, and 2.2% of the estimated 
yearly total. Within the 330 possessions extracted, 1341 worksites were 
planned and 41053 changes were inputted to PPS. 
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5.3.4. Possession planning level 
Table 5.6 provides an overview of the statistics produced from the data 
extracted from PPS on possession planning.  The average values for the 
three weeks are given for each parameter showing in these tables. 












































































































































































Western 15.8 2.0 0.4 3.3 56.8 64.5 7.7 241 3.8 916 
Wessex 4.1 1.4 0.3 1.5 14.4 31.6 17.2 155 1.3 202 
Anglia 13.6 1.5 0.4 2.1 28.6 37.0 8.4 223 5.9 1316 
Kent & Sussex 6.0 1.9 0.3 1.8 24.1 36.8 12.6 250 2.1 525 
Scotland 13.5 1.6 0.3 2.3 14.1 16.8 2.7 436 3.6 1570 
LNW (S) 12.7 1.9 0.1 2.6 22.5 29.8 7.3 242 5.5 1331 
LNW (N) 24.0 1.9 0.3 3.0 25.5 30.7 5.2 447 7.5 3353 
LNE (S) 13.4 2.0 0.3 2.9 38.0 41.9 3.9 89 3.0 267 
LNE (Central) 9.5 0.5 0.3 1.1 20.6 23.7 3.2 198 3.5 693 
East Midlands 13.1 1.8 0.2 2.7 32.6 40.0 7.4 109 4.7 512 
LNE (N) 12.7 0.2 0.4 1.8 27.1 32.5 5.4 86 4.1 353 
National 
average 12.6 1.5 0.3 2.3 27.7 35.0 7.4 225 4.1 1003 
 
Within data in Table 5.6, four areas revealed patterns in terms of volume of 
change and duration of planning with relevance for the description of 
differences in planning activity: 
x Despite an averagely duration of planning, LNW (N) shows one of the 
highest overall volumes of change, mostly motivated by a volume of 
change to possession details considerably higher than other areas. In 
addition, this area is estimated to produce more than double the 
worksites of all the others (3353 worksites). Hence, within a relatively 
short period (planning duration), LNW (N) produces higher volumes of 
planning change and outputs more planned work. This can be 
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interpreted as LNW (N) demonstrating a level of planning activity higher 
than other areas. This discrepancy may be explained by the work 
undertaken within the West Coast Route Modernisation Programme, 
which was ongoing during this period. 
x Scotland shows the shortest planning duration whilst producing an 
average volume of change (2.3 changes per possession), which makes 
it the area with the highest number of planning changes per week of 
possession planning (approximately 22.1 changes/week against 16.6 
changes/week for LNW (N)). Scotland plans for approximately the same 
number of possessions as LNW (N), but registers a number of 
worksites per possession considerably lower and therefore, the 
estimated total number of worksites planned is close to half as the one 
for LNW (N). This suggests that although Scotland may have a 
relatively high level of planning activity, it plans for less work than LNW 
(N). It also indicates that Scotland plans for smaller possessions as it 
tends to integrate fewer worksites in each possession. 
x Contrary to LNW (N), data suggests that Wessex has one of the lowest 
levels of planning activity. Not only it registers the lowest estimated total 
number of worksites (202 worksites), but also one of the lowest 
durations of planning (14.4 weeks) and one of the lowest volumes of 
change (4.1 changes per possession and an overall volume of 1.5 
changes per parameter created). 
x The Western area stands out as the one with the highest volume of 
change (3.3) and the longest duration of planning (56.8 weeks). In 
particular, the start of planning shows a difference of approximately 
45% more than the average number of weeks (35 weeks). Although not 
shown in Table 5.6, the data collected revealed that Western had a 
possession under planning for a period of 112 weeks (for week 36), 
which constitutes the maximum duration of planning registered. These 
features also suggest a low level of planning activity as the one 
described for Wessex. However, it must be taken into account that 
Western produces an amount of planned work close to average 
(estimated 916 worksites), which distinguishes it from Wessex. 
In general, areas with higher durations of possession planning also tend to 
have higher volumes of change (overall volume). Figure 5.1 shows the 
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graphical position of the four areas previously discussed in relation to the 
remaining ones when plotting the duration of planning against the volume 
of change. While Wessex, Scotland and LNW (N) are more or less in line 
with the trend shown by the majority of areas, the duration of planning 
suggests a different pattern of planning activity for the Western area. 
 
Figure 5.1: Relation between duration of planning and overall possession volume 
of change  
LNW (N) and Scotland were identified as areas with a higher level of 
planning activity. This designation was given on the base of the high 
volume of change registered, the amount of work planned and the relatively 
short time window in which this planning was developed. However, these 
areas registered a clear difference in terms of the amount of work planned 
and in particular, the number of worksites integrated in each possession.  
Integrating progressively more worksites into possessions is likely to 
require a higher number of changes to possession details, in particular to 
the possession limits. For instance, as discussed in section 4.7.2, the 
possession details in PPS, apart from general and traffic remarks, also 
reflect the linkage of worksites to possessions. Hence, whenever a worksite 
is allocated or taken out from a possession, a change input is registered in 
PPS under possession details. Within this frame of mind, the differences 
between areas in terms of the volume of changes to possession details 
(Changes / Pos) and the number of worksites per possession were 
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Figure 5.2: Relation between volume of changes to possession details and number 
of worksites per possession 
The plotting in Figure 5.2 indicates that the volume of change to possession 
details tends to increase as the number of worksites per possession also 
increases. While LNW (N) produces 24 changes per possession, Wessex 
produces 83% less changes of this type (4.1 Changes / Pos). LNW (N) is 
clearly the area with the highest number of worksites per possession (7.5). 
Scotland shows one of the highest numbers of possessions published 
(436), while its number of worksites per possession is below average (3.6). 
This suggests that Scotland, despite having a considerably high volume of 
work planned (1570 worksites), tends to plan for smaller possessions with 
as few worksites as possible. Overall, Figure 5.2 and in particular the trend 
shown by LNW (N), suggests that making possessions larger to include as 
many worksites as possible may impose an increasing volume of planning 
changes. 
The plotting in Figure 5.3 was produced to verify if the number of 
possessions published (and therefore planned), regardless of the amount 
of work integrated into possessions, would demonstrate a similar 



































Number of WS / Pos (sample) 
Understanding engineering planning 
167 
 
Figure 5.3: Relation between the volume of changes to possession details and the 
number of possessions published 
The graphic shows a considerable dispersion of areas, which suggests that 
in fact, the complexity of possession planning is more related to the size 
and amount of work integrated into each possession, rather than the actual 
number of possessions planned. 
5.3.5. Worksite planning level 
Table 5.7 summarises the statistics generated from data extracted for 
worksite planning. In general, less clear differences are registered between 
areas and none of the patterns identified for possession planning are 
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Western 6.4 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.6 8.1 20.0 11.9 38 
Wessex 8.3 0.9 0.6 0.9 1.6 7.3 31.5 24.2 13 
Anglia 6.3 0.4 0.6 1.7 1.0 8.3 20.9 12.6 59 
Kent & Sussex 7.7 1.2 0.4 0.7 1.8 6.4 23.0 16.6 21 
Scotland 8.4 1.1 0.6 0.6 1.8 7.1 15.7 8.6 36 
LNW (S) 10.1 0.9 0.4 1.1 2.5 16.1 23.5 7.4 55 
LNW (N) 10.7 1.0 0.4 1.2 2.1 10.4 19.6 9.2 75 
LNE (S) 10.4 1.6 0.5 1.4 2.3 13.2 23.3 10.1 30 
LNE (Central) 6.5 0.5 0.3 1.1 1.0 9.5 26.5 17.0 35 
East Midlands 6.8 0.9 0.4 1.3 1.8 11.0 18.3 6.6 47 
LNE (N) 7.1 0.7 0.3 1.2 1.3 12.7 29.1 16.4 41 
National average 8.1 0.9 0.5 1.1 1.7 10.0 22.9 12.8 41 
 
Table 5.7 shows that volumes of change have different trends then the 
ones made evident for possession planning. LNW (N) remains the area 
with the highest number of items but with a less distinct difference from the 
remaining areas. LNW (N) is the area with both the highest volume of 
change to possessions and the highest number of worksites planned, which 
seems to be reflected in the volume of change to worksite details, where 
LNW (N) also shows the highest value (10.7 Changes / WS). Numbers for 
East Midlands suggests that this area plans worksites closer to delivery 
date that most other areas. This area finishes planning the closest to 
delivery (6.6 weeks before delivery), despite having an averagely duration 
of planning (11 weeks) by also starting later than most other areas (18.3 
weeks). 
As detailed in section 4.7.2, the identification of worksites were also 
extracted from PPS and grouped under major categories according to the 
expected degree of complexity involved in the planning of the work in 
question. Table 5.8 provides the average number of worksites (from the 
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three weeks) that areas planned under each of the derived major 
categories. In order to establish a comparison between areas, these 
numbers are shown as percentages of the total number of worksites 
planned.  































































































Western 55% 18% 6% 8% 3% 10% 
Wessex 23% 40% 15% 5% 8% 10% 
Anglia 53% 13% 8% 3% 15% 6% 
Kent & Sussex 52% 15% 15% 8% 10% 2% 
Scotland 43% 28% 4% 6% 12% 7% 
LNW (S) 39% 18% 8% 17% 15% 4% 
LNW (N) 55% 11% 12% 16% 2% 4% 
LNE (S) 58% 3% 13% 18% 1% 7% 
LNE (Central) 70% 8% 14% 2% 0% 5% 
East Midlands 44% 10% 17% 14% 6% 8% 
LNE (N) 60% 13% 15% 7% 0% 4% 
National average 50% 16% 12% 10% 6% 6% 
 
As expected, asset related work is clearly the main category. It should be 
noted that because PPS offered little information on the actual nature of the 
work, this category not only contemplates maintenance, but also minor 
renewals projects often managed by the maintenance organisation. 
Although not shown in Table 5.8, it was possible to determine that 
maintenance of track assets (plain track and S&C) accounts for 
approximately 55.5% of this work. 
LNE (S) area stands out by having nearly no inspection and patrolling work 
registered. The data available offered no justification for this trend but it is 
evident that any given area is required to perform higher volumes of 
patrolling and inspection work than an average of one worksite per week. 
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Thus, it can only be assumed that either it has been registered under other 
descriptions or in fact, it has no register, and patrolling and inspection work 
within this area is normally included under other worksites with little formal 
reporting to planning. 
Three categories predictably involve more planning work than the 
remaining ones: 
x Work on stations and particularly other structures such as tunnels and 
bridges, are likely to involve more equipment, which not only requires a 
number of specific inputs to planning, but also may impose higher 
constraints on delivery. 
x Major projects are normally delivered as a sequence of possessions 
throughout several days, weeks or even months. The sequence of work 
initially scheduled is likely to require more or less significant 
adjustments as work delivery evolves, which will import changes into 
planning. 
x Project related work, as described in Table 4.4 (section 4.7.2), consists 
on work necessary to either prepare for or conclude details related to 
major pieces of work. In particular, the work under the designation of 
“follow-up work” is frequently used to refer to work necessary to adjust 
the schedule of major projects. Hence, these items are often the source 
of numerous inputs to planning. Approximately 31% of worksites 
registered as follow-up work were submitted to major changes beyond 
the date of publication of the WON and its supplements (three days 
from delivery). Despite being linked to possessions, five of these 
worksites were still showing a status of “proposed” rather than 
“approved” and four others were moved to a different possession within 
this timeframe. 
In order to investigate how the type of work may affect planning, the 
percentage of worksites planned by each area under these three categories 
was plotted against the worksite volume of change, as shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4: Relation between worksite volume of change and the percentage of 
worksites dedicated to structures work and major project 
LNW (S) and East Midlands are the two areas with higher concentration of 
work under the previous three categories (39% and 38% respectively). 
Overall, Figure 5.4 suggests that areas that plan more complex work also 
tend to register higher volumes of planning changes, which indicates that a 
higher complexity of the work to be delivered tends to impose higher 
demands on planning. 
Overall, planning data indicates that the complexity of either the possession 
arrangements or the contents of worksites lead to an increased volume of 
planning change. On the one hand, as shown in Figure 5.2, the volume of 
changes to possession details increases with the number of worksites per 
possession. Although the size of possessions and the way in which they 
may become larger as more worksites are slotted in was not taken into 
consideration, this suggests that more complex possession arrangements 
with higher volumes of work contents also impose more planning work. On 
the other hand, as discussed in section 5.3.5 (worksite planning level), the 
type of work being planned influences the volumes of changes made to 
worksites. Data has shown that the planning of complex work, such as 
major projects and structures, tends to be subject to higher volumes of 
change. Major projects normally extend throughout several days of work 
and are subject to adjustments from day to day as unforeseen elements 
arise. Project teams often request worksites for follow-up work, which late 
in the planning process may change in nature and volume, or it may even 
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Interviews indicated that there is a considerable degree of informal planning 
activity, which becomes more relevant during the final stages of planning 
when details of delivery are defined. The consultation of PossMan outputs 
provided useful insight on planning activity during these stages. For 
instance, the WEN for week 8 which is sampled in Appendix 5, showed that 
for a possession to be delivered on the weekend of 16 and 17 May 2009, 
for the 21 worksites (as referenced in PPS) integrated, approximately 17 
changes, were being introduced about four weeks before delivery. The 
changes noted concerned mostly times and mileages but cancellations and 
changes to equipments and machinery were also registered. 
5.4. Chapter conclusions 
Overall, the findings in this chapter are compatible with the literature 
background on system complexity and decision making. Like many other 
planning and scheduling activities documented in literature (McCarthy & 
Wilson, 2001a), rail engineering planning can also be fundamentally 
described as a form of decision making that aims to allocate limited 
resources in view of organisational goals (Pinedo, 2009). The large 
organisational and geographical scale of the planning process is clearly at 
the source of both the distributed nature of decision making processes 
(Woods, 2006b) and the variability and uncertainty that result from high 
system complexity (Leveson, 2004). 
The interviews provided detailed information on a broad range of planning 
issues. The initial interview was particularly relevant for the understanding 
of the planning process as a whole and how it relates to the remaining 
engineering functions. This knowledge is part of the information presented 
in section 2.3. Planners demonstrated being aware of the fact that planning 
must above all, support work delivery with reliable information. This 
became clear by the statements of interviewees regarding the need to 
understand the impact of their decisions on delivery and their concerns 
towards the impacts of frequent and late changes in planning. The following 
themes were considered the most relevant within the scope of this 
research: 
x The planning organisational structure is characterised by a considerable 
degree of fragmentation. Planners identified this as a problem and 
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placed at its origin the different organisational functions and various 
geographical divisions that participate in the planning process. As 
described by Carayon (2006), the interactions among people who work 
across organisational, cultural and temporal boundaries are major 
sources of complexity in sociotechnical systems. 
x Dealing with frequent planning changes was described as one of the 
major problems. Changes were described by planners as the source of 
unpredictability in process and of uncertainty towards the decisions 
made. Both internal and external sources of uncertainty were identified 
(Crawford & Wiers, 2001). While the fragmentation of the planning 
process constitutes an internal source, external uncertainty is mainly 
generated by the fact that planning relies considerably on inputs from its 
operating environment (stakeholders). 
x Experience was regarded as a key factor towards reliable and efficient 
planning. Planners described experience as the source of confidence in 
the decisions made and the base for developing reliable work relations 
within the planning organisation. A as argued by Svenson (1996), 
accumulated experience in a given environment or task reduces the 
level of complexity of decision making within that same context. Roland 
et al (2011) also found that planners rely on overall knowledge of the 
businesses to solve decision problems and on efficient access to 
information to accurately interpret the state of affairs and of planning 
scenarios. 
x Information related issues were often mentioned during discussions 
with planners. Not only does incomplete information about system 
behaviours generates uncertainty, but also the volume of information 
that is generated and transmitted throughout the system creates 
potential for information loss, imprecision or incompleteness, which can 
lead to severe physical and financial losses (Leveson, 2004). As 
observed by Kirwan (1998), communications and group factors become 
dominant as decisions become distributed across increasing numbers 
of people and larger organisational and geographical areas. Planners 
regarded informal means of communication as a fundamental resource 
to, not only respond to planning needs with efficiency and anticipate 
potential planning conflicts, but also understand the potential impacts of 
planning decisions on delivery and develop appropriate 
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contingency plans. 
x The ambitious capacity enhancement targeted for the near future (to be 
delivered during CP4 and CP5) was considered a major challenge. The 
impacts of these targets on the volume of engineering work to be 
planned and on the available access to deliver it were often discussed 
by planners as a cause for concern. The transformation of planning, 
and the engineering organisation as a whole, were also mentioned as a 
challenge and a necessary step to respond to the upcoming demands. 
x Planners related resilience in planning to the ability of people to 
manage conflicts between business pressures and the conditions 
necessary for the deliverability and protection of the engineering work 
submitted to planning. This is consistent with the arguments of 
McCarthy & Wilson (2001a) in terms of the need to manage pressures 
and conflicting circumstances within planning and scheduling activities. 
x The reference made to planning under the West Coast Mainline Project 
(section 5.1.3) provides initial indications of potential sources of 
resilience in planning. The NAU manager interviewed described a 
cohesive planning team under this programme with an increased ability 
to deal with issues through an efficient information exchange and 
shared good practices. This is compatible with the information needs 
previously mentioned and with some of the aspects referred to in Table 
3.6 (section 3.4.6) as characteristics of a resilient system, in particular 
the willingness to learn from, and respond to, events (T+1 meetings) 
and the use of this as feedback information that can improve awareness 
(Jorna et al, 2005). 
Through the analysis of PPS data, considerable differences between areas 
became apparent in terms of planning change patterns and duration of 
planning. The exploratory work carried out led to the identification and 
quantification of different factors that may influence planning performance. 
Data for all areas suggests that planning is subject to a considerable 
degree of variability. The reversing of planning decisions identified through 
meeting minutes (section 5.3.2) and the variability of PPS data (sections 
5.3.4 and 5.3.5) confirm aspects of variability and uncertainty in planning. In 
particular, the fact that planning changes appear to intensify as delivery 
approaches, supports the notion of the need for adjustments to local 
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operating conditions (Grote, 2004 and Hollnagel, 2009a). The graphical 
illustrations of the volume of change against the remaining indicators gave 
way to a better understanding of how planning “behaves”. Rather than the 
actual amount of planning work, the determining factors seem to be related 
to the way areas manage their own planning needs. 
At possession planning level, change appears to be generated by a higher 
density of possessions. While areas such as LNW (N) that tend to plan for 
larger possessions register higher volumes of change, others such as 
Scotland tend to plan possessions with fewer worksites and register lower 
volumes of change. LNW (N) was considered the area with the highest 
level of planning activity, as it produced one of the highest volumes of 
changes to possessions, while having a relatively short duration of planning 
and planning for the highest number of possessions. At worksite level the 
contents of work seem to be the determining factor. Areas with higher 
concentrations of more complex work (work on structures and major 
projects) have registered higher volumes of change, which suggests that in 
fact work that can be more complex to deliver also imposes higher 
demands on planning. Complex organisational endeavours also require 
complex planning work to forecast possible scenarios and allocate 
resources and people accordingly, either as a primary course of action or a 
contingency solution (Jorna & Kiewiet, 2007). 
The analysis of meeting minutes offered a better understanding of planning 
than PPS data, as it facilitated the detailed description of a planning 
timeline. Based on the description of planning changes and their sequence, 
this approach showed that decisions are often reversed and that 
fundamental changes to access are made, even at the last stages of 
planning. The similar way in which planners referred to changes during the 
interviews suggests that the trends identified in the analysis of meeting 
minutes may be common to other areas. This would mean that differences 
between areas are more relevant in terms of timings and volumes, rather 
than specific types of change. Thus, although changes and duration of 
planning may be valid as indicators of performance, a level of detail beyond 
what PPS data allows is necessary to produce more conclusive results. 
Understanding asset management and work delivery 
176 
6. Understanding asset management and work delivery 
As observed in the conceptual framework (section 4.3), understanding the 
success of planning needs to recognise its relationship with engineering 
work delivery. This chapter studies the performance of work delivery 
through the analysis of possession delivery related incidents. A study of the 
main characteristics of the infrastructure in each area was also carried out 
to identify possible impacts of the infrastructure profile both on planning and 
delivery of work. As discussed in section 3.6, understanding system 
resilience requires the investigation of interactions within the system and 
between the system and its operating environment. Overall, this chapter 
develops an understanding of the wider system environment in which 
planning operates, in order to support the interpretation of planning 
performance. 
Objectives Questions Methods 
2) Identify the critical 
human and 
organisational factors 
of the rail engineering 
planning system. 
3) Investigate relations 
between planning and 
engineering work 
delivery and identify 
the impacts of planning 
on work delivery. 
x How do the planning 
process and its 
organisational structure 
support or hinder decision 
making processes? 
x What are the main trends 
in work delivery 
performance? 
x What are the different 
trends in the relations 






x Safety data 
analysis 
x Analysis of 
infrastructure and 
asset archival data 
6.1. Familiarisation interviews 
These interviews provided an overall understanding of engineering work 
delivery and any issues emerging from its relations with planning. As 
discussed earlier in section 4.4.2, the purpose was to obtain insights from 
people whose work relied on the output produced by planning. 10 
unstructured interviews were conducted with PICOPs, signallers and route 
controllers, as these could be considered the “end consumers” of the 
information produced by the planning process. Following the presentation 
used in sections 5.1 and 5.2, relevant quotes of interviewees are given in a 
table format at the end of each sub-section. 
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6.1.1. PICOPs from London Bridge Maintenance Delivery Unit 
All three PICOPs demonstrated little knowledge and concern towards the 
planning process. Their visibility of this part of the organisation appeared to 
be limited to pre-possession briefings. A senior PICOP acknowledged not 
being aware that planning consisted of a process with an approximate 
duration of 18 months. PICOPs admitted giving little consideration to the 
information discussed at these briefings, as too often it is subjected to late 
changes. Going over a list of possession limits, machines, trains and 
names was considered little added value to prepare for possession. Having 
an accurate local knowledge and up-to-date information on site conditions 
were considered by all PICOPs as the most valuable assets to manage 
delivery. In this regard, the use of “white board” representations was 
regarded a useful exercise to review possession details. 
The most significant remarks were made in regard to frequent late 
changes. All PICOPs stated that they often found discrepancies between 
what is discussed at the PICOP briefing and what they are provided with in 
the PICOP possession packs. Such changes concern blocking points, 
trains and their paths, and even the numbers and types of on-track plant 
booked. The interviewed PICOPs admitted being confronted on the night 
with the addition or cancellation of trains or machines, for which they had 
no record of in their packs, even though the ES may have had the required 
paperwork. This was mentioned as a major cause of disruption to PICOP 
work, as it forces them to review the entire possession management, 
which, under more complex delivery scenarios, can be a cause for failures. 
Unexpected changes were also brought up as a source of stress during 
delivery, as PICOPs are aware that communications with staff on the 
ground are not always as reliable as they would feel necessary to manage 
such issues. 
The maintenance organisation was pointed out as the major source of such 
disruptions. Despite recognising recent improvements in the maintenance 
organisation, two of the PICOPs interviewed felt that the lack of 
coordination and communication between the different maintenance 
sections remained a critical issue. 
PICOPs stated that they are rarely asked to input on planning, even at T-3 
or T-10 days stages. They considered it of limited use for them to take part 
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in these planning stages or earlier ones. All PICOPs have identified night 
rosters as one of the difficulties to having any participation in planning. 
They sometimes have to extend their night shifts and stay in during part of 










x At PICOP meetings things get re-planned and sometimes on the night we 
get changes to mileages and other things 
x We always pickup discrepancies (in possession documentation) when 
taking possession 
x I need to take my own time (out of rosters) to prepare for the night and go 
to PICOP meetings 
x Departments in maintenance don’t talk to each other 
x I have no idea what planning does 
6.1.2. Signallers from London Bridge signal box 
Similar to PICOPs, signallers also expressed little awareness of the 
planning process. Although the majority of their complaints were directed to 
the delivery of work, the frequent need to verify a succession of 
supplements for several possessions was referred to as a burden imposed 
on signallers by planning. Both signallers stated that the possession 
granting processes would be improved considerably if items in the WON 
were entirely re-issued when more than one amendment had been made. 
This would prevent having to chase information, as amendments may not 
sometimes be delivered to the signaller on duty. This creates a potential for 
irregularities and failures, as PICOP and signaller may go through 
possession arrangements using different sets of information. As a standard 
precaution, both signaller and PICOP always verify and crosscheck 
supplements by number. 
Signallers considered that planning errors are frequent and that these are 
mostly related to machine and train routes. These errors often cause delays 
in the process of taking or handing back possession of the line, as routes 
have to be re-checked for possible conflicts with train services. In general, 
the information published was considered sufficient, although specific 
characteristics of the area may not be mentioned, such as the need to 
protect possession flanks (lines alongside of those taken under engineering 
possession, which remain open to traffic). Experience as a signaller and 
local knowledge were described as critical assets to realise any additional 
requirements. Taking part in planning meetings was considered useful for 
complex scenarios and a good practice to be further encouraged. 
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Access under T2 protection arrangements (section 2.3.4) was considered a 
cause for higher concerns. These tend to be less planned and contain poor 
details, which imposes a higher number and longer communications for 
protection arrangements. In addition, the possibility of coordination between 
work to be carried out under T2 arrangements and work requiring 
possession of the line (T3 arrangements) is rarely considered. As stated by 
a signaller, “T2 requests are poorly aligned with work planned under T3 












x There’s too much paper and too much information we don’t need 
(regarding the WON) 
x We always have to be checking and double checking references 
x T2 requests are poorly aligned with work planned under T3 
arrangements 
6.1.3. Signallers from Liverpool Street from signalling centre 
The signalling centre at Liverpool Street is one of the busiest ones in the 
London area due to the complexity of tracks under its control and the 
volume of traffic it manages. All four signallers presented similar views on 
the information produced by the planning organisation. The main issues 
were related to the fact that information on possessions is scattered 
through different sections of the WON, whenever it involves different route 
areas. One signaller suggested that, similar to PICOPs, having “information 
packages” prepared beforehand would support them in anticipating issues 
and thus, considerably reduce their workload peaks (for instance, having to 
grant possessions simultaneously) and increase the efficiency of 
possession granting processes. 
The number of amendments to published items was also considered a 
problem by these four signallers, despite showing some appreciation for the 
fact that changes cannot always be anticipated. All signallers expressed 
concern in regards to non published changes and the way these can affect 
their performance by imposing time consuming verifications and additional 
demands on operations under their control. Signallers admitted often 
finding conflicting information between the WON and train notices 
(information on schedules and routes of all trains) regarding possession 
limits and train routes. The lack of planning for work under T2 protection 
arrangements was also considered a problem by all four signallers. 
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Signallers considered that the complexity and high volume of work that 
characterises this area often makes it infeasible to grant each possession 
on time, due to the short time window between possessions that is 
contemplated in planning. Under such circumstances, signallers have to 
establish priorities, having little information regarding the criticality of the 
work within each possession. Thus, all four signallers welcomed any 
additional information regarding possession details, in particular, on train 
movements, as it created the possibility to anticipate issues and better 
prepare for granting possessions on time. One signaller added that having 
wider possessions, rather than multiple short blocks, could limit such 
problems, as well as reduce the amount of paper to be kept on the 
signalling desk. 
Being called into planning meetings was also mentioned by all signallers in 
this box as a valuable good practice. In the same scope, interviewees 
added that having the PICOP in the box could increase reliability and 












x The information we need is scattered in the WON. We have to be going 
back and forth 
x We can’t always take possessions on time because that would mean 
having to respond to calls simultaneously. The time between possessions 
is often too short 
6.1.4. Anglia route control centre 
Control centres are not directly involved in the processes of protecting and 
carrying out work on the infrastructure. However, control centres must be 
kept informed of all activities carried out in the infrastructure which may 
affect train operations. This is clearly the case of possessions of the line. 
An interview with an Anglia route control manager was arranged in order to 
collect additional evidence on the views expressed by PICOPs and 
signallers. 
Late changes generated by the planning system were also the mentioned 
as the major concern. The interviewee offered as evidence, the register of 
late changes for week 43 (from January 4th to 11th), during which, apart 
from six additional possessions, 11 requests for amendments to existing 
possessions were made, ranging from changes to isolations, possession 
limits and additional work (repair of rail defects). One of the main 
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consequences of such levels of change pointed out by the controller, were 
the conflicts generated between train paths and possession limits, which 
tend to occur every night. 
Similar to what was stated by signallers, this interviewee also considered 
the poor alignment between T2 arrangements and possessions as a source 
of problems and conflicts in access. 
Late running trains were also mentioned as a frequent problem for 
possessions. Nevertheless, a reduction in possession overruns has been 
observed in the last few years, which the interviewee attributed mostly, to 
maintenance being able to plan to a more adequate level of detail. Despite 
noticeable improvements, the controller expressed concern towards what 
he described as a significant shortage of staff, access and budget to 
respond to the volume of maintenance work to be delivered. To some 
extent, this volume of work was attributed to an aging infrastructure. It was 
mentioned that repairing rail defects and crossovers is one of the most 
frequent maintenance work requirement. 
Regarding communication and information, it was mentioned that the 
triangle between PICOP, signaller and controller works well within this 
route. Some problems may occur with renewals and projects, as PICOPs 
are usually working under a contractor. This means that, instead of 
communicating informally with signallers and control centre, because they 
are not “in-house” staff, PICOPs relate to National Delivery Services (NDS), 












x The triangle between PICOP, signaller and control works well here and 
has solved many problems 
x Maintenance is living serious resource limitations to respond to all work 
necessary 
6.2. Safety data analysis 
Work delivery incidents were analysed using data from the national control 
logs and incident categories extracted from the asset incident trends 
database. The analysis of control logs was based on interpretative work, 
aiming to identify evidence for the impact of planning on work delivery. 
Asset incident trends provided more precise statistics to support the 
interpretation of control logs. 
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6.2.1. Control logs 
Control logs referring to the same three weeks used as a timeframe for the 
analysis of planning data were reviewed. Nine incidents were registered 
during these three weeks sampled (Week 16: 3 incidents; Week 24: 2 
incidents; Week 36: 4 incidents). Considering the diversity of the contents 
of logs, the size of this sample was considered too small to support a valid 
discussion. An additional period of three months (from January to March 
2009) was surveyed to produce a more reliable sample. Within this 
additional period, 43 relevant incidents were identified. 
Table 6.1 shows the main outcome of this analysis according to each of the 
categories and the two levels of coding described in section 4.8.  Because 
of the different timeframes, the nine events that occurred within the three 
weeks for which planning data were analysed were kept separate from the 
remaining data. The distribution of these nine events is shown in the 
columns designated as “Planning weeks”. Whenever the log contents 
provided information relevant for more than one category, the event in 
question was registered simultaneously in the categories concerned. This 
was particularly important to improve the level of detail of cause analysis, 
as logs would often offer evidence for several relevant causal relations. 
Hence, when summing up numbers in the first part of Table 6.1 (first level 
of coding – causes) this will actually correspond to the total of causal 
factors identified and not the 43 incidents analysed. 
Table 6.1: Analysis of control logs 
Causes Jan – Mar 2009 
Planning 
weeks 
(16, 24 and 36) 
Planning failure 11 26% 3 
Equipment failure 14 33% 3 
Extreme weather 2 5%   
Staff shortage 4 9%   
Points run through 8 19% 2 
Cable damage 5 12%   
Other asset damage 2 5%   
Late start 1 2%   
Other 5 12% 1 
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Outcome Jan – Mar 2009 
Planning 
weeks 
(16, 24 and 36) 
Possession overrun 34 79% 8 
Additional work 17 40% 2 
Work cancellation 1 2%   
Problem mitigated 2 5%   
Planning issues Jan – Mar 2009 
Planning 
weeks 
(16, 24 and 36) 
Worksite planning 20 47% 3 
Possession planning 4 9%   
Staff rosters 3 7%  
Haulage / machine routing 5 12% 1 
Haulage / machine planning 1 2%  1 
Non related / no evidence 16 37% 4 
 
Overall, there appears to be coherence between the distribution of 
incidents registered during the three planning weeks and the one observed 
from January to March 2009. The categories showing higher percentages, 
as well as the distribution per route (Table 6.2), coincide with the 
distribution of the nine incidents observed within the planning data period. 
This improves confidence in the fact that the robustness of the comparative 
studies will not be affected by the difference of timescale between the 
planning and the possession delivery topics. 
Based on the coding method used and considering the three months period 
together with the planning weeks, control logs offered evidence of planning 
failures as a causal factor for 14 (11+3) out of the 52 incidents under 
analysis (43+9), which corresponds to 27%. Although not shown in Table 
6.1, within this category, six incidents were attributed to worksite planning 
issues and another four incidents were attributed to possession planning. 
Moreover, according to the criteria of the second level of coding, Table 6.1 
shows that planning issues were identified on the description of 38 
incidents, which corresponds to 73% of the total 52 cases. 
The damage to assets during work delivery appears as the main cause for 
possession failure. 32% of the events involved either points being run 
through, cable damage or damage to other assets. However, of the 15 logs 
concerned in this percentage, only six show evidence of planning related 
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issues. Beyond the fact that 10 out of these 15 incidents resulted in a 
possession overrun, additional repairing work was needed in all cases, 
which often meant requesting new access. This suggests a potential knock-
on effect of incidents on planning. 
Worksite planning is clearly the most important planning issue, with 20 of 
the logs from the three months analysed (47%) showing evidence of such 
problems. These 20 incidents represent 74% of all planning issues 
identified (excluding “non related / no evidence” cases). The contents of 
these 20 logs revealed the following main issues: 
x Site access or terrain conditions not properly assessed in view of 
planned delivery details. 
x Inadequate machinery or equipment planned for in view of work delivery 
requirements. 
x Sequential nature of work not properly assessed in terms of 
deliverability risks. 
Table 6.2 shows the distribution of events by route. While only 43 incidents 
were identified during the three months period, because two of these 
incidents affected two different routes, the total for the possession failures’ 
column is 45. Additionally, Table 6.2 shows the distribution by route for the 
main categories illustrated in Table 6.1. 


























Western 8 19%   1 9%   5 25%  8 24%  
Wessex 6 14%   3 27%   3 15%  5 15%  
Anglia 6 14% 1 1 9% 1 4 20%  4 12%  
Kent 2 5%   2 18%   0 0%  2 6%  
Sussex 3 7%   0 0%   1 5%  1 3%  
Scotland 5 12% 2 0 0% 1 2 10% 2 5 15% 2 
LNW 10 23% 4 4 36% 1 5 25% 1 7 21% 4 
LNE 5 12% 2 0 0%   0 0%  3 9% 1 
 
LNW stands out as the route with the highest numbers across all the 
categories.  The Western route shows a similar trend, except for planning 
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failures as a main cause. Although following the second level of coding, 
worksite planning issues were identified in five of the logs from the Western 
route, only one of these logs provided evidence towards a planning failure 
as a main cause (first level of coding). 
6.2.2. Asset incident trends (possession delivery incidents) 
The three types of incidents discussed in section 4.8 and considered 
relevant for this scope of analysis, are shown in Table 6.3. The average 
number of incidents per period is given for the year 2008/2009 and is 
presented both by route in order to maintain the same structure as the one 
used for control logs, and by WON areas for comparison with planning 
data. Because this database is organised by engineering areas and the 
WONs for LNE (S) and LNE (central) correspond to one single area, they 
are shown in Table 6.3 together. 
































































Total Route Total 
Western 18.6 27.0 0.9 46.5 Western 46.5 
Wessex 44.5 20.1 3.8 68.5 Wessex 68.5 
Anglia 31.1 28.3 5.8 65.2 Anglia 65.2 
Kent & Sussex 
30.0 19.2 5.9 
88.8 
Kent 55.1 
15.0 11.4 7.3 Sussex 33.7 
Scotland 0.5 13.5 0.4 14.4 Scotland 14.4 
LNW (S) 40.5 33.5 4.7 78.7 
LNW 135.7 
LNW (N) 27.8 26.2 3.0 57.0 
LNE (S & central) 16.8 22.5 1.2 40.4 
LNE 111.8 East Midlands 23.2 12.8 0.5 36.5 
LNE (N) 10.5 22.7 1.8 34.9 
 
Data in Table 6.3 reveal a similar trend as the one mentioned in the 
discussion of control logs regarding the LNW route. According to the types 
of incidents analysed here, both LNW and LNE show numbers that are 
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close to double of those for all other routes while Scotland registers 
considerably less incidents than any other route. Despite this tendency, the 
Wessex area shows the highest number of patrolling incidents. It should be 
kept in mind that both LNW and LNE routes are composed of four different 
engineering areas, while most other routes are only divided into two areas. 
Across all routes, work left incomplete registers considerably lower 
numbers than the other two types of incidents. This difference might be 
motivated by a tendency from work delivery to favour a possession overrun, 
rather than leave work incomplete when the schedule of the possession is 
compromised. The numbers for Sussex illustrate a different pattern, as the 
three types of incidents in Table 6.3  have considerably lower differences 
between them. While showing some of the lowest numbers for track patrol 
and possession overrun, Sussex leaves as much work incomplete as LNW. 
When considering the analysis of control logs together with the data taken 
from the asset incident trends database, LNW clearly stands out as the 
route with the highest number of failures in terms of both the actual delivery 
and the incidence of planning issues on delivery. Regarding Scotland, there 
appears to be a different tendency between the outcome of control logs 
analysis and data from the asset incident trends. While according to control 
logs, Scotland registered a considerable number of incidents, mostly 
resulting in overruns, asset incident trends confirmed this route as the one 
with the lowest incidence of possession related incidents. From a planning 
perspective, based on the first level of coding, no evidence of planning 
failures as a main cause was found on control logs. 
For both sources of data, the volume and type of work planned by each 
area must be taken into account as a contributing factor for the incidence of 
possession failures. An area that plans and delivers higher volumes of work 
will necessarily have a higher exposure to incidents than other areas. 
Similarly, areas delivering more complex work or work with higher 
deliverability risks should also be expected to register higher rates of 
possession incidents. These aspects will be later explored in the context of 
the interactions between planning and possession delivery in section 7.2.1. 
6.2.3. The Christmas 2007 overruns 
As described in section 4.8.1, the events surrounding the severe 
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possession overruns that took place during the intensive period of 
engineering work of Christmas 2007 were considered an important source 
of evidence on issues regarding the relations between planning and work 
delivery. Between 24 December 2007 and 2 January 2008 more than 1000 
pieces of work were delivered. The following figures demonstrate the scale 
and complexity of this national plan: 
x More than £123 million were invested 
x 414 possessions and 2300 worksites 
x Over 1.2 million man hours were worked, which equates to 5000 people 
working on the railway at any time in a 24-hour period 
x Among other types of work, 35km of track were renewed, and 77 S&C 
units were delivered 
x Throughout this work, only one very minor ‘reportable' accident 
occurred 
Appendix 8 summarises the different work scopes that occurred 
simultaneously throughout the country during this period. 
Work at Rugby was part of the West Coast Route Modernisation (WCRM) 
and was aimed at delivering improved capacity and performance in the 
area of Nuneaton – Rugby. The work to be delivered over the Christmas 
period was deemed crucial to allow an enhanced timetable to come into 
place in the New Year. It should be pointed out that the planning team to 
which the NAU manager referred to during the familiarisation interview 
(section 5.1) was no longer in place when most of the work delivered in this 
period and within the area of the West Coast Main Line were submitted to 
planning. 
An initial scheme from 2002/03 consisted on demolishing and relocating 
Rugby station. In 2004 this was replaced by a less costly scheme that 
worked around the current location to rebuild the station and reconfigure 
track layouts. Despite reducing costs, this new project introduced technical 
challenges with a degree of complexity never before experienced by the 
WCRM programme. This work included: 
x Installing more than 5km of overhead line 
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x Bringing into use 5.3km of new track,15 new sets of points and 18 new 
signals 
x Making 16 new track connections 
x Installing 9 new signalling 'booster' cabinets 
Table 6.4 summarises the information reported by means of control logs 
since the start of work related to the Rugby. Reports on the remaining 
possession overruns were also collected and are presented in Appendix 8 
to provide a perception of the chain of events at a national level. 




/Item Event description 
22-12-07 
(Sat) 39 / 6 














Possession continued to overrun with a completion date of 
05:00 Thursday 03/01. Prior to the start of the blockade over 
the Christmas period, it had been determined that the work 
could not be completed during the planned timescales and the 
possession had been extended to be given up at 05:20 
Tuesday 1st January 
10:00 (Mon): Overhead Line Equipment (OLE - electrification) 
work was 6 hours late with no chance of recovery and the 
possession would overrun until 12:00 on 1st January 
11:00 (Thu): OLE work was behind the revised schedule. 
Further conferences with the Project teams determined that 
there had been very little progress and it was estimated that 
the possession would now overrun until Wednesday 2nd 
January. Additional OLE staff were transferred to the site 
11:50 (Thu): tamping operations would not be completed until 
08:00 Wed 2nd January and the OLE renewals programme 
was in disarray. Further investigations revealed that at least 24 
hours of work was required, with no detailed assessment of 
actual work completed available, no confirmed resources 
determined and no rectification plan formed 
14:00 (Thu): the status of the overrun would transfer to that of 
recovery from an operational incident and an Incident 
Management structure was put in place 
Arrangements were made for engineers to attend at 07:00 
Wed 02/01 to carry out a complete walkthrough of the entire 
worksite 














Work on completing outstanding track and OLE renewals 
continued through the day, with the 16:00 conference reporting 
that ballast unloading and associated tamping operations 
would be completed by 22:30. Lists of outstanding OLE tasks 
had been compiled and allocated to the additional OLE teams 
on site, estimating that OLE Section proving work would 
commence by 22:00. By 04:00 track work was almost 90% 
complete. OLE work continued with section proving expected 
to commence at 08:00 Thu 03/01. A test train was arranged to 













22:32 (Wed): Possession handed back. All test runs were 
completed at 0318 with no further problems reported 
23:40 (Wed): electric test train reported a loss of line light on 
the Down Fast and OLE staff were sent to site 
00:45 (Thu): work required on two drapes was commenced 
02:37 (Thu): work was completed, and the additional 
possession and isolation handed back 
02:40 (Thu): electric test run over the Down Fast commenced 
and no problems were found 
03:18 (Thu): all test runs completed with no further problems 
reported 
03:35 (Thu): all infrastructure signed into use 
 
The events described in Table 6.4 clearly show how from day-to-day, work 
delivery progressed outside the predicted and planned schedule. In 
particular, it shows that whatever contingencies were put in place, these 
were insufficient to buffer the extent of the deviations from the initial plan. 
The contents of the logs further suggest that the project team management 
was unable to adequately monitor the work progress and act in a timely 
manner to prevent the escalation of problems. In order to further investigate 
these issues and their relations to planning, the investigation report 
produced by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR, 2008) was consulted. The 
facts contained in this report are summarised below. Facts that contributed 
for the deterioration of work delivery and for the seriousness of the overrun 
are listed beforehand, followed by a list of facts that attempted to mitigate 
problems. 
Facts that further deteriorated circumstances: 
x By endeavouring to avoid a blockade extension, Network Rail came to 
consider that decision too late (at T-3 days) for a proper formal 
discussion with stakeholders 
x The 12 weeks required by process could never have been met, but 
decision could have been addressed at least 1 week earlier 
Understanding asset management and work delivery 
190 
x Only after 3 consecutive weekends of lost work Network Rail came to 
that decision 
x Informal working level discussions took place on several occasions but 
never developed into a formal and precise information 
x Inadequate response to a considerable risk of delivery failure identified 
by the Schedule Quantitative Risk Assessment (SQRA), even before 
previous weekend possessions were lost 
x Management of shift changeovers was inadequate and, other than the 
correction of the shift change misalignment for the machine controllers, 
no action appears to have been taken to rectify the problem 
x Blockade overran for about 14 hours before a state of operational 
incident was declared and a “Gold Command” instated 
x No SQRA was undertaken prior to applying for the additional day 
x The SQRAs carried out were based on the assumption that weekend 
works to be delivered throughout November and December would be 
completed successfully and on time 
x In addition to OLE staff shortage, a lack of contractor’s supervision on 
site had severe impact on its productivity 
x The way in which contractors communicated with staff agencies and 
how they attempted to secure additional OLE staff was unclear 
x Reports from contractors on work progress were increasingly inaccurate 
and undermined the seriousness of shortfalls 
x Network Rail engineers were unable to properly monitor the situation as 
their attention was diverted to other pressing problems 
x The fact that train operators were getting informal indications of 
problems through control centres at an earlier stage demonstrates the 
existence of indicators which were not being properly monitored 
x OLE resource shortfalls were already partly responsible for the deferral 
of work from previous weeks into the blockade 
x The level of absence verified during this blockade had not been 
experienced before 
x Several times the blockade plan was re-configured to deliver an on-time 
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hand back but this continued to rely on remaining OLE staff reporting 
for duty, supplemented by extra OLE staff from other contractors and 
Network Rail OLE maintenance staff 
x Despite resourcing problems NR continued to rely upon the common 
practice of allowing contractors to self-certify their own work 
x Network Rail should have done more to test the sensitivity of its 
assumptions in SQRAs i.e. for the completion of preparatory work and 
taken appropriate mitigation measures 
x TOCs complained that there did not appear to have been anyone in 
overall charge or taking an overview 
x The difficulties from contractors in securing the necessary resources 
together with the criticality of the work should have driven the provision 
of a higher level of supervision during the blockade which would have 
helped Network Rail to predict and to minimise the extent of the overrun 
x Given the controversies and disruptions already caused by the 
blockade extension it would be expected that Network Rail 
management would have devoted its full attention to the delivery of the 
project 
x Weaknesses in risk assessment and risk management previously 
identified in connection with the overrun of the Portsmouth re-signalling 
project in 2007 were also present in two of the three cases investigated, 
each in a different part of the country and related to a different type of 
project 
x The significant de-scoping of the Annual Integrated Work Plan (AIWP) 
undertaken in this period is likely to have led to wasteful levels of 
project development and planning work. Network Rail should work with 
the industry to review its own planning, looking to improve both 
predictability and stability 
x Network Rail contracts should  ensure that its suppliers take an 
appropriate share of the financial consequences of any risk to the 
projects, and equally share the financial rewards of success 
Bellow are listed the facts extracted from the ORR report, which attempted 
to mitigate problems: 
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x As OLE staff shortage was detected over the initial 2 days of the 
blockade, Network Rail re-planned the work to create additional time for 
the OLE work and sought to obtain additional staff 
x As it became clear to the project team that the contractor was not on 
course for delivery, several planned and real-time contingencies were 
put in place 
x SQRA recognised that work was sequential and therefore, delays to the 
early activities would have a knock on effect on the succeeding 
activities 
x The readiness-reviews were well structured and identified key risks (i.e. 
availability of key staff for both the signalling and OLE works) 
x Information from contractors advised on difficulties in securing the 
required level of resource 
x Programme management expertise and its application was deemed as 
“impressive” and appropriate for the project 
x An allowance of +20% was considered as a contingency for the 
duration of works 
x Network Rail requested from contractors the names of key people 
rostered for each work to be delivered and checked for double bookings 
of staff 
x Network Rail reviewed all national planned OLE work and cancelled 
lower priority work packages 
x The introduction of “Gold Command” arrangements was successful in 
recovering train services and communicating with operators and 
customers. Reviewing how and when such arrangements should be 
called into effect may contribute to further its effectiveness 
x Within a period of approximately 2 weeks Network Rail had developed a 
preliminary investigation and produced actions to be taken as an 
outcome of that investigation (The actual effectiveness of these actions 
cannot be demonstrated) 
x The need to seek an extra day for the possession at a late date, or 
failure to complete the work on schedule - were not believed 
to be caused by any significant failure of project or risk 
Understanding asset management and work delivery 
193 
management in the weeks beforehand 
Overall, the facts and events here discussed clearly illustrate how the work 
delivery organisation, namely the project teams and the organisation that 
supports them, were unprepared for the scale and complexity of the work 
planned. From the planning side, it is also clear that planning was unable to 
assess the real extent of the risks and produce an adequate overall picture 
of what was being demanded at national level in terms of resources. The 
organisational fragmentation and communication breakdowns discussed by 
planners during the interviews were made evident by these events. Despite 
the information regarding the accumulation of delays and problems being 
available, it was never properly transmitted or given the necessary 
attention. 
Several implications for the understanding of resilience in planning and the 
overall engineering system can be deducted from these events. The 
inability to respond to the evidence of problems, the unpreparedness to 
react to events and the difficulties in containing damages made apparent by 
the data presented are characteristics well documented in resilience 
engineering literature (sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.6). These are explored in 
detail later in section 7.2.5. 
6.3. Infrastructure and asset archival data 
This section investigates the influence that different infrastructure profiles 
may have on both planning and delivery of engineering work. This was 
achieved by looking at the assets within each area and the types of faults 
that these experienced. Three sources of historic data were used: 
x Asset incident trends 
x Equated Track Miles (ETM) 
x Asset counts 
While asset incident trends provided an estimate of the unexpected events 
that may disrupt planned work, the remaining two sources offer an overview 
of the type and number of assets that each area has to manage. 
6.3.1. Asset incident trends 
For the purpose of direct comparison with the planning data, the periods 
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concerning each of the three weeks extracted from PPS were analysed: 
x Period 4 for week 16 (from 21-06-08 to 19-07-08) 
x Period 6 for week 24 (from 17-08-08 to 13-09-08) 
x Period 9 for week 36 (from 09-11-08 to 06-12-08)  
Additionally, average values per period were calculated for the 2008/2009 
year and used not only to identify overall asset trends by area, but also to 
verify the validity of the data for each of the three periods previously 
mentioned. 
Table 6.5 presents the average number of incidents per period for the types 
of incidents selected for this work and described in section 4.9 (Asset 
incident trends). Given the differences in timeframes between the topics 
discussed throughout this chapter, total numbers for the periods during 
which planning data was extracted from PPS are also given in Table 6.5 in 
comparison with the yearly total numbers of incidents. 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































At national level, 3244.6 incidents per period were registered. The LNW 
route and in particular the LNW (S) area, shows the highest number of 
incidents, while East Midlands registers a clearly lower number from all 
other areas. Track circuit failures are the type of incidents in which the 
difference between LNW and the other routes appears to be most relevant, 
in particular for LNW (S) with 109.2 incidents. Although with smaller 
differences, LNW (S) is also the WON area with the highest number of 
points failures, which on average, are the most frequent type of incident. 
The use of TSR is more frequent on the west and east coast main lines and 
Anglia. Given that these are known to be considerably busy routes, the 
wear out of the infrastructure and reduced access can be considered 
probable causes. Despite being recently submitted to an extensive 
modernisation programme, the LNW route maintains considerably high 
numbers of TSR and the highest total number of failures. 
The impact of weather related incidents varies considerably from area to 
area. While in LNW (S) these only represent 4%, for Kent & Sussex 
weather is responsible for 13% of the total of incidents registered. Western 
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and Scotland registered a number of severe weather related incidents 
similar to Kent & Sussex but a much lower number for other weather 
related problems. 
Gauge corner cracking is the type of incident with less importance. 
However, while most areas have one or less incidents of this type per 
period, Wessex shows 10.4 corner cracking incidents per period. An 
overview of the existing data since 1999 suggests that gauge corner 
cracking and track faults are the incidents for which numbers suffer 
stronger variations from period to period. While for the year under analysis 
here (2008/2009) only Wessex registered such a variation, the database 
showed that approximately from October 2000 to February 2001 there was 
a significant increase in the number of these incidents across all 
engineering areas. In some cases like in the East Midlands area, an 
increase from zero to 139 incidents was registered in two consecutive 
periods. Given the extent of data involved, the numbers for these features 
are not shown here. The causes of such variations could not be accurately 
identified from the data available but based on the understanding of rail 
engineering this is likely to be derived from either variations in the type or 
volume of traffic or significant variations of temperature due to weather 
changes. 
Sudden increases in the incidence of any type of incident are potentially 
unforeseen and therefore, are likely to generate higher volumes of planning 
changes. To offer a better perception of these variations, Figure 6.1 shows 
the total number of incidents (for the 14 types initially considered) for each 
of the periods of the year 2008/2009. 
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Figure 6.1: Variation of the number of asset incidents by area 
Figure 6.1 was considered a relevant illustration for the strong variations 
registered by all areas at different periods of the year. Except for LNE (S & 
Central), all areas registered significant increases from period 1 to period 2. 
While from period 9 to period 10 a reduction of incidents occurred across all 
areas, the most significant increases and highest numbers were registered 
between periods 10 and 12. Given that these periods correspond to the 
winter months, weather conditions could be one of the factors accounting 
for this heighten number of asset incidents. The strong variations also 
visible during other periods of the year suggest the contribution of other 
factors to the occurrence of asset incidents. 
6.3.2. Asset data 
This section focuses on the analysis of data regarding the assets that exist 
under each area. The purpose is to establish what type and number of 
assets each area is required to maintain, in order to investigate possible 
impacts that this may have on planning performance. The Equated Track 
Miles (ETM) and asset counts were used in this assessment. While the 
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required, asset counts provide a more precise estimate of the infrastructure 
complexity. 
The distribution by MDU of data from both sources is shown in Table 6.6 
together with its correspondence to the engineering areas, as these 
represent the geographical structure of the planning organisation. The 
correspondence to the WON areas is also shown to facilitate the 
comparison with data from the other two topics discussed in the course of 
this chapter. In addition to ETM and the total number of assets, this table 
shows the standard mileage of each MDU and offers the number of assets 
per mile of track as a base for comparison between areas in terms of 
density. 






















Bedford 798.2 589.3 7079 12.0 Midlands & 
Continental 
East 
Midlands 1424 1090 15084 28.0 Derby 625.8 500.4 8005 16.0 
Hitchin 804.1 508.5 5842 11.5 
Great 
Northern 
LNE (S) 1208 964 9689 19.9 
Lincoln 404.3 455.3 3847 8.4 
Doncaster 614.3 323.2 4994 15.5 LNE 
(Central) 1014 722 11460 31.6 Sheffield 399.8 399.2 6466 16.2 
Leeds 718.5 649.0 11642 17.9 
North 
Eastern LNE (N) 2203 1860 27051 43.4 Newcastle 747.3 642.9 8281 12.9 
York 736.9 567.7 7128 12.6 
Chester 482.8 564.3 9841 17.4 
Central 
LNW (N) 2808 2633 53022 102.0 
Crewe 585.7 462.3 11740 25.4 
Manchester 694.5 622.4 15902 25.5 
Carlisle 736.1 676.8 9558 14.1 Lancs & 
Cumbria Preston 309.0 306.8 5981 19.5 
Bletchley 550.4 291.6 4428 15.2 
West Coast 
South 
LNW (S) 2789 1805 29239 83.7 
Stafford 609.5 359.8 3417 9.5 
Stonebridge 
Park 432.1 229.9 4556 19.8 
Saltley 765.5 622.5 9747 15.7 
West 
Midlands Sandwell-
Dudley 431.0 300.9 7091 23.6 
Colchester 556.5 493.8 7658 15.5 
Anglia Anglia 1695 1426 31338 68.2 Romford 546.6 371.6 11471 30.9 
Tottenham 591.6 560.2 12209 21.8 
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Ashford 417.7 494.2 7103 14.4 
Kent 
Kent & 
Sussex 1997 1793 42410 132.7 
London 
Bridge 320.0 250.5 12466 49.8 
Orpington 367.0 349.1 7212 20.7 
Brighton 519.7 438.9 7765 17.7 
Sussex 
Croydon 372.8 260.4 7864 30.2 
Clapham 363.8 270.7 7939 29.3 
Wessex Wessex 1606 1286 21846 57.0 Eastleigh 609.5 555.0 6883 12.4 
Woking 632.6 460.0 7024 15.3 
Edinburgh 721.7 648.5 7299 11.3 Scotland 
East 
Scotland 2606 2588 26381 42.2 
Perth 613.2 774.7 5763 7.4 
Glasgow 498.5 499.1 6949 13.9 Scotland 
West Motherwell 772.7 666.0 6370 9.6 
Reading 536.7 283.7 7281 25.7 Thames 
Valley 
Western 3485 3197 52574 102.5 
Swindon 737.1 495.9 7253 14.6 
Bristol 621.5 592.0 9478 16.0 West 
Country Plymouth 459.6 532.2 8279 15.6 
Cardiff 697.6 760.2 13307 17.5 Wales & 
Marches Shrewsbury 432.1 532.5 6976 13.1 
 
Overall, considerable differences are observed between MDU in terms of 
ETM and asset counts. As expected, the delivery units located in urban 
areas or around major junctions show higher concentrations of assets per 
mile of track. London Bridge is the MDU with the highest concentration, 
which reflects on the Kent & Sussex area where this concentration is also 
the highest. In order to maintain the base for comparison with the other two 
topics, prevalence was given to the distribution by WON areas. However, it 
should be kept in mind that Kent and Sussex have separate planning 
teams. At engineering area level, Kent remains the one with the highest 
number of assets per mile (84.8) while Anglia has one of the highest 
numbers of assets. The Central engineering area in LNW (N) is the one 
with the highest asset count (37483). 
Western is the WON area with both the highest number of ETM and 
standard miles. This would suggest that Western is the area requiring the 
highest volume of maintenance work. This area is divided into three 
different engineering areas, which presupposes a distribution of the 
planning needs amongst these three areas, as these are the basis of the 
geographical organisation of planning. In terms of delivery, Western is also 
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the area with more MDU. LNW (N) shows a comparable number of assets 
and the same concentration per mile but with approximately less 20% of 
ETM than Western. 
The breakdown of asset counts (section 4.9) into categories is shown in 
Table 6.7. The numbers given illustrate the differences registered by WON 
area. 




































































Western 399 14557 409 155 8385 7256 1951 16482 2980 52574 
Wessex 209 3608 39 33 3905 3954 1377 7329 1392 21846 
Anglia 239 6031 14 87 6222 5496 1261 10077 1911 31338 
Kent&Sussex 357 7992 234 27 7163 7234 2040 14702 2661 42410 
Scotland 347 5378 114 83 6401 5951 2143 3663 2301 26381 
LNW (S) 200 8744 122 60 4802 5977 1496 5473 2365 29239 
LNW (N) 406 11892 247 171 8814 7374 2223 18924 2971 53022 
LNE (S) 80 812 45 57 2928 2384 427 1974 982 9689 
LNE (Central) 46 1373 71 41 3101 2081 395 3391 961 11460 
East Midlands 82 1576 111 38 3816 2698 547 5155 1061 15084 
LNE (N) 184 5246 191 121 6038 5354 1274 6791 1852 27051 
 
Data in this Table 6.7 indicate that the number of bridges and IBJ are the 
categories contributing the most for the significant differences registered by 
Western, Kent & Sussex and LNW (N) in terms of total asset counts. In 
addition, Western possesses almost the double the number of tunnels than 
any other area. Given the complexity of engineering work within tunnels, 
this is likely to impact on planning. The number of points operating 
equipment in areas such as Western and LNW (N) can also be interpreted 
as an indication of the complexity of the infrastructure within these areas. 
LNW (S) has less 45% of the assets and less 31% of the standard miles 
than LNW (N). Despite these differences, the two areas have similar 
numbers of ETM (2789 ETM for LNW (S) and 2808 for LNW (N)). 
The areas previously identified as having the highest numbers of incidents 
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are also the areas with the highest ETM. Figure 6.2 illustrates the relation 
between these two parameters. 
 
Figure 6.2: Relation between number of asset incidents and ETM 
Figure 6.2 shows that the number of incidents occurring within a given area 
(as registered in the asset incident trends database) is related to the 
complexity of the infrastructure. Although LNW (S) and LNW (N) show very 
similar trends in this figure, as previously pointed out, LNW (S) owns 
significantly less assets and mileage than LNW (N) but both areas have 
similar ETM numbers. This indicates that beyond the number of assets, 
other factors taken into account in the calculation of ETM are contributing to 
the heighten number of incidents registered by the LNW (S) area. As 
previously mentioned, among other factors, the calculation of ETM takes 
into account the annual tonnage, which depends on the loads hauled and 
on the volume of traffic. Hence, where annual tonnage is higher, a more 
intensive use of the infrastructure is expected and potentially, not only 
higher numbers of incidents may be registered but also more significant 
engineering access constraints may exist. Both of these factors can have a 
significant impact on planning performance. 
6.4. Chapter conclusions 
The familiarisation interviews not only supported some of the main 
conclusions drawn from the semi-structured interviews with planners, but 
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also provided important guidance for the subsequent study of work delivery. 
The following aspects were considered as the more relevant ones for the 
pursuit of this research: 
x The little awareness that PICOPs expressed regarding the complexity 
of the planning organisation and its processes. 
x In general, PICOPs gave little importance to the information produced 
by planning. Not only the contents of that information was described as 
having a moderate relevance on the night, but also often, after issuing 
the PICOP back, less than 24 hours before delivery, changes are again 
introduced, particularly to details of engineering trains. Keeping in mind 
that planning should be the source of management of uncertainty for 
delivery, as it builds on foreseeable aspects of the business to 
anticipate needs (Grote et al, 2009), it can be concluded that often 
planning is unable to appropriately manage uncertainty and transfers it 
to those responsible for work delivery (PICOPs and signallers). 
x All interviewees offered insight on the impact of late changes on work 
delivery. In particular, PICOPs and signallers are confronted on the 
night of delivery with possession arrangements that often differ from the 
formal and documented details.  
x The need for reliable information and efficient communications was 
mentioned by all interviewees. While PICOPs valued above all, the 
detailed knowledge of the infrastructure in their area, signallers 
considered as useful the opportunity to participate in planning meetings 
during the last stages of the process. The Anglia route controller 
highlighted the importance of an efficient exchange of information on 
the night between PICOP, signaller and control centre to guaranty a 
successful and safe work delivery. 
x Both PICOPs and signallers recognised efficient communications while 
checking (and double-checking) details of possession as a safety guard 
against incorrect or late changed planning details. 
Overall, the points taken from the interviews and highlighted above are 
consistent with the poor information flows and poor visibility described by 
planners, as well as the way in which the impacts of late changes were 
described. These points also reinforce the arguments introduced by the 
literature regarding the importance of information and in particular 
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feedback, in the management of uncertainty. On the one hand, access to 
reliable information about the details of the work planned helps anticipate 
issues and thus, reduces uncertainty. As discussed in section 3.1.5 and 
previously observed in regards to planners interviews, incomplete (or 
inaccurate) information about the behaviours of the system generates 
uncertainty in operations (Leveson, 2004). On the other hand, as observed 
in section 3.5.5, feedback from the operational level is fundamental for the 
development of visibility and situation awareness in planning regarding 
changes in operating conditions which may require readjustments of 
planning (Jorna et al, 2005). Leveson et al (2003), while introducing the 
concept of a safety control loop (section 3.3.6), also state the importance of 
feedback and information flows in general for maintaining control over the 
system. The triangle between PICOP, signaller and operations control, as 
described in section 6.1.4, clearly supports the information needs 
discussed here. 
National control logs provided useful insight in terms of possession related 
incidents and the relevance of planning as a causal factor. The use of asset 
incident data gave additional support for the identification of different 
performance trends between geographical structures. LNW route was 
identified as having the highest incidence of possession failures and of 
planning related issues. 
The study of events leading up to the Christmas 2007 possession overruns 
further illustrated organisational fragmentation and the problems it creates 
for an efficient flow of communication between planning delivery and 
operations control. There is ample evidence of poor communication 
between the project team responsible for work delivery and other 
engineering stakeholders, including planning, which provide additional 
arguments in favour of those previously presented regarding the need for 
efficient information flow and the importance of feedback to create 
adequate situation awareness (Jorna et al, 2005). As pointed out by Woods 
(2006b), the fragmented organisational structure generates equally 
fragmented information flows, which leave decision makers unable to 
recognise the big picture and reframe their situation assessment. From this 
perspective, the Christmas overruns, and in particular, the Rugby project 
show evidence of the following: 
x Production and business pressures led planning to exceed available 
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resources and capacities. 
x Although delivery teams detected problems with work progress, they 
were unable to properly assess the extent of the problems and 
adequately communicate them to operations and planning. 
x The measures taken by project teams in terms of re-planning work and 
deploying contingencies were based on incomplete knowledge of the 
situation and therefore were consecutively insufficient to produce the 
necessary adjustments. 
The changes made to the initial scheme, which as described in section 
6.2.3, reduced costs but increased complexity, not only demonstrate the 
business pressures under which Network Rail operates, but also illustrate 
the kind of trade-offs which are involved in planning decision making 
processes. In this case, in line with the principles of an Efficiency-
Thoroughness Trade-Off (ETTO - Hollnagel, 2009a), decisions clearly 
favoured efficiency aspects by aiming to reduce costs and the increased 
complexity of the option taken had clear additional delivery risks. As 
mentioned in section 6.2.3, the events around these possession overruns 
provide ample support for the understanding of resilience in the rail 
engineering system and will be further discussed in section 7.2.5. 
The investigation of infrastructure profiles provided valuable information on 
different possible constraints imposed on planning. For instance, a higher 
concentration of bridges such as the one identified in Western area is likely 
to cause additional challenges for planning due to the limitations of 
equipment that can be used and the additional difficulties in accessing the 
infrastructure. The fact that ETM appears to be closely related to the 
number of asset incidents registered by each area further supports these 
conclusions. These findings are in line with the arguments presented by 
Jorna & Kiewiet (2007) when considering that the complexity of the 
undertaking entails equally complex planning, in order to predict possible 
scenarios and allocate resources in accordance to such scenarios. 
As stated earlier, the investigation of work delivery and of the different 
infrastructure profiles was considered a fundamental step towards 
understanding the success of planning (section 4.3). This chapter explored 
both work delivery and the infrastructure trends in order to support the 
understanding of the operating environment of the planning system. These 
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findings are brought together in the next chapter, in order to develop an 
understanding of what could be considered a successful planning 
performance and what are the sources of resilience in planning. Following 
the base of the geographical comparison already created, planning, work 
delivery and infrastructure data are confronted. 
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7. Understanding and measuring resilience in planning 
Resilience engineering was defined in section 3.4 as a property which 
emerges from the way in which the system performs. Within the scope of 
this research, this means that planning performance must be understood 
and resilience engineering features must be recognised in its operations. 
As argued in section 4.3, the study of planning performance needs to 
recognise the fact that the purpose of planning is to support work delivery. 
Successful planning can only be understood in view of how it supports a 
safe and reliable work delivery. Resilience literature also demonstrated the 
importance of understanding interactions, not just within the system under 
analysis, but also those occurring between the system and its operation 
environment (McDonald, 2006). From Figure 4.1, the immediate 
environment of planning can be recognised as work delivery and the rail 
infrastructure. 
While chapter 5 amply explored planning and aspects of its performance, 
chapter 6 developed an understanding of work delivery and of different 
infrastructure profiles. This chapter explores resilience in planning by 
integrating perspectives from the previous two chapters. Apart from 
referring to the literature discussed in section 3.4, the data presented in 
chapters 5 and 6 are recalled to highlight aspects of engineering planning 
which, in view of resilience concepts, can be described as factors either 
contributing or eroding system resilience. 
Objectives Questions Methods 
3) Investigate relations 
between planning and 
engineering work 
delivery and identify 
the impacts of 
planning on work 
delivery. 
4) Describe resilience 
within the planning 
system and identify 
means to improve it. 
5) Contribute to the 
development of a 
framework, methods 
and measures for 
assessing resilience 
in planning. 
x What are the different trends in 
the relations between planning 
and delivery? 
x How does variability and 
uncertainty express itself in the 
planning system? 
x What are the sources of 
resilience in planning? 
x What aspects of planning 
performance can potentially 
support the development of 
resilience indicators? 
x How can resilience in rail 
engineering planning be 
monitored? 





x Exploring of 
archival data 
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7.1. Indicators of resilience from interviews with planners 
This section recalls the main findings of the semi-structured interviews and 
interprets them in view of resilience concepts and the related literature 
presented in chapter 3. The purpose is to substantiate aspects of planning 
that may either contribute to or erode resilience in the system, and thus 
better understand what could be considered resilience in the planning of rail 
engineering work and how it could be “engineered” in such systems. This 
later supported the development of part 2 of the questionnaire (section 
7.4.7). 
7.1.1. Management of planning changes 
The management of planning changes stands out from every interview as 
the most critical issue for the success of planning. Every planning change 
has at its origin a planning decision that generates a system trade-off of 
some kind. This often means that in order to maximise the use of every 
access opportunity, an increase of the risks of deliverability must be 
accepted. The way in which trade-offs may contribute to a sustained and 
adequate balance between efficiency and thoroughness (Hollnagel, 2009a) 
is influenced by the quality of decision making processes (experience and 
skills of decision makers, available information, culture aspects that frame 
decisions, among others). In this sense, resilience relies on the ability of the 
system to develop information that can support planners in realising when a 
particular decision is contributing to an efficient use and allocation of 
resources, rather than generating unacceptable risk of planning error or 
delivery failure. As argued by Hale et al (2006), there are two faces to 
change: while the ability to change is an important source of resilience, as it 
allows to flexibly cope with unexpected circumstances, it can also erode 
tried and tested methods and solutions to problems. Hence, while trying to 
improve the efficiency of the plan and the allocation of resources it 
stipulates, planners also incur in the risk of dismantling important safety 
and reliability mechanisms already embedded in the plan, such as 
contingency measures for complex work. 
It was pointed out by planners that the lack of reliable information 
generates unnecessary planning change and was identified by all as the 
main source of uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the performance 
of the planning as whole. Crawford & Wiers (2001) have pointed out that 
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unstable conditions of the environment are a cause for the need to adjust 
plans and add to the instability and complexity of planning. Planners also 
recognised that some level of change is necessary to adjust planning to 
emergent engineering or business needs, as there are things that cannot 
be anticipated. Hence, planners are aware that some form of flexibility is 
needed in planning. 
A higher volume of change does not necessarily imply a degradation of 
planning quality, as any change could at any stage, be contributing to 
eliminate unacceptable risk or to optimise resource allocation. 
Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the more changes are made to a given 
plan, the more complex becomes the task of maintaining its integrity and 
coherence. A high volume and frequency of change is compatible with a 
fast pace changing operational environment (Leveson, 2004) and if at the 
core of high complexity (Marais et al, 2007 and Jackson, 2010). Keeping in 
mind that planning archival data showed that the frequency of planning 
changes is intensified as delivery date approaches and therefore, time 
pressure increases (section 5.3.2), the volume and frequency of change 
normally verified in the planning system may generate a higher risk of 
planning failure, as it increases its complexity. 
Through experience, planners develop a better understanding of their 
sources of information as well as of the impact that their decisions may 
have on the delivery of work. These two aspects of experience can then 
support a better balanced decision making and hence, improve the 
management of planning changes. Thus, planning experience constitutes a 
critical factor for the management of planning changes. 
7.1.2. Organisational and geographical barriers 
As previously mentioned, the planning system relies on the relations 
existing between different geographical and organisational units, which in 
some cases, go beyond the corporate limits. This fragmented organisation 
clearly generates the potential for communication breakdowns at the 
boundaries of different planning levels and teams. This is mainly 
substantiated by the poor visibility and information that planners claimed 
regarding how the system performs beyond the limits of their planning 
units. 
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This system complexity derives from the need to respond to specific local 
engineering requirements whilst ensuring that resources available at 
national level are used in the most efficient way possible and within the 
guidelines of national strategies of enhancement and modernisation of the 
railway. This relates to the need to balance acute and chronic goals, as 
discussed by Woods (2006a). Often long-term (chronic) and strategic goals 
define safety and efficiency targets which cannot be simultaneously 
achieved. As in the example previously given of a trade-off, delivering as 
much work as possible within the available access inevitably requires 
accepting higher deliverability risks. In a similar way, delivering the work 
necessary to achieve the envisaged enhancement and modernisation 
targets, whilst reducing engineering access, means that other engineering 
work needs must be reduced. This is often the case of lower priority 
maintenance work and other local and immediate (acute) engineering 
needs. The pressures generated by business long-term commitments are 
often incompatible with local and short-term or immediate maintenance 
needs (i.e. emergency work). This became clear in the recurrent revisions 
of decisions made and the way in which work that has undergone the 
planning might be cancelled during last stages of the process, due to 
factors such as budget changes or the emergence of other higher priority 
engineering interventions. 
7.1.3. Variability of information inputs to the planning process 
Information provided to planners is characterised by two major sources of 
variability: 
x The specific geographical and organisational demands generate a 
significant variability of the type of information and the formats under 
which it is provided to planning units. Although this may impact little on 
the quality of the decision making process, it requires additional time to 
process information and a frequent need to request clarifications from 
sources, in particular for less experienced planners as they still lack 
some familiarity with the different existing methods of working. 
x The second cause of variability is related to the wide range of 
engineering work scopes and the way in which these often struggle to 
work to common timings. Although the timescales defined by the 
national planning process try to account for this diversity, it is often 
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difficult to ensure that the development of major investments coincides 
with other less complex work such as the cyclic maintenance needs. 
These sources of variability often force planners to review their decisions 
as information is either changed or provided beyond the established 
timescales. Variability is also a consequence of the broadness of the 
planning system in terms of, both its geographical and organisational 
dispersion, and the diversity of engineering needs to which it must respond. 
This generates a wide range of different inputs and variables which 
planners must manage. These characteristics of the planning system are at 
the origin of its complexity and therefore, also of the variability which is 
inherent to complex systems (Jackson, 2010). 
The lack of regular and formal feedback also generates variability of 
information. As mentioned by planners, normally they would only receive 
feedback, either from planning units at later stages or from work delivery, 
when “something has gone wrong”. As mentioned in section 5.2.6, planners 
attempt to compensate poor feedback by resorting to informal contacts. As 
discussed by Vernon (2001), there are two fundamental types of feedback 
for planning activities: 
x Feedback to assist the development of the plan by providing information 
support to decision making regarding the feasibility of the plan. This 
information constitutes a fundamental support for the development of 
adequate planning practices and is the source of what planners referred 
to as “understanding the impact of decisions on delivery” (section 
5.2.4). 
x Feedback on the progress and conditions of work delivery which may 
require revisions of the plan (planning changes). This helps reduce 
uncertainty and unpredictability by supporting the anticipation of 
problems (section 5.2.6). 
The diversity and range of information which is inputted to the planning 
system is often difficult to manage, as planners expressed during interviews 
(section 5.2.6). This contributes to uncertainty in decision making 
processes (Leveson, 2004) and accounts for the underspecified nature of 
activities in the planning system (Hollnagel, 2009a). 
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7.1.4. Formal and informal flows of information 
As pointed out by Vernon (2001), planning and scheduling activities are 
often embedded in informal knowledge rather than formal communication 
and explicit processes. The distribution of decision making amongst several 
people or teams can enforce some formalisation of information exchanges. 
Because the planning of engineering work involves negotiations with 
numerous organisations across the industry, planning decisions require a 
formalisation and proper documentation, as they often assume the role of a 
contract between different companies. This can considerably increase the 
time necessary to reach decisions and disseminate their outcome to all 
those requiring it to further detail their work scopes. When pressured to 
solve issues, planners seek informal contacts in order to make a decision, 
which becomes later formalised according to the process. Planners often 
alluded to the need to request information from stakeholders or other 
planning teams. This means that the planning system relies mostly on 
information pulling, rather than pushing (Hollnagel, 2009a). This creates an 
informal information flow that runs parallel to the formal and documented 
decision making. Depending on how trustworthy their source of information 
may be, planners may build their decisions on an informal basis and seek 
documented confirmation later. This means that despite standard 
timescales according to which information should be delivered (information 
push), system operation relies a great deal on planners chasing information 
(information pull) (Hollnagel, 2009a). Because planners will tend to look for 
information when they feel the need for it and where they believe the 
source to be most reliable, it can be argued that this method of working 
improves control over decision making. However, this also increases the 
risk of decisions being made on the grounds of erroneous information, 
particularly in the case of less experienced planners. As argued by Leveson 
et al (2003), reliable information flows are a fundamental source of control 
over the system. 
7.1.5. Uncertainty and unpredictability 
Dealing with uncertainty and unpredictability was recognised as part of the 
daily activity in planning and as a major obstruction to reliable planning. As 
pointed out by Leveson (2004), incomplete or inaccurate information are a 
major source of uncertainty in system operations. Planners pointed out that 
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managing sources of uncertainty is often difficult because information and 
pressures for changes normally emanate from outside their planning teams 
or even from beyond the limits of the planning organisation. The cross-
organisational scale and the timescale of the planning process inevitably 
lead to a self-containment of its activities into different stages and with set 
deadlines. As discussed by Vernon (2001), self-containment may reduce 
complexity of decision making locally and force coordination and exchange 
of information between the different planning entities involved. However, in 
large scale systems such as the planning of rail engineering work, the 
number of planning units and the diversity of planning steps that must be 
coordinated clearly contributes to its complexity and uncertainty. This is in 
line with the arguments presented in section 3.1.6 regarding intractable 
systems. Operations in the planning system must be seen as being 
underspecified which means that planners must be provided with means to 
manage uncertainty, as debated in section 3.4.3. 
The broadness of the planning organisation hampers planners’ visibility 
over how decisions made within their own unit, will be carried forward 
through the process. This considerably reduces whatever feedback 
planners may obtain regarding the effectiveness of their decisions and 
creates additional uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Information pulled from other sources allows planners to anticipate issues. 
However, they are aware of the likelihood that such information might 
change when going through the formal channels of communication. On the 
other hand, often stakeholders push information through to planning only to 
keep with the imposed timescales and if necessary, will later seek to 
change that information. These issues confer a considerable degree of 
uncertainty to information sources. While these common practices may 
contribute to the efficiency of decision making processes, if the information 
used turns out to be unreliable, additional planning changes are generated 
and the integrity of planning may be compromised. 
Despite the scale of the planning organisation and the way it branches out 
to several geographical structures, the planning process strongly 
emphasises the need for strict timescales and tight work flows, which is 
compatible with what Grote et al (2009) describe as centralised feed-
forward controls that aim to minimise uncertainty. Change Control Process 
(PL0086) as described in section 5.1.3, aims to reinforce compliance with 
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the planning process and control any deviations deemed necessary. As 
stated by Grote et al (2009), this approach aims to minimise the degrees of 
freedom of those responsible for delivering the deployed plans. The high 
incidence of uncontrolled change, as described by planners during the 
interviews, suggests that such strict and rigid control (by means of the 
planning process) may be unadjusted to the real demands imposed on 
planners in terms of balancing the engineering work requirements against 
the available resources. As discussed in section 3.4.3, this may require 
additional local control and management of uncertainty (Grote et al, 2009). 
7.1.6. Planning experience 
As pointed out by Hollnagel (2009a), maintaining a high level of safety 
requires learning from experience. Planning experience was recognised as 
the means through which trustworthy work relations were developed. It thus 
becomes a fundamental resource, which supports informal discussion of 
issues and problem solving. Planners referred to the overall understanding 
of how the rail industry operates as the means to recognise when and what 
information is required to support a given decision.  
Through experience, planners also develop a geographical knowledge of 
the railways, which becomes relevant to understand the impact of decisions 
in terms of what might be the consequences or the arrangements 
necessary when blocking a particular route with engineering works. 
Experience and knowledge of the railways support planners when they are 
confronted with the need to make decisions beyond the strict limits of what 
would be allowed by the planning process, such as accepting details of 
work and changes beyond the established deadlines. As discussed by 
McDonald (2006), professionalism and competence compensate for the 
rigidity of systems by allowing people to incorporate flexibility in that 
system. 
7.1.7. Reliable work relations 
Reliable work contacts are the means through which planners pull 
information from the wider planning system and work towards an optimised 
problem solving. When having to deal with issues such as unforeseen 
delivery conflicts or late changes, planners draw on their work contacts as a 
bypass of the formal communication and decision making channels. 
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Depending on the trustworthiness of these contacts, planners try to 
anticipate issues and mitigate sources of information, which they know 
often to be unreliable, whilst awaiting formal agreement on the decisions 
from all parts involved (train operators, engineer suppliers, maintainers, 
project teams, among others). 
By resorting to these methods of working, planners not only increase the 
level of trust in the decisions they make, but also allow the planning 
organisation to respond with higher efficiency to numerous pressing issues 
that often push planning timescales, especially as work approaches its 
delivery date. These work relations create the proximity between people 
necessary to respond to issues in a timely manner. Leveson et al (2006) 
consider that rate of information sharing (sharing the news) relies on the 
number of contacts between people who are at the origin of that information 
(those who know) and those that may require it (those who don’t know). 
From this perspective, work relations are fundamental to ensure an efficient 
dissemination of information. 
7.1.8. Understanding the impact of decisions on delivery 
Overall, planners demonstrated being aware of the fact that planning must 
above all, support work delivery with reliable information. This became 
clear by the statements of interviewees regarding the need to understand 
the impact of their decisions on delivery and their concerns towards the 
impacts of frequent and late changes. 
Planners rely on experience and an overall knowledge of the railways to 
develop awareness of the potential impacts of their decisions on work 
delivery. This awareness concerns among others, the issues involved in 
routing engineering trains and machines in and out of possessions or under 
which conditions rail vehicles may or may not be run through worksites. 
Understanding these issues becomes particularly relevant when having to 
plan high volumes of work or complex work scopes within diminishing track 
access opportunities. Throughout the interviews, planners indicated that the 
more in-depth knowledge they had regarding the requirements and 
implications of engineering work delivery, the more comfortable they would 
feel when having to solve safety issues and conflicts within possessions. 
Within this context and as earlier mentioned, having access to reliable 
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information, both in terms of work to be planned and feedback from work 
already planned becomes a fundamental source of confidence in decisions 
by minimising uncertainty. Information is a crucial element in understanding 
and maintaining awareness of problems and shortcomings within a decision 
making process and supports the ability to anticipate such problems 
(Leveson et al, 2006).  
7.1.9. Development of contingencies 
When planning for higher risk delivery scenarios such as complex renewals 
works or possessions that integrate numerous independent work scopes in 
order to maximise access opportunities, it becomes crucial to consider in 
more detail any potential failures and plan for contingencies. For instance, 
this could mean planning for buffer time to compensate unforeseen issues 
or having machinery standing-by in case of equipment failures. In this 
sense, developing contingencies embodies safety criteria into planning as it 
aims to prevent against delivery failures. 
In order to do so, apart from requesting more specific input from the 
stakeholders involved in that particular work (contractors, project teams or 
maintenance units), planners rely on their knowledge and understanding of 
the railways to identify any potential problems and conduct their decision 
making accordingly. As discussed earlier, feedback is also a fundamental 
support to the identification and understanding of problems. As argued by 
Axelsson (2006), weak and diffuse signals must be managed in order to 
create opportunities for the anticipation of problems. A problem that stays 
with the one that discovers it and is not disseminated remains an unknown 
problem and this cannot be dealt with at a wider scope of decision making 
processes and systems. 
7.2. Archival data analysis from a system perspective 
Archival data was earlier investigated from three different perspectives: 
x Planning data sources provided grounds for an understanding of 
planning performance based on a comparison of geographical areas 
(section 5.3). 
x Safety data supported the analysis of work delivery incidents, aiming to 
identify and assess planning related causes (section 6.2). 
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x Asset and infrastructure data was used to characterise the profile of the 
infrastructure in each geographical area, aiming to better understand 
the volume and type of work that different areas of the infrastructure 
may require (section 6.3). 
Keeping in mind that the core function of planning is to support work 
delivery by producing a reliable plan, this section explores the relations 
between these three perspectives in order to understand from a system 
perspective, the extent of the impacts of planning on work delivery. 
Infrastructure data is also contemplated in this analysis in order to 
understand the influence that different infrastructure profiles may have on 
planning. This scope of analysis is illustrated by Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Analysis on archival data trends from a systems perspective 
The bullet points under each of the three perspectives recall the data 
sources used. The three perspectives of analysis were depicted as FRAM 
functional units (section 4.11.2) as in fact each focuses on system 
components that could be viewed as functions within the scope of a 
“FRAMing”. This is also in line with the system framework given in Figure 
4.1 (section 4.1) and the interactions represented between planning, work 
delivery and infrastructure. In a simplistic way and from a high system level, 
these could be explained as follows: 
x Planning aggregates the targeted work packs, aiming to match the 
available resources (including access) and outputs a plan for delivery. 
Planning mediates the relation between the infrastructure and work 
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delivery, as it balances the requirements of the infrastructure in terms of 
engineering work against the available resources to deliver it. 
x Possession delivery puts this plan into practice and makes access to 
the infrastructure operational. The infrastructure shapes the service that 
Network Rail provides to its customers. 
x An operational rail infrastructure is the core of the service provided by 
Network Rail to its customers and thus, indicators on its engineering 
characteristics and asset performance constitutes a source of feedback 
in terms of the required engineering interventions. 
Exploring these system interactions is expected to contribute to a better 
understanding of resilience in the planning of engineering work. 
Two additional sections discuss archival data aspects relevant for the 
understanding of resilience in planning. Section 7.2.4 presents a qualitative 
summary of all the archival data analysed and concludes on different trends 
exhibit by the geographical areas that supported the comparison of data. 
The Christmas 2007 possession overruns were earlier discussed in section 
6.2.3 as demonstrating a number of behaviours of the engineering system 
under particularly high business and production pressures. The events 
presented in section 6.2.3 are recalled in section 7.2.5 to support a 
discussion on sources of resilience in planning and in the broader 
engineering system. 
7.2.1. Relations between planning and delivery 
The planning data analysed revealed a considerable degree of variability, 
as discussed in section 5.3. This variability was expressed not only by the 
variation of indicators for each area throughout the three weeks of data 
analysed, but also by the distinct patterns of each area in terms of volumes 
of change and duration of planning. As discussed in section 3.1.5, 
variability in system operations constitutes a major source of uncertainty, 
which is also consistent with the comments of planners provided during the 
semi-structured interviews in this regard (sections 5.2.3 and 7.1.5). 
Data regarding possession delivery gave way to the identification of 
different planning related causal factors and the characterisation of their 
contribution to possession failures. For 27% of the incidents analysed by 
means of control logs, planning was found to be a main cause (first level of 
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coding). The interpretation of events carried out on the base of the second 
level of coding found evidence of planning related issues on 73% of the 
incidents. Worksite planning was identified as the most significant issue 
affecting delivery. Worksite related issues were recognised in 47% of the 
incidents occurring within the period of three months, which represents 
74% of all planning related issues identified. The analysis of planning 
meeting minutes and PPS data (section 5.3) showed that worksite planning 
is the most significant source planning changes, affecting also the volume 
of change at possession planning level. Because planning changes are at 
the core of planning variability and its resulting uncertainty, it is likely that 
planning uncertainty considerably contributes to delivery failures. 
As mentioned in section 6.2, it should be taken into account that differences 
between areas in terms of the incidence of possession failures may be 
influenced by the volume and type of work planned by each area. In order 
to verify this, Table 7.1 presents the number possession incidents 
registered by the asset incident trends database (totals from Table 6.3) 
against the estimated volume of work planned by each area (based on the 
estimation of the number of WS from Table 5.6). 






























































Western 46.5 916 5.1 
Wessex 68.5 202 33.9 
Anglia 65.2 1316 5.0 
Kent & Sussex 88.8 525 16.9 
Scotland 14.4 1570 0.9 
LNW (S) 78.7 1331 5.9 




LNE (Central) 693 5.8 
East Midlands 36.5 512 7.1 
LNE (N) 34.9 353 9.9 
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While Scotland is clearly the area with the lowest rate of incidents per 
worksite (0.9), Wessex stands out as the one with the highest rate (33.9), 
with a difference of more than double the second highest rate (Kent & 
Sussex with 16.9 incidents per 100 WS). Data in Table 7.1 suggests that 
differences in the rate of incidents per WS are mostly generated by 
differences between areas regarding the volume of work planned. The 
variations of the volume of work are considerably higher than those of the 
number of incidents as can be seen by the standard deviation of both 
parameters. While possession incidents have a standard deviation of 21.9, 
the estimated volume of work registered a standard deviation of 907.1. 
Figure 7.2 shows the plotting of the number of possession incidents against 
the estimated volume of work planned, in order to illustrate the differences 
between areas. 
 
Figure 7.2: Relation between possession incidents and volume of work planned 
LNW (N) area shows a clearly different pattern than the remaining areas, 
mostly due to the volume of work it plans. Above all, Figure 7.2 indicates 
that the fact that an area plans for (and delivers) a higher volume of work 
does not necessarily mean that it is also subject to a higher rate of 
possession incidents. 
Regardless of the type of changes and the way these are integrated into 
planning, an increasing number of changes can impact negatively on the 
robustness and coherence of any given plan. As planners commented 
during the interviews (section 5.2.3), the initial plan can be compared to a 
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packs in this case) are likely to become less adjusted to each other. Thus, 
a higher volume of planning changes would likely decrease the quality of 
planning and increase its contribute as a causal factor in the occurrence of 
possession failures. In order to investigate this, the incidence of possession 
failures was plotted against volumes of planning changes. Throughout 
these comparisons, no areas were identified as having a pattern that 
outstood from the remaining areas and no other clear trends were visible. 
As shown in Appendix 5, PossMan is used to manage a considerable 
number of changes made during the last stages of planning which may not 
be captured in PPS and thus, not reflected in the data under analysis here. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 7.3, the number of possession incidents 
appears to slightly increase with the volume of worksite changes registered 
in PPS. 
 
Figure 7.3: Relation between possession incidents and the overall volume of 
worksite changes 
As earlier mentioned, the type of worked planned was also considered as a 
factor likely to influence this relation. Work on structures such as tunnels 
involves higher risks and degrees of complexity than work on open plain 
line. Similarly, major investment projects which must be delivered according 
to strict schedules and sequences of work is normally subject to higher 
deliverability risks than isolated maintenance work. Hence, areas with 
higher concentrations of major projects or structures work would be likely to 
register higher numbers of possession incidents. Although data does not 
offer evidence to support this influence of the type of work over the 
Western Wessex 
Anglia 
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occurrence of possession incidents, the following remarks can be made 
from the breakdown by categories of the type of work planned shown in 
Table 5.8 (section 5.3.5): 
x There are four areas with 15% or more work under the category of 
“stations and other structures work”. Two of these areas are locate in 
southern regions of the country and register some of the highest 
numbers of possession incidents (Wessex and Kent & Sussex) The 
other two areas are locate in the north region of the country and register 
some of the lowest numbers of possession incidents (East Midlands 
and LNE (N)). 
x LNW (S) is the area with the highest percentage of planned work under 
the categories of “major projects” and “related work” and registers an 
incidence of possession failures only inferior to Kent & Sussex. 
x Wessex was both the area registering the highest number of worksites 
dedicated to asset inspection and patrolling work (40% as shown in 
Table 5.8) and the one with the highest number of incidents on the 
category of “track patrols and related possessions”, as shown in Table 
6.3, section 6.2.2 (44.5 incidents). 
7.2.2. Relations between infrastructure and planning 
Data on asset and infrastructure trends also revealed a strong variability, as 
clearly illustrated in Figure 6.1 (section 6.3.1). Given that the observed 
variability extended beyond the periods of the year during which severe 
weather conditions could account for increased numbers of incidents, it can 
be assumed that, apart from weather conditions, other factors contribute 
significantly to this variability. The information available regarding train 
timetables does not suggest variations in traffic throughout the year, which 
could justify an increase in asset wear out and therefore, a probable 
increase on asset incidents. 
The ETM numbers together with the asset counts provided a useful 
understanding of several aspects contributing to the complexity of the 
infrastructure. From one hand, earlier in section 6.3, Figure 6.2 showed the 
relation between the infrastructure profile and the incidence of asset 
failures. Areas with higher ETM tended to register higher numbers of asset 
incidents. On the other hand, as discussed in section 4.9.1, the asset 
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incidents investigated (apart from the three possession delivery incidents 
discussed in section 6.2.2) were the ones likely to impose some kind of 
emergency response from maintenance and therefore, impact on planned 
work. This section explores the possible impacts of these different trends of 
the infrastructure on the planning performance of each area. Table 7.2 
recalls the data used for this analysis (estimated volume of work planned 
from Table 5.6 in section 5.3.4 and infrastructure data from section 6.3). 
Rates of volume of work planned by ETM and incident are also shown to 
illustrate differences between areas. 


















































































Western 405.3 3485 916 0.26 2.26 
Wessex 218.7 1606 202 0.13 0.92 
Anglia 274.3 1695 1316 0.78 4.80 
Kent & Sussex 343.7 1997 525 0.26 1.53 
Scotland 349.7 2606 1570 0.60 4.49 
LNW (S) 425.7 2789 1331 0.48 3.13 
LNW (N) 429.7 2808 3353 1.19 7.80 
LNE (S) 
300.3 
1208 267 0.22 0.89 
LNE (Central) 1014 693 0.68 2.31 
East Midlands 148.0 1424 512 0.36 3.46 
LNE (N) 354.7 2203 353 0.16 1.00 
 
LNE (S) and Central are the areas with higher rates of incidents per ETM, 
with considerable differences from the remaining areas. Despite having one 
of the highest numbers of incidents, Western area shows one of the lowest 
rates of incidents per ETM, as it also has the highest number of ETM with a 
considerable difference from the remaining areas. Regarding the estimated 
volume of work planned, the rate of volume of work planned per incident 
registered by the LNW (N) area shows the clearly different trend of this 
area in terms of volume of work. 
To better illustrate differences between areas, Figure 7.4 shows the plotting 
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of the estimated volume of work planned against both the number of asset 
incidents and ETM. 
 
Figure 7.4: Relation between ETM and volume of work planned 
Figure 7.4 suggests a slight tendency for areas with higher incidence of 
asset failures to register higher volumes of work planned. Although it can 
be assumed that the more incidents one area experiences, the more 
(emergency) repairing work it will have to undertake, it should be kept in 
mind that, as mentioned in section 2.3.4, there is a considerable volume of 
work that is delivered under T2 protection arrangements and thus, does not 
follow the planning process and protection arrangements of T3 
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regain train operations as quickly as possible, is likely to be carried out 
under such T2 arrangements. 
From one hand, proportionally to other areas, Western appears to plan for 
less work when compared to its number of ETM. On the other hand, LNW 
(N) is one of the areas with the highest ETM but the volume of work it plans 
follows a considerably different pattern. This suggests that planning in the 
LNW (N) area responds to different demands than in most areas. While 
having a similar number of ETM, LNW (S) registers a much lower volume of 
work planned than LNW (N). The considerably lower asset numbers and 
standard mileage of LNW (S) (section 6.3.2), together with the work 
involved in the West Coast Main Line Modernisation Programme (Schock, 
2010) ongoing in the LNW (N) area, may be the cause of this trend. 
The need to carry out emergency repairing work on the infrastructure, like 
responding to unforeseen delivery needs, was pointed out during the 
interviews as a cause for frequent planning changes (section 5.2.3). Hence, 
the occurrence of asset incidents is likely to be reflected in the volume of 
change registered by each area. This was explored by plotting the asset 
incidents against the volume of change for both possession and worksite 
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Figure 7.5: Relation between asset incidents and the overall volume of possession 
and worksite changes 
East Midlands clearly stands out for its considerably lower number of 
incidents. As shown in Figure 6.1 (section 6.3.1), this area exhibits this 
trend in all periods of the year 2008/2009. In particular regarding 
possession planning, Figure 7.5 suggests that the volume of change is 
related to the incidence of asset failures, as areas with higher numbers of 
incidents also tend to register higher volumes of change. Keeping in mind 
that planning changes are at the origin of planning variability and 
uncertainty, from a systems perspective, this would indicate that 
unforeseen events related to asset performance are a source of variability 
and uncertainty in planning. 
7.2.3. Relations between delivery and infrastructure profile  
The analysis of control logs (section 6.2.1) revealed that the damage of 
assets such as points (points being run-through) and signalling cables, was 
one of the main causes for possession incidents (32% of the incidents 
analysed). It was also possible to realise that these incidents often resulted 
in a possession overrun and in some cases, the need for future 
interventions to complete repairing work. Hence, areas in which such 
incidents are more frequent are likely to, not only register higher numbers 
of possession overruns, but also require more frequent unplanned access 
to carry out or complete repair work to damaged assets. This could be 
considered a source of additional pressure on the available access, which 
is often deemed insufficient to respond to planned cyclic maintenance 
needs. Within this frame of mind, areas with higher incidence of damage to 
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Anglia 
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assets during possession delivery are likely to experience more difficulties 
in responding to maintenance work demands, which could be reflected in a 
general poorer asset performance. This is explored in this section by 
investigating possible relations between the number of possession 
incidents caused by damage to assets and the number of asset incidents. 
The data used for the study of this relation is recalled in Table 7.3. The 
breakdown by route of the incidents identified during control logs analysis is 
shown against asset incidents. Given the low amount of data from control 
logs, which provides little grounds for discussion, Table 7.3 also shows 
possession overruns from the asset incident trends database (from Table 
6.3 section 6.2.2), although this requires contemplating the fact that the 
overruns registered in this database have other causal factors beyond the 
damage to assets. 


































































































Western 3 30.0 405.3 
Wessex 3 17.3 218.7 
Anglia 0 29.3 274.3 
Kent & Sussex 1 27.3 343.7 









East Midlands 13.7 148.0 
LNE (N) 22.7 354.7 
 
Overall, areas with higher numbers of possession overruns appear to also 
register higher numbers of asset incidents. The two areas with higher 
numbers of possession overruns are also the ones with higher incidence of 
asset failures (LNW (S) and Western). Conversely East Midlands registers 
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the lowest number of overruns and also the lowest number of asset 
incidents. Figure 7.6 plots possession overruns against asset failure to 
illustrate this relation. 
 
Figure 7.6: Relation between possession overruns and asset incidents 
Figure 7.6 suggests a strong relation between the number of possession 
overruns and the number of asset incidents. A correlation factor of 0.738 
was found between these two parameters, which also supports this 
conclusion. Because the overruns registered by asset incident trends 
database contemplate other causes than the damage to assets, this 
suggests that more broadly, areas that performance worse in terms of 
delivery tend to have poorer asset performance. However, based on the 
analysis of control logs, damage to assets can be considered one of the 
main causal factors for the possession overruns illustrated in Figure 7.6. 
7.2.4. Area comparison 
The main geographical structures used for this analysis were the WON 
areas. Table 7.4 summarises the main characteristics found for each WON 
area based on all the quantitative data produced. Whenever no relevant 
interpretation could be produced from data, the corresponding box in this 






























Possession overrun and related faults 
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Table 7.4: Characterisation of WON areas based on quantitative data analysis 






Highest overall volume 
of change and longest 
duration of planning 
Clearly different trend 
from other areas 
Considerably high 
number of possession 
failures but no 
evidence of planning 
related causes 
One of the highest total 
number of incidents, and 
points failures 
Highest number of ETM 
One of the highest total 
number of assets with a 
considerably Higher 





Lowest level of planning 
activity 
Lowest number of WS 
per Pos, duration and 
volume of change 
Starts and closes 
planning the soonest 
Highest number of 
patrolling possession 
incidents 
One of the lowest 
numbers of incidents 
registered, in particular 
no TSR caused by 
condition of track 
Considerably high 






Highest volume of 
project work but no 
related work is 
registered (survey, 
preparatory or follow-up 
work) 
One of the highest 
number of incidents, 
particularly for Pos 
overruns 
Contrary to all the 
southern areas, Anglia 
has 12.2 TSR per period 
caused by track 
condition, together with 
the highest infrastructure 
mishaps and highest 









One of the lowest 
volumes of change to 
Pos details and 
numbers of WS per Pos 
Shortest WS planning 
duration 
 Highest number of 
weather related incidents 
One of the highest 
numbers for track and 
trackside assets (signals, 
track circuits, TPWS, IBJ 
and points op. equip.) 
Highest number of 






Shortest duration of Pos 
and WS planning (latest 
start and closing of 
planning) 
One of the highest 
numbers of Pos 
published but a below 
average number of WS 
per Pos 
Highest volume of 
patrolling and inspection 
work planned 
Considerably lower 
numbers of incidents 
across all the three 
categories analysed  
One of the highest 
numbers of weather 
related incidents and 
signalling system and 
power supply failures 






Similar trend to Scotland 
except for one of the 
highest numbers of WS 
per Pos 
Highest overall WS 
volume of change 
Engineering area with 
highest number of 
incidents, particularly 
for patrolling 
Highest total number of 
incidents motivated 
mostly by points, OLE 






Highest level of planning 
activity 
Highest volume of 
change to Pos details 
Highest number of WS 
and WS per Pos with 
considerable differences 
from other areas 
Average numbers of 
incidents 
One of the highest total 
number of incidents 
Highest number of signal 
failures and one of the 
highest for track circuit 
failures 
Highest total number of 






One of the longest 
durations of Pos and 
WS planning together 
with one of the highest 
overall volumes of 
change to both Pos and 
WS, and also on the 
highest volume of 
changes to WS details 
One of the lowest 
numbers of Pos 
published 
On average, only one 
WS per week for 
patrolling and inspection 
work 
 Highest number of TSR 
together with one of the 
highest numbers of track 
faults (for LNE S & 
Central) 






l) Lowest overall volume of change to Pos and 
WS 
One of the earliest 
closing of WS planning 











Latest closing of WS 
planning with an 
averagely duration 
(tends to plan late in the 
process) 
One of the highest 
volumes of structure 
work and non-asset 
related work 
Despite a considerable 
number of patrolling 
related incidents, 
registers lowest 
number of overruns 
and work left 
incomplete 
Considerably lower 
numbers for points, 
signal and track circuit 
failures and lowest 
overall number of faults 






Lowest number of Pos 
published 
Lowest number of 
patrolling incidents 
Highest number of TSR, 
track faults and signalling 
systems failures and 
highest number of 
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Table 7.4 demonstrates that each area has a different planning 
performance trend, even when showing similar demands from the 
infrastructure or similar work delivery requirements. From this perspective, 
each area seeks to balance their demands and constraints, namely their 
resource limitations, according to different factors. The following trends 
were considered relevant as evidence of the different balances that each 
area is required to manage: 
x As shown in Table 6.7 (section 6.3.2), Western registers a considerably 
higher number of tunnels than other areas (409 tunnels against 247 of 
LNW (N), which has the second highest number). As illustrated in 
Figure 5.1 (section 5.3.4, Western also stands out in terms of overall 
volume of change and duration of planning for possessions. Moreover, 
Western has the highest number of ETM but Figure 7.4 (section 7.2.2) 
shows it plans for a relatively low volume of work when compared to 
other areas. Above all, tunnels represent an important limitation and 
constraint for engineering access. Thus, the infrastructure profile (and 
the limitations it imposes) may have more severe impacts on planning, 
rather than the total number of assets or their concentration. 
x Wessex shows evidence for the lowest level of planning activity, which 
may indicate fewer constraints in terms of available access in view of 
the work planned. Wessex also closes their planning considerably 
sooner than other areas. On average, no changes to possessions are 
registered after 17.2 weeks before delivery, and for worksites, this 
average is 24.2 weeks. This area registers the highest number of 
possession incidents, in particular, patrolling incidents. LNW (S) 
delivers on average the double of the patrolling and inspection work 
whilst registering a slightly lower number of incidents in this category. 
As commented during the interviews, one of the causes for 
maintenance requesting late changes is the need to comply with their 
patrolling and inspection requirements. This suggests that either 
Wessex area is refusing to integrate such changes or they are not being 
formally registered in PPS. In any case, this appears to produce a 
significant impact on the delivery, which suggests that the planning 
output produced by the Wessex area is not responding adequately to 
the delivery needs. 
x According to the asset incident database, Scotland registered a 
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considerable lower number of possession incidents than other areas 
and fewer planning related issues were revealed by control logs. In 
terms of planning, Figure 5.3 (section 5.3.4) demonstrates that Scotland 
publishes as many possessions as LNW (N) but only close to half the 
worksites, which indicates that Scotland tends to plan less worksites per 
possession. In addition, despite an average volume of change to 
possessions, Scotland has the shortest duration of planning. This 
suggests that by planning less complex possessions, Scotland uses a 
shorter time window for planning and potentially contributes to a more 
successful delivery. However, a graphical representation of the relation 
between the number of worksites per possession and the number of 
possession failures shows no evident trend. 
x Contrary to Wessex, the LNW (N) area demonstrates the highest level 
of planning activity, together with the highest volume of work planned 
and a considerably low number of possession incidents. In terms of 
possession delivery, although control logs show that at route level, LNW 
registered the highest number of incidents, asset incident trends 
indicate that this is mostly due to the high numbers verified in the 
southern area rather than the northern one. Despite no apparent impact 
on delivery, LNW (N) registered one of the highest numbers of 
infrastructure incidents but according to Figure 6.2 (section 6.3.2), this 
is well within the trend demonstrated by the remaining areas. This 
suggests that planning output produced by the LNW (N) area might be 
successfully supporting delivery needs. 
Areas such as LNW (N) where more significant access limitations may exist 
in view of the volume of work to be delivered, also tend to show higher 
levels of planning activity. Such areas attempt to plan for a maximum of 
work within each access opportunity, which results in larger possessions. 
This means that more adjustments will tend to be made to each worksite 
and possession, as conflicts between items have to be dealt with. When 
comparing with the performance pattern of Scotland, data suggests that 
fewer worksites per possession may lead to a more reliable planning, as 
Scotland also registered lower numbers of possession incidents and fewer 
planning related issues. Overall, LNW (N) and Scotland show 
characteristics of a more “positive” planning performance than Wessex, as 
these two areas appear to better manage planning changes and thus, to 
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better support work delivery. 
From a resilience perspective, and taking only into consideration the 
management of planning changes, the characteristics presented by LNW 
(N) may be consistent with higher potential for resilience (Hollnagel & 
Woods, 2006). Despite generating higher volumes of change, this area 
plans for more work whilst appearing to produce a reliable output for 
delivery. This could be interpreted as an adequate balance between the 
need to reject changes that might affect delivery and integrating those that 
could improve allocation and utilisation of resources. 
7.2.5. Resilience indicators from Christmas 2007 overruns 
As stated in section 6.2.3, the facts extracted from the report issued by the 
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR, 2008) have clear implications for the 
understanding of resilience in planning and the overall engineering system. 
Recent resilience engineering literature introduced four main capabilities as 
a support for the measurement of resilience (Hollnagel 2011b). The 
definitions of these capabilities, as argued throughout section 3.4.6, 
incorporate many of the resilience concepts also given in the literature. 
These capabilities were used to support the interpretation of the facts 
extracted from the ORR report from a resilience perspective. This is in line 
with the approach proposed by Woods & Branlat (2011) regarding the 
assessment of resilience through the study of the history of adaptation of a 
system. 
Table 7.5 shows the facts found to be related to each of the four 
capabilities. For each capability the table is structured as follows: 
x The first line recalls the definition of each capability 
x Second line introduces the facts which were found to erode that 
capability. 
x The third line of each table introduces the facts which potentially 
contributed to reinforce that capability. 
This approach provides an overview of both “what went wrong” and “what 
went right”, which is in line with the notion that undesirable outcomes are 
the “flipside” of success (Hollnagel, 2006). Some of the facts extracted 
have clearly impacted across more than one or even across all capabilities. 
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In order to maintain a comprehensive structure of the analysis, each piece 
of information was singly linked to the capability to which it related more 
closely. 
Table 7.5: Facts from ORR report related to the four main resilience capabilities 
Knowing what to do 
Ability to address the “actual” and respond to regular or irregular disruptions by 














x By endeavouring to avoid a blockade extension, Network Rail came to 
consider that decision too late (T-3) for a proper formal discussion with 
stakeholders 
x The 12 weeks required by process could never have been met, but decision 
could have been addressed at least 1 week earlier 
x Only after 3 consecutive weekends of lost work Network Rail came to that 
decision 
x Informal working level discussions took place on several occasions but 
never developed into a formal and precise information 
x Inadequate response to a considerable risk of delivery failure identified by 
the SQRA (Schedule Quantitative Risk Assessment) even before previous 
weekend possessions were lost 
x Management of shift changeovers was inadequate and, other than the 
correction of the shift change misalignment for the machine controllers, no 
action appears to have been taken to rectify the problem 
x Blockade overran for about 14 hours before a state of operational incident 















x As Overhead Line Equipment (electrification) staff shortage was detected 
over the initial 2 days of the blockade, Network Rail re-planned the work 
to create additional time for the OLE work and sought to obtain additional 
staff 
x As it became clear to the project team that the contractor was not on 
course for delivery, several planned and real-time contingencies were 
put in place 
Knowing what to look for 
Ability to address the “critical” by monitoring both the system and the environment 














x No SQRA was undertaken prior to applying for the additional day 
x The SQRAs carried out were based on the assumption that weekend works 
to be delivered throughout November and December would be completed 
successfully and on time 
x In addition to OLE staff shortage, a lack of contractor’s supervision on site 
had severe impact on its productivity 
x The way in which contractors communicated with staff agencies and how 
they attempted to secure additional OLE staff was unclear 
x Reports from contractors on work progress were increasingly inaccurate and 
undermined the seriousness of shortfalls 
x Network Rail engineers were unable to properly monitor the situation as 
their attention was diverted to other pressing problems 
x The fact that train operators were getting informal indications of problems 
through control centres at an earlier stage demonstrates the existence of 
indicators which were not being properly monitored 
















x SQRA recognised that work was sequential and therefore, delays to the 
early activities would have a knock on effect on the succeeding activities 
x The readiness-reviews were well structured and identified key risks (i.e. 
availability of key staff for both the signalling and OLE works) 
x Information from contractors advised on difficulties in securing the 
required level of resource 
Knowing what to expect 
Ability to address the “potential” longer term threats, anticipate opportunities for 
changes in the system and identify sources of disruption and pressure and their 














x OLE resource shortfalls were already partly responsible for the deferral of 
work from previous weeks into the blockade 
x The level of absence verified during this blockade had not been experienced 
before 
x Several times the blockade plan was re-configured to deliver an on-time 
hand back but this continued to rely on remaining OLE staff reporting for 
duty, supplemented by extra OLE staff from other contractors and Network 
Rail OLE maintenance staff 
x Despite resourcing problems Network Rail continued to rely upon the 
common practice of allowing contractors to self-certify their own work 
x Network Rail should have done more to test the sensitivity of its 
assumptions in SQRAs i.e. for the completion of preparatory work and taken 
appropriate mitigation measures 
x TOCs complained that it appear to be no one in overall charge or taking an 
overview 
x The difficulties from contractors in securing the necessary resources 
together with the criticality of the work should have driven the provision of a 
higher level of supervision during the blockade which would have helped 















x Programme management expertise and its application was deemed as 
“impressive” and appropriate for the project 
x An allowance of +20% was considered as a contingency for the duration of 
works  
x Network Rail requested from contractors the names of key people rostered 
for each work to be delivered and checked for double bookings of staff 
x Network Rail reviewed all national planned OLE work and cancelled lower 
priority work packages 
Knowing what has happened 
Ability to address the “factual” by learning from experiences of both successes and 
failures 















x Given the controversies and disruptions already caused by the blockade 
extension it would be expected that Network Rail management would have 
devoted its full attention to the delivery of the project 
x Weaknesses in risk assessment and risk management previously identified 
in connection with the overrun of the Portsmouth re-signalling project in 
2007 were also present in two of the three cases investigated, each in a 
different part of the country and related to a different type of project 
x The significant de-scoping of the Annual Integrated Work Plan (AIWP) 
undertaken in this period is likely to have led to wasteful levels of project 
development and planning work. Network Rail should work with the industry 
to review its own planning, looking to improve both predictability and stability 
x Network Rail contracts should  ensure that its suppliers take an appropriate 
share of the financial consequences of any risk to the projects, and equally 















x The introduction of “Gold Command” arrangements was successful in 
recovering train services and communicating with operators and customers. 
Reviewing how and when such arrangements should be called into effect 
may contribute to further its effectiveness 
x Within a period of approximately 2 weeks Network Rail had developed a 
preliminary investigation and produced actions to be taken as an outcome of 
that investigation (The actual effectiveness of these actions cannot be 
demonstrated) 
x The need to seek an extra day for the possession at a late date, or failure to 
complete the work on schedule - were not believed to be caused by any 
significant failure of project or risk management in the weeks beforehand 
 
Facts in Table 7.5 indicate that despite information that work delivery was 
not going according to plan, Network Rail was unable to initiate 
appropriate responses. There was a clear failure to revise risk 
assessments and operations as new evidence accumulated (Hale & Heijer, 
2006b). The information on emerging problems was not properly conveyed 
to support corrective actions. Work was lost in three consecutive weekends 
before measures were taken. Informal discussions at working level had 
clearly gathered evidence that urgent action was needed, but this never 
reached higher decision making levels, which demonstrates breakdowns in 
the feedback information flows and control loops (Leveson, 2004). Because 
of such communication failures, measures taken as a response to problems 
(re-planning of work and deployment of contingencies) soon revealed 
insufficient to recover control. In fact, the possibility that control over the 
project had been lost appears to have been dismissed, which accounts for 
the efforts taken by Network Rail to avoid having to declare a failure and 
request an extension of the blockade. This also suggests that defences 
were eroded by production pressures (Hale & Heijer, 2006b). 
Data shows no indication that SQRA, as a method of monitoring delivery 
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risks, was inappropriate to the task at hand. However, the assessments 
carried out with this method were based on assumptions and incomplete 
information, which more than contributing for the lack of visibility over 
developments at work delivery level (Leveson, 2004), they reinforced shifts 
towards loss of control (Dekker, 2004). There is ample evidence that staff 
on the ground was overwhelmed by the numerous minor issues and 
problems emerging, which made them unavailable to “take a step back” 
and properly assess to whole picture. Problems like the derailment of an 
engineering train and the unexpected finding of buried services in area of 
the Rugby station were mentioned in the ORR report and described as 
manageable issues with normal capacity. Within this context reports from 
delivery and communication amongst stakeholders further deteriorated and, 
despite control centres receiving some information on problems and the 
indications of potential risks that came out from SQRA (namely the 
sequential nature of work), project teams did not know what to look for. 
A global picture of planned work and delivery progress was never 
developed. As earlier discussed in section 6.4, a fragmented organisational 
structure is at the origin of equally fragmented information flows which 
“clouds” the ability of decision makers to reassess a view the “big picture” 
(Woods, 2006b). Neither the assessments carried out nor the information 
made available to planning allowed for a national and integrated view on 
how projects were being planned and later delivered, which led to an 
incremented overuse and over demand on resources. Thus, project teams 
and other engineering stakeholders did not know what to expect. As 
stated in the ORR report, on hindsight it was recognised that several 
aspects of the complexity and scale of these engineering projects had 
never been experienced before, namely the staff shortages and difficulties 
in obtaining accurate reports from contractors. Common management and 
monitoring practices rapidly became inadequate to the complexity of the 
work and no adjustments were made in time to avoid serious failure 
(Hollnagel, 2006). 
The decision to accept the level of risk estimated by the SQRA appears to 
have been made on the basis of certain assumptions which might have 
been reasonably acceptable under normal delivery conditions. However, 
the real complexity and challenges posed by this project would have made 
those assumptions unacceptable but, as these were part of normal “way of 
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doing things”, they were not given proper consideration (Dekker, 2004). 
In terms of lessons learned, data from the ORR investigation suggests 
that some of the failures experienced at Christmas could have been 
avoided or at least been better managed if previous opportunities for 
organisational learning had been seized properly (similar weaknesses had 
been identified in connection to other projects earlier that year). Cook & 
Woods (2006) present a number of factors which can work as barriers to 
learning. The great diversity of stakeholders involved in the facts described 
in Table 7.5 is likely to have generated an equal diversity of views on the 
causes of the incidents verified, which makes it difficult to produce a clear 
objective to drive organisational change towards improving and responding 
to the lessons to be learned (Cook & Woods, 2006). The high exposure to 
public and political scrutiny, pressured Network Rail to trade-off a more 
thorough investigation and consequent learning process, with a rapid 
reaction (approximately 2 weeks) to the events and its consequences 
(Hollnagel, 2009a). 
In line with the business processes described in Chapter 2, the targets for 
capacity enhancements in the Rugby area had been scoped during Control 
Period 2 (CP2). In line with the description of the Alaska Airlines accident 
given by Dekker (2004) and earlier mentioned in section 3.3.5, the 
Christmas 2007 overruns are the result of decisions made throughout the 
period of several years which progressively pushed the system across 
safety boundaries. During the years building up to the final deadline for 
delivering the capacity necessary for the new timetable of 2008, as 
planning would come to realise that resources were not sufficient, 
engineering work was frequently decommissioned and pushed back for 
later opportunities. This has accumulated a growing volume of work to be 
delivered during 2007 and in particular, during the blockade of that 
Christmas. 
7.3. Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
As stated in section 4.11, FRAM was used to investigate system 
interactions within the planning organisation and its process flows. This 
section describes the experimental work developed towards the application 
of FRAM in engineering planning. 
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Given the particular interest in better understanding the planning system, 
the use of FRAM focused mainly on the description of functions. The study 
of Network Rail documentation and the contacts with planners during 
interviews supported the identification of functions, as well as some of their 
aspects, in particular the inputs and outputs. Part of this work was earlier 
described in chapter 2 (Research context), where the planning system was 
already described according to three main high level functions (access 
planning, possession planning and worksite planning). This line of work 
was then further developed through the cooperation with ongoing projects 
by the Ergonomics NST at Network Rail and the Rail Human Factors Group 
at the University of Nottingham. This work is described by Wilson et al 
(2009) and led to the identification of more detailed (lower granularity) 
functions. 
The complexity and extent of the planning process made it unrealistic to 
aim for the “FRAMing” of the three stages of planning, as described in 
section 5.1 (long-term, medium-term and short-term). Only short-term 
planning was considered for this analysis, as earlier work, namely the 
interview processes, had confirmed this as the most relevant stage. In line 
with the description given in chapter 2, this corresponds to the last stages 
of access planning down to delivery. 
Table 7.6 shows the initial high level functions considered for this analysis 
in relation to the lower granularity ones. The organisational units 
responsible for each of the functions are also shown. From the six FRAM 
aspects of functions, only the inputs and outputs are shown in Table 7.6. 
Although further work was developed towards identifying the remaining 
descriptors for each function, due to time constraints, only inputs and 
outputs were fully studied, as these were considered sufficient to pursue 
the stated objectives on exploratory work (section 4.2). The work in 
progress towards identifying the remaining descriptors is shown in 
Appendix 9. Following a table which details the extent of the work carried 
out, a graphical representation of FRAM is given. 
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Table 7.6: “FRAMing” of the planning system – identification of functions 
High level 
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MP&I detailed work 





Haulage and trains 
plan 
Outstanding actions 
Issue of WON 
NAU on behalf 
of route 
directors 





Delivery Unit Proposed work 
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 Site specific 
information 
Development of 
MP&I delivery details 
(work packs) 
Project team 
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plan 
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assessments Project team 
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 Available access Other risk 
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Integration of 





supplement MP&I work packs 
PICOP briefing ADPU 
PICOP pack Work delivery 










Work delivery Work deliverer 
Work delivery details 
PICOP report Locked-down 
haulage and train 
plan 
T+1 review Maintenance Delivery Unit 
PICOP report Asset update 
MP&I hand back Outstanding 
actions 
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Functions from Table 7.6 were then used to produce a FRAM graphical 
representation. The instantiation in Figure 7.7 shows links between 
functions based on their inputs (left-hand side of the function) and their 
outputs (right-hand side of the function). A colour coding was used to 
illustrate different categories of functions based on their role in the planning 
system. Figure 7.7 should be read as follows: 
x Functions shown in green are those providing the main input to the 
system. This corresponds to the “what”, “where” and “when” of the work 
to be delivered. 
x Functions in yellow are the core planning steps. They process the input 
fed by green functions, and determine according to rules and 
procedures, how much and what work is it safe to deliver within each 
access opportunity. 
x Functions in red produce the output of the planning system. They 
gather the information necessary to support those delivering work. 
x Functions in white are work delivery steps and thus, beyond the limits of 
the planning system. They put into practice the output of planning. 
x Continuous line arrows represent the main flow of information towards 
delivery and dashed lines represent feedback flows. 
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Figure 7.7: “FRAMing” of the planning system - Categories of functions and their 
interactions 
Both Table 7.6 and Figure 7.7 describe what is formally established as the 
planning system. Overall, Figure 7.7 shows that little flow of information 
exists between the development and planning of maintenance and 
investments work. This is consistent with the organisational fragmentation 
to which planners referred to during semi-structured interviews (section 
5.2), in particular regarding the organisational separation of planning 
between Infrastructure Maintenance and Infrastructure Investments, as 
described in section 2.3. Information is exchanged to integrate work 
approved for delivery (connection between maintenance and MP&I green 
functions with yellow function “Integration of maintenance and projects 
work”) and beyond that point, each work pack is further detailed separately 
(remaining yellow functions). Information on work packs is only brought 
together (formally) later to produce possession management packs. 
The planning sequence investigated through planning meeting minutes 
(section 5.3.2) showed that changes affecting access are made at late 
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stages of the process. Although a function aiming to integrate late changes 
and emergency needs is formally contemplated (green in Figure 7.7), its 
links to the remaining functions suggest that little (formal) information on 
such changes is provided to functions producing details of work (shown in 
yellow). Keeping in mind the information from the different interview 
processes (sections 5.1, 5.2 and 6.1) regarding the impact of late changes 
and the quantitative data gathered on changes (section 5.3), this function 
and the formal output it produces to the system appear to be insufficient to 
respond to the considerable volume and frequency of changes submitted. 
Several references were also made during the interviews regarding the little 
feedback information produced by the system. The relatively low number of 
dashed arrows represented in Figure 7.7 illustrates this. In particular, 
regarding feedback on delivery, the interviews led to the belief that planning 
teams only receive feedback when “something has gone wrong on the 
night”. 
Above all, the arguments here presented are consistent with the crucial role 
played by informal communication, as described by planners during the 
interviews. The high pace of change and interdependency of planning 
requires more flexible communication channels, which according to the 
outcome of interviews, planners develop through informal contacts. 
7.4. Questionnaire 
This section discusses the application of the questionnaire and the results 
of its two independent parts. General characteristics of the responding 
population are given beforehand. Part 1 of the questionnaire focused on the 
assessment of resilience factors in engineering planning, as described in 
section 4.10.1. Basic statistics are presented, followed by a description of 
the principal components analysis approach. Tests were developed to 
verify the reliability of data as well as its suitability for factoring. The factor 
extraction and the rotation methods are then discussed, as well as the 
approach used to interpret the chosen factor solution. Part 2 of the 
questionnaire provides an assessment of the aspects discussed in section 
7.1. Keeping in mind how these aspects were related to resilience concepts 
and that planners were asked to rate them according to how these affected 
their performance, the purpose is to better understand the sources of 
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resilience in the planning system. 
7.4.1. Characteristics of the population 
Despite the fact that several area and territory planning units did not 
respond to the questionnaire, the sample obtained covers most regions of 
the country. Figure 7.8 shows the distribution of the 105 respondents by 
location. For members of territory planning teams the corresponding 
territory is given and for members of area planning teams the WON area 
designation was used. 
 
Figure 7.8: Distribution of respondents to the questionnaire by their location 
Each location represents approximately between 5 and 10 percent of the 
sample. Only LNW (N) contributed with a considerably higher number of 
respondents. 20 questionnaires were completed in this area planning unit, 
which accounts for 19% of the sample. This can be explained by the fact 
that, not only this was found to be one of the largest planning teams, but 
also a particularly strong cooperation was obtained from its members. 
The distribution of respondents by level of experience in planning is 
consistent with the tendency earlier observed in regard to the semi-
structured interview process (section 5.2.1), as the majority of planners 
possesses more than 3 years of planning experience. Figure 7.9 shows the 
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Figure 7.9: Distribution of respondents to the questionnaire by level of experience 
in planning 
While the least experienced respondent was working in planning for a 
period of about 6 months, the most experienced planner had 34 years of 
work in planning. Based on the difference between the most experienced 
and the least experienced planner which responded to the questionnaire, 
five intervals were created for this distribution, as shown on the legend of 
Figure 7.9. Planners with more than three years of experience account for 
81 percent of the respondents. While the majority of the planners 
interviewed had more than 10 years of experience, although not shown in 
Figure 7.9, planners with 10 years or more of planning experience 
represent approximately 24% of this sample. 
7.4.2. Part 1 of the questionnaire 
Overall, planners attributed a high score to all 22 statements, 
demonstrating a general agreement with the issues raised. Figure 7.10 
ratings for each statement in terms of percentage of respondents. As in 
Figure 7.13 (section 7.4.7), absolute numbers of respondents for scores 5 







More than 12 years 
Between 6 and 12 years 
Between 3 and 6 years 
Between 1 and 3 years 
1 year or less 
Missing cases 
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Figure 7.10: Ratings for part 1 of the questionnaire by percentage of respondents 
Overall, the data shows a clear shift towards scores 5 (agree) and 6 
(strongly agree). The large majority of statements were rated as 5 or 6 by 
more than 40% of respondents. Statements were rated as “strongly 
disagree” by considerably lower numbers of respondents. Although not 

























































































I receive feedback on the outcome of my  
I have a clear picture of how my planning  
I manage to finish whatever plans I start 
I have all the information I need to do my  
I have the information necessary to deal  
I have the information needed to detect  
I have enough time to do my planning  
I have enough time to reflect on my  
I am encouraged to reflect on my planning 
I revise my planning whenever new  
I take into account a balance between  
I can adjust my way of working according  
I can solve problems even when  
I can solve problems even when faced  
I feel in control of my work activities 
I assess the potential safety impacts for  
I can identify when my planning decisions  
I can detect failures or errors in my  
I have the support of my manager to  
My management does not blame me for  
Because something has always gone well  
I can communicate my decisions  
Strongly agree Agree Slightly agree Slightly disagree Disagree Strongly disagree 
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the statement with the highest number of “strongly disagree” responses (6 
respondents). 
The statement “having enough time to reflect on my planning” obtained the 
lowest number of scores 5 and 6 (29 of the 105 respondents for both 
scores). Although the statement regarding “having enough time to do my 
planning thoroughly” was rated with scores 5 and 6 by 10 more 
respondents (39 in total for both scores), both statements were interpreted 
very similarly, as ratings on both statements were found to be strongly 
correlated. A correlation of 0.762 was found between these two items for a 
level of confidence of 0.01 (p=0.711), which constitutes one of the highest 
inter-item correlations found for this set of data. Most planners might feel 
that in order to plan thoroughly, they also require time to reflect on it and 
thus these statements were interpreted in very similar ways. 
The statement “being encouraged to reflect on my planning” registered a 
considerably higher percentage of scores 5 and 6. Although a significant 
correlation was found between statements “having enough time to reflect” 
and “being encouraged to reflect” (0.475 significant at the 0.01 level), the 
different distribution of scorings suggests that planners, despite recognising 
some encouragement to reflect on their work, feel that they do not always 
have time to do so. 
The highest concentration of scores 5 and 6 were registered on the 
following statements: 
x I manage to finish whatever plans I start (87 respondents) 
x I revise my planning whenever new information arises (88 respondents) 
x I take into account a balance between safety and efficiency in my 
planning decisions (89 respondents) 
x I can solve problems even when pressured to deliver fast results (89 
respondents) 
x I can solve problems even when faced with unexpected situations (88 
respondents) 
x I have the support of my manager to make decisions (89 respondents) 
x I can communicate my decisions promptly to those that rely on them (88 
respondents) 
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All the previous statements were rated with either “agree” or “strongly 
agree” by more than 80% of respondents. When considering the contents 
of these statements, it appears that they all tend to focus on aspects which 
planners might take for granted during their normal activities. Finishing their 
plans, revising them, taking into account safety and efficiency needs, 
solving problems regardless of constraints, having managerial support and 
having to communicate promptly, are all aspects that can be considered as 
everyday requirements of being a planner. These might be aspects of a 
more constant nature than the remaining ones. Conversely, the rating of 
other statements such as for instance, having all the information needed, 
“having enough time” or “receiving feedback”, on which average scores 
were lower, might have been judged by respondents as aspects that tend 
to vary in time and therefore are less constant in their daily activities. This 
could also account for the fact that, as previously mentioned, the statement 
“I have all the information I need to do my work” registered a higher number 
of “strongly disagree” responses. 
7.4.3. Data suitability for factor analysis 
Principal components analysis is based on the study of correlations 
between items. Thus cases with any missing data had to be excluded from 
the process. Of the initial 105 cases 7 were excluded on this basis. 
Skewness and Kurtosis tests were run to verify the distribution of each 
variable. Ferguson & Cox (1993) recommend +/- 2 as a cut-off value for 
both Skewness and Kurtosis. Although Skewness values suggested no 
need for dismissal of variables, six variables presented Kurtosis values 
above 2. Ferguson & Cox (1993) further suggest that the possibility of such 
variables affecting the validity of results is minimal if they represent less 
than 25% of all variables. On the basis of this heuristic, and with the intent 
to maintain the largest possible set of data, all variables were taken forward 
for the factor analysis. 
As generally recommended for factor analysis, the correlation matrix 
showed a substantial number of significant correlations above 0.300. 
According to Tabachnick & Fidell (2007), the factorability of the data set 
can be verified by means of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy (KMO). This coefficient provides a ratio for partial correlations. If 
the value approaches 1 then partial correlations are small. Tabachnick & 
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Fidell (2007) recommend a KMO above 0.6. The obtained value for this set 
of data was 0.747 which indicates good potential for factor analysis 
procedures. 
A reliability test was also undertaken using Cronbach’s Alpha to verify the 
internal consistency of data. An Alpha value of 0.856 was found with a 
value based on standardised items of 0.869. 
7.4.4. Principal components analysis 
Initial extractions, as recommended by the “Kaiser 1” rule (Ferguson & Cox, 
1993), aimed to explore the maximum number of components taking only 
into account eigenvalues >1. The scree test, although not an exact 
reference is recommended by Ferguson & Cox (1993) and Tabachnick & 
Fidell (2007) as a reliable indicator for the most appropriate number of 
components to be extracted. 
Orthogonal rotation using the Varimax method is described by Tabachnick 
& Fidell (2007) as the most common approach to factor rotation, as it 
minimises the complexity of the process. The selection of the most 
appropriate solution took into consideration the concept of “simple 
structure” described by Kline (1994). A simple structure is defined by the 
following principles: 
x Each of the rotated matrix should contain at least one zero. 
x In each factor, the minimum number of zero loadings should be the 
number of factors in the rotation. 
x For every pair of factors there should be variables with zero loadings on 
one and significant loadings on the other. 
x For every pair of factors a large proportion of the loadings should be 
zero, at least in a matrix with a large number of factors. 
x For every pair of factors there should be only a few variables with 
significant loadings on both factors. 
Although it is unlikely that any extracted solution meets simultaneously all 
these criteria these were considered a useful guidance for the selection of 
the most suitable combination of components.  
Using the Kaiser 1 rule SPSS extracted a six component solution. 
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However, the aspect of the Scree plot shown in Figure 7.11 appears more 
agreeable with a four or five component solution. 
 
Figure 7.11: Scree Plot 
Considering these indicators, solutions for four, five and six components 
were extracted and rotated. Of all the solutions explored the five 
components using the Varimax rotation was the one that best fitted the 
criteria of simple structure. Table 7.7 shows the loading factors for each 
variable. 
Table 7.7: Matrix of extracted components 
  Components 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 I receive feedback on the outcome of my planning -.013 .181 .573 .380 .001 
2 
I have a clear picture of how my planning 
contributes to the building of an 
integrated national delivery plan 
.114 .071 .720 .065 -.107 
3 I manage to finish whatever plans I start .071 .653 -.037 .342 -.073 
4 I have all the information I need to do my 
work .006 .832 -.016 .138 .233 
5 I have the information necessary to deal 
with unexpected situations .234 .771 .257 -.044 .167 
6 I have the information needed to detect potential planning failures .084 .556 .385 -.050 .360 
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8 I have enough time to reflect on my planning .094 .280 -.038 .215 .839 
9 I am encouraged to reflect on my planning -.036 -.095 .460 .433 .566 
1
0 
I revise my planning whenever new 
information arises .518 -.101 .144 .167 .220 
1
1 
I take into account a balance between 
safety and efficiency in my planning 
decisions 
.187 .023 .170 .671 .176 
1
2 
I can adjust my way of working according 
to external pressures .344 .199 .500 -.056 .221 
1
3 
I can solve problems even when 
pressured to deliver fast results .787 .141 .058 .247 -.013 
1
4 
I can solve problems even when faced 
with unexpected situations .791 .144 .009 .191 .048 
1
5 I feel in control of my work activities .426 .651 .008 -.113 .338 
1
6 
I assess the potential safety impacts for 
each of my planning decisions .218 .072 -.149 .802 .079 
1
7 
I can identify when my planning 
decisions are pushing the boundaries of 
safe performance 
.284 .115 -.017 .795 -.062 
1
8 
I can detect failures or errors in my 
planning before they create problems .627 .170 .122 .401 .169 
1
9 
I have the support of my manager to 
make decisions .206 -.069 .665 .007 .162 
2
0 
My management does not blame me for 
any poor outcome of my planning -.021 .076 .715 -.162 -.059 
2
1 
Because something has always gone 
well before, I feel confident that it will 
continue to go well in the future 
.374 .268 .162 -.234 -.073 
2
2 
I can communicate my decisions 
promptly to those that rely on them .458 .349 .269 .222 .071 
 
Loading factors above 0.400 were considered (shown in bold in Table 7.7) 
and, where this led to multiple loadings, a minimum difference of 0.200 was 
imposed (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). The solution in Table 7.7 converged 
after 10 iterations and shows one non-loading variable (no loading factor 
above 0.400 – item 21) and one cross-loading variable (more than one 
loading factor above 0.400 with difference between them below 0.200 – 
item 9). Overall, loading coefficients are significantly high, which 
demonstrates a strong correlation between items and their loading 
components. The components extracted are shown bellow in Table 7.8. 
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7.4.5. Interpretation of the extracted components 
Ferguson & Cox (1993) suggest two methods for naming the extracted 
components. Both methods resort to a sample of judges as a way to 
develop an independent interpretation, which makes their use time 
consuming and requiring a rather large number of participants. 
For this research, an approach was developed based on the Delphi method 
(Turoff & Linstone 1975). The 25 members of the Ergonomics NST at 
Network Rail were used as the “discussion group”. Team members were 
asked to name each of the five groups of statements (variables loaded into 
each of the five components) according to what concept or idea they felt 
most accurately would describe that group, using as few words as possible. 
Based on the outcome of these interpretations, a name was proposed by 
the researcher for each of the extracted components. The interpretations 
made use whenever adequate, of concepts found in resilience engineering 
literature. 
Following the Delphi approach, team members were then given the 
opportunity to confirm or dispute the proposed names in the light of their 
initial interpretations. Each respondent was given a new table showing their 
own interpretations against the proposed names and asked whether they 
agree with the given name or still prefer their initial interpretation. 
16 members of the Ergonomics National Team responded to the initial step 
of the Delphi with interpretations for each component. Table 7.8 
summarises the expressions and concepts that were most frequently 
mentioned by the respondents for each of the components. 









I can solve problems even when pressured to deliver fast 
results 
I can solve problems even when faced with unexpected 
situations 
I can detect failures or errors in my planning before they 
create problems 
I can communicate my decisions promptly to those that rely 
on them 
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2 
I manage to finish whatever plans I start 
Control 
Information 
I have all the information I need to do my work 
I have the information necessary to deal with unexpected 
situations 
I have the information needed to detect potential planning 
failures 
I feel in control of my work activities 
3 







I have a clear picture of how my planning contributes to the 
building of an integrated national delivery plan 
I can adjust my way of working according to external 
pressures 
I have the support of my manager to make decisions 
My management does not blame me for any poor outcome 
of my planning 
4 
I take into account a balance between safety and efficiency 
in my planning decisions 
Safety 
Trade-offs 
I assess the potential safety impacts for each of my planning 
decisions 
I can identify when my planning decisions are pushing the 
boundaries of safe performance 
5 
I have enough time to do my planning thoroughly Time available 
Management I have enough time to reflect on my planning 
 
The interpretation for all five components was considered valid by the 
majority of respondents. Nevertheless, to improve confidence on the 
outcome of this process, a clarification was sought whenever challenges 
were made by respondents. 
Comments made by respondents regarding component 3 pointed towards 
the high number of statements contained in this component and the fact 
that these (apparently) bring together a more diverse set of issues. The 
initial interpretations provided by respondents tended to favour sub-groups 
of statements, according to issues which they felt to be more dominant. 
This accounted for a lower number of confirmations obtained for this 
component. 
While components 1 and 2 seem to have a higher focus on personal 
capabilities, components 3, 4 and 5 could be seen as shifting towards a 
more organisational nature. The fact that the cross-loading item (I am 
encouraged to reflect on my planning) refers to an organisational cultural 
aspect and that it loads onto components 3, 4 and 5 supports this 
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assumption. Within this frame of mind, having the organisational support to 
reflect on ones planning could be an important underlying condition to allow 
for an adequate performance in regards to the aspects comprised in 
components 3, 4 and 5. 
The non-loading variable (Because something has always gone well 
before, I feel confident that it will continue to go well in the future) was the 
one that more explicitly aimed at complacency issues. As shown in Table 
7.8, none of the interpretations for the extracted components allude to 
these issues, which would account for the non-loading of the variable. 
Based on the previous feedback, the names shown in Table 7.9 were 
proposed by the researcher. 12 out of the initial 16 people responded to the 
second stage of inquiry of the Delphi. Table 7.9 indicates the percentage 
(of the 12 respondents) of confirmations obtained for each of the proposed 
names. 
Table 7.9: Names proposed for each component and confirmation level 
 Component name Confirmation 
1 Adaptability and flexibility 92% 
2 Control 92% 
3 Awareness and preparedness 67% 
4 Trade-offs 92% 
5 Time management 100% 
 
The definitions shown in Table 7.10 aim at placing the proposed names 
within the context of rail engineering planning. Resilience literature, namely 
concepts from Table 3.3 in section 3.4.1, and the semi-structured 
interviews with planners described in section 5.2 were used as a 
background for this process. 






Planners are able to restructure their work (the building of a 
national plan for delivery) in response to pressures and adapt to 
new arising circumstances through problem solving 
Control People feel they have the means necessary, in particular information, to appropriately control and steer their activities 
  





The system generates feedback and provides support in such a 
way that people have a clear view of how they should contribute 
towards the production of a plan and respond to demands 
Trade-offs 
Achieving a balance between safety and efficiency through 
decision making. This can be interpreted in the light of the 
ETTO principle (Hollnagel 2009) 
Time 
management 
Having the time to be thorough when planning decisions require 
it. Managing a “buffer capacity” 
 
The extracted components emphasize a relation between the issues raised 
by the questionnaire and resilience engineering constructs, which 
reinforces the potential use of this approach for the measuring of resilience. 
To further explore this potential, the extracted components were used to 
generate corresponding variables in SPSS. As detailed in the next section, 
a statistical analysis was developed based on these new variables to 
investigate any possible planning performance trends which these 
components might reflect. 
7.4.6. Analysis of extracted components 
Keeping in mind the exploratory scope of this work, the extracted 
components were integrated into the original SPSS data set as new 
variables. The purpose was to further understand the constructs produced 
by the extracted components by comparing the scores obtained by 
geographical region. 
As suggested by Hair et al (1998), these new variables were computed in 
SPSS as an average of the scores of all variables initially loading onto each 
component. For each case (respondents), the new variables were 
computed as follows: ܸܿ1 = ܸ1ܿ1 +  ܸ2ܿ1 +ڮ+  ܸ݊ܿ1݊  





scores for each ݊ variables loading onto component 1. From this, it follows 
that the new composite variables assume values between 1 and 6. Figure 
7.12 shows the average scores on each component by geographical 
region. 
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Figure 7.12: Average ratings for extracted components by geographical region 
Overall, the component “time management” shows lower scores than the 
remaining ones in most regions, in particular for East Midlands area. 
Recalling data for worksite planning (Table 5.7, section 5.3.5), East 
Midlands was found to be the area which tends to plan worksites the 
closest to delivery date, despite having an average duration of planning. 
This could be put forward as a possible cause for a lower rating in the “time 
management” component. 
In order to identify any significant differences between component scores, 
significance tests were carried out. SPSS was used to perform 2-tailed 
Mann-Witney tests (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) on all components, using 
geographical regions as the grouping variable. The null hypothesis (H0) can 
be given as “there are no significant differences between areas on each of 
the five components” and the hypothesis to be tested (H1) corresponds to 
the existence of significant differences. Table 7.11 shows p-values for 
“control”, “awareness and preparedness” and “time management”, as 
significant differences were identified for these three components. Similar 
tables were reproduced for components “adaptability and flexibility” and 
“trade-offs” but, given that no significant differences were found, they are 














Adaptability and flexibility control Awareness and preparedness trade-offs Time management 
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which are less reliant on local capabilities and are dependent on higher 
level (perhaps nationally) organisational operating conditions. For instance, 
having the ability to be flexible and adapt at an area level is considerably 
dependent on the way in which higher levels of the organisation provide 
enough room for local adjustments or rather they exert pressure for 
compliance with strict regulations. Grote et al (2009) debated these issues 
in regards to the use of tight and central planning as a way to minimise 
uncertainty.  
Table 7.11: Significance tests for components “control”, “awareness and 



























































Western .001 .009 .001 .862 .061 .593 .237 .162 .010 .020 .004 
Wessex 
 
.501 .961 .145 .357 .052 .300 .120 .460 .916 .595 
Anglia 
  
.537 .152 .520 .108 .512 .303 .324 .823 .420 
Scotland 
   
.120 .356 .051 .312 .142 .420 .884 .626 
LNW (S) 
    
.367 .937 .279 .464 .049 .146 .167 
LNW (N) 
     
.225 .951 .531 .108 .413 .338 
LNE (S&C) 
      
.405 .616 .037 .099 .079 
East Mid 
       
.777 .230 .514 .356 
LNE (N) 
        .080 .244 .150 
LNE 
         .335 .525 
Western 
(territory)           1.000 


























































Western .205 .654 .922 .769 .311 .100 .514 .257 .210 .023 .553 
Wessex  .530 .239 .419 .979 .023 .216 .900 .065 .010 .139 
Anglia   .802 .538 .662 .065 .410 .411 .154 .018 .419 
Scotland    .457 .385 .028 .271 .243 .108 .005 .443 
LNW (S)     .498 .712 .783 .304 .752 .335 .917 
LNW (N)      .037 .250 .812 .086 .006 .253 
LNE (S&C)       .321 .008 .880 .394 .258 
East Mid        .082 .575 .103 .851 
LNE (N)         .039 .002 .119 
LNE          .372 .451 
Western 
(territory)           .103 
  




























































Western .556 .105 .591 .412 .717 .770 .019 .969 .073 .485 .765 
Wessex  .242 .807 .552 .979 .435 .037 .910 .134 .275 .821 
Anglia   .216 .853 .128 .077 .352 .094 .901 .042 .292 
Scotland    .494 .444 .326 .031 .440 .243 .152 .736 
LNW (S)     .299 .202 .357 .351 .670 .083 .459 
LNW (N)      .440 .023 .874 .245 .429 .944 
LNE (S&C)       .024 .538 .105 1.000 .588 
East Mid        .010 .150 .015 .097 
LNE (N)         .031 .245 1.000 
LNE          .043 .240 
Western 
(territory)           .536 
 
Numbers in bold indicate cases for which the null hypothesis is rejected 
and therefore, a significant difference between areas exists. For the 
component “awareness and preparedness” significant differences are 
mostly concentrated on Western territory. As shown in Figure 7.12, this 
geographical region registered the highest average score on this 
component. This could be related to the fact that, as a territory, this 
geographical structure addresses different planning stages than the 
remaining ones represented in Table 7.11 (apart from South East territory). 
For the component “time management”, East Midlands area stands out as 
the region with the most significant differences, which is consistent with 
previous observations regarding Figure 7.12. From the analysis developed 
in section 7.2, East Midlands was found to have clear differences from the 
remaining areas when comparing the number of asset incidents against the 
volumes of worksite and possession changes. While registering a 
considerably lower number of asset incidents, this area produced some of 
the highest volumes of planning changes. Within the scope of this research, 
it was not possible to further investigate potential relations between such 
differences and the ones registered in terms of the component “time 
management”, as this would require additional data collection and different 
methodological approaches. 
Although other significant p-values were found, given the high number of 
tests carried out, it should be taken into account the possibility that these 
are the result of “statistical chance”, rather than representing actual 
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disparities between variables. 
7.4.7. Part 2 of the questionnaire 
Figure 7.13 shows the ratings given by planners for each of the 10 
statements introduced in section 4.10.3. Labels on the graphic are given in 
absolute values and percentages are indicated on the “yy” axel. 
 
Figure 7.13: Ratings for part 2 of the questionnaire by percentage of respondents 
All statements except the one regarding “the organisational division of 
planning units”, were rated with either 5 (Much) or 6 (Totally) by at least 
50% of respondents. Keeping in mind that planners were asked to rate 
statements according to how much they felt the issues influenced their 
performance, the results obtained demonstrate the relevance of these 
issues for the performance of planners. Although maintaining the shift 
towards the higher scores, the aspects regarding “organisational division 
and “diversity of inputs” only had 10% of respondents attributing a score of 
6. As discussed in section 4.10.3, the issues introduced by these 
statements were described as having a negative impact on planning 
performance. The relatively lower scores attributed by respondents to these 
statements can be interpreted as, although recognising their relevance, 
10 10 






































































































































































































































































Totally Much Some Little Very little Not at all 
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planners feel that they are able to cope with these issues having serious 
impacts on their performance. 
Statements regarding “understanding the impact of planning decisions” and 
“having trustworthy contacts” stand out as the most relevant issues with 
86% of respondents attributing either a score 5 or 6. This is consistent with 
the descriptions given during the semi-structured interviews. As earlier 
discussed in section 5.2, while understanding the impact of decisions on 
work delivery was considered the fundamental support for decision making 
in planning, trustworthy contacts were described as the means to acquire 
information necessary to generate confidence in the decisions made. From 
discussions in section 7.1, in particular sub-section 7.1.5, reliable 
information out came as a fundamental resource for reducing uncertainty 
and unpredictability. Sub-section 7.1.3 discusses the absence of reliable 
feedback as a hindering factor for decision making and a contributing factor 
for uncertainty. Planners resort to informal contacts in order to acquire 
reliable information to support their decisions in terms of better 
understanding their potential impacts on work delivery and thus attempting 
to reduce uncertainty. 
Only 4 respondents scored these two statements with either 1 (Not at all), 2 
(Very little) or 3 (Little). By observing the data tables in SPSS, it was 
noticed that these 4 planners gave similar scores to the remaining 
statements. 
Figure 7.13 reveals strong similarities between the responses given to each 
statement. To verify similitude, Pearson correlations are shown in Table 
7.12. Levels of significance of 0.05 and of 0.01 were studied, with “p 
values” of 0.215 and 0.282 respectively. Correlations significant at the 0.01 
level are shown in bold numbers and correlations significant at the 0.05 
level are underlined. 
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Table 7.12: Correlations between statements of part 2 of the questionnaire 
 





























































































































































































































division of planning 
units 
.611 .213 .206 .084 .066 .105 .165 .216 ,243 
2 The range of inputs to the planning process  .236 .161 .112 .097 .186 .157 .281 ,250 





   .065 .134 ,230 .109 .363 ,255 
5 Planning experience     .721 .389 .335 .429 .512 
6 
Geographical 
knowledge of the 
railways 
     .482 .342 .525 .521 
7 
Having trustworthy work 
contacts within the 
planning organisation 
      .557 .465 .686 
8 Informal flow of information        .603 .537 
9 Informal face-to-face discussion         .635 
 
Overall, Table 7.12 shows strong correlations, in particular between 
statements relating to issues impacting more positively on planners’ 
performance (statements 5 to 10). This appears to be consistent with the 
interdependencies described by planners during the semi-structured 
interviews. Statements “planning experience” and “understanding the 
impact of planning decisions” appear as the ones with higher numbers of 
interdependencies and in particular, the latter shows some of the strongest 
correlation coefficients. 
The issues addressed by the statements assessed in this part of the 
questionnaire were earlier analysed with regard to resilience concepts 
(section 7.1), and in particular, the importance of “understanding the impact 
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of planning decisions” to the management of uncertainty was argued in 
section 7.1.5. Within this scope, the interdependencies demonstrated by 
correlations in Table 7.12 illustrate some of the mechanism used by 
planners to manage uncertainty and variability in their daily activities and 
thus, contribute to system resilience. 
The way in which these correlations contribute to the understanding of the 
sources of resilience in the planning system is later argued as a final 
research discussion. At this point, based on the information from section 
7.1, Table 7.13 clarifies correlations significant at the 0.01 level by 
providing a brief description. Given that statements regarding “informal flow 
of information” and “face-to-face communications” were both derived from 
information issues in section 7.1.4, and that they also originate from the 
same issues introduced by planners in section 5.2, their correlations are 
here described together. 
Table 7.13: Description of correlations significant at the 0.01 level 
Correlation Description 
The organisational division 
of planning units - The 
range of inputs to the 
planning process 
The fragmentation of the planning process generates 
different views on priorities and goals, which 
contributes to differences in the contents and formats 
of the information shared throughout the planning 
system. Overall, this renders planning information 
subject to a considerable degree of variability 
(sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3) 
Difficulties in obtaining 
accurate information - 
Working with incomplete or 
inaccurate information 
The imprecision or insufficiency of information forces 
planners to make decisions based on inaccurate 
details of work packs (sections 7.1.3 and 7.1.4) 
Planning experience - 
Geographical knowledge of 
the railways 
Geographical knowledge of the railways is an 
important element in developing planning experience 
(section 7.1.6) 
Planning experience - 
Having trustworthy work 
contacts within the 
planning organisation 
Knowing who to trust and where to go for reliable 
information is built through experience in planning 
(sections 7.1.4 and 7.1.6) 
Planning experience - 
Informal flow of information 
Informal communication and exchange of information 
is based on the knowledge of people concerning who 
to trust and of reliable sources of information, and 
therefore also relies on experience (sections 7.1.4 
and 7.1.7) 
Planning experience - 
Informal face-to-face 
discussion 
Planning experience - 
Understanding the impact 
of planning decisions on 
delivery 
Knowledge of the railway is an important element of 
planning experience because it supports an 
understanding of how decisions may affect delivery 
(section 7.1.8) 
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Geographical knowledge of 
the railways - Having 
trustworthy work contacts 
within the planning 
organisation 
Having strong and reliable work relations contributes 
to a better understanding of how the railway operates 
(section 7.1.6) 
Geographical knowledge of 
the railways - Informal flow 
of information 
Understanding the railway and its operations 
supports the development of more informal and 
efficient exchange of information (section 7.1.6) 
Geographical knowledge of 
the railways - Informal 
face-to-face discussion 
Geographical knowledge of 
the railways - 
Understanding the impact 
of planning decisions on 
delivery 
Understanding the railway and its operations 
supports the ability to consider possible outcomes of 
the decisions made (sections 7.1.6 and 7.1.8) 
Having trustworthy work 
contacts within the 
planning organisation - 
Informal flow of information 
Informal exchange of information is supported by the 
contacts on which planners feel they can rely on 
(section 7.1.7) 
Having trustworthy work 
contacts within the 
planning organisation - 
Informal face-to-face 
discussion 
Having trustworthy work 
contacts within the 
planning organisation - 
Understanding the impact 
of planning decisions on 
delivery 
Information obtained from trustworthy contacts 
supports the ability to predict possible outcomes of 
the decisions made (section 7.1.9) 
Informal flow of information 
- Informal face-to-face 
discussion 
Planning meetings are based on face-to-face 
discussion and are part of the planning decision 
making processes. This constitutes an important 
element of information flows within the planning 
system and reinforces an efficient and timely decision 
making  (sections 7.1.4 and 7.1.7) 
Informal flow of information 
- Understanding the impact 
of planning decisions on 
delivery 
The informal exchange of information is often the 
source of reliable information, which planners require 
to understand how their decision might impact on 
delivery (section 7.1.8) 
Informal face-to-face 
discussion - Understanding 
the impact of planning 
decisions on delivery 
7.5. Chapter conclusions 
The information discussed in Section 7.1 illustrates issues with relevance 
for either the enhancement or erosion of resilience in the planning systems. 
Two main traits can be identified: 
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x On the one hand, the organisational and geographical dispersion of the 
planning system contributes to a higher variability of information inputs, 
and generates a fragmented information flow. A fragmented 
organisational structure and information flow were placed at the source 
of incomplete or inaccurate information which in return, increases 
uncertainty and unpredictability in planning decision making (Leveson et 
al, 2006). This reflects mainly on the volume of planning changes, as 
decisions which originate such changes must be frequently reviewed 
and visibility on their potential outcomes is reduced Leveson et al 
(2003). 
x On the other hand, planning experience provides a means for the 
development of reliable work relations, which support informal 
exchanges of information. This informal communication provides 
reliable feedback and supports coping with uncertainty in decision 
making (Leveson, 2004). Experience also leads to a better knowledge 
of the railway in general and an understanding of the impacts of 
planning decisions on delivery by improving awareness on possible 
scenarios (Woods, 2006b). 
In view of the arguments presented by Hollnagel (2009a), the management 
of planning changes plays a crucial role in achieving and maintaining a 
balance between efficiency (from production pressures) and thoroughness 
(through safety requirements). A minimum volume of changes was 
recognised by planners as necessary to respond to unpredictable 
engineering needs, which is consistent with the need for proximal 
adjustments to unpredicted operating conditions (Crawford & Wiers, 2001). 
However, there was consensus towards the fact that a considerable volume 
of change brings unnecessary disruption to planning, as this can emanate 
from issues that planners deemed possible to anticipate. This amounts to 
distinguish between unpredictable and unpredicted problems. While to deal 
with unpredictable issues, planning changes are unavoidable, if issues are 
deemed as unpredicted, it implies that some form of anticipation would 
have been possible. As discussed in section 7.1.1 and supported by Hale 
et al (2006), changes that can allow to flexibly cope with unpredictable 
issues should be integrated as efficiently as possible and changes which 
may disrupt tested and verified planning should be avoided. This 
demonstrates potential for improvements in the management of planning 
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changes, which can lead to a more adequate coping with uncertainty and 
therefore, for enhancement of resilience in planning. From this point of 
view, a better management of planning changes is consistent with more 
reliable planning and thus, contribute to a more safe and efficient work 
delivery. 
The contents of the investigation report produced by the Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR, 2008) provided ample support to the previous 
arguments. Mainly, production and business pressures led to the planning 
of volumes of work which clearly exceeded the management and control 
capabilities of the system and the resources available. The fragmented 
organisation and communication structures rapidly eroded means to adjust 
plans and contingencies and the ability to respond and recover from failure. 
Woods (2006b) refers to accidents such as the Columbia space shuttle as 
late indicators of a system that became brittle. A similar perspective could 
be applied to the chain of events and overall system behaviours exhibit by 
Network Rail, which led to the Christmas overruns. The work delivery on-
going within that period of time throughout the country had been within the 
scope of planning for more than a year and several years prior to the formal 
planning, the ambitious renewal schemes that framed such complex 
engineering work were the scope of high level negotiations with rail industry 
stakeholders and governance. The following quote of Woods (2006b) 
summarises this series of events quite clearly: 
As pressure on acute efficiency and production goals 
intensifies, first, people working hard to cope with these 
pressures make decisions that consume or sacrifice tasks 
related to chronic goals such as safety. As a result, safety 
margins begin to erode over time – buffering capacity 
decreases, system rigidity increases, the positioning of 
system performance relative to boundary conditions 
becomes more precarious (pp 315). 
At a system level, planning demonstrated inability to produce an adequate 
overall picture, both at the scale of independent projects and at a national 
level. Although the problems found during the Rugby project (derailment of 
train, unforeseen buried services, staff shortages, among others) were 
considered to be manageable with capacities, their cumulative effect clearly 
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contributed to the inability to properly monitor work and the consequent loss 
of control. The way in which several major projects on-going simultaneously 
at national level (Appendix 8) end up by competing against each other for 
resources, namely experienced Overhead Line Equipment staff, shows that 
planning was unable to properly integrate a national plan and allocate 
resources accordingly. The way in which normal (manageable) events 
combined and generated an operational variability and uncertainty which 
exceeded the ability of the system to adapt and maintain control over 
operations is compatible with the principles of functional resonance 
(Hollnagel, 2004). 
The use of FRAM, also offered evidence towards the fragmented 
information flow and its impacts on the variability and uncertainty of 
planning. Despite the fact that only the initial steps of analysis were fully 
developed, useful insight was obtained regarding flows of information and 
the overall operation of planning by means of the function analysis that was 
involved in the application of this method. A considerable gap appears to 
exist between the identified formal exchanges of information and what was 
described by planners (mainly during interviews) as informal 
communications. 
The variability registered in the analysis of archival data is consistent with 
the high uncertainty earlier described during the interviews processes. 
From a resilience perspective, the comparison of data from the different 
archival sources investigated has indicated potentially relevant couplings 
between planning, work delivery and the infrastructure. Beyond the 
evidence gathered from safety data (control logs) regarding the impact of 
planning on delivery, the analysis of infrastructure profiles against planning 
data has revealed important characteristics about areas. In particular, areas 
with higher numbers of asset incidents appear to register higher volumes of 
planned work and of planning changes. The graphical representations 
shown in section 7.2.2 highlighted the clear different trend of LNW (N) area, 
when compared to other areas, in terms of the volume of work planned and 
East Midlands area in terms of the number of asset incidents. As illustrated 
in Figure 7.6, higher incidence of asset failures also appears to be related 
to a higher number of possession incidents. 
Regarding data from part 1 of the questionnaire, the high ratings suggest a 
strong relevance of the issues raised by statements. The principal 
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components analysis has led to the identification of five constructs with 
potential use as measurable resilience factors. Some significant differences 
between geographical areas were identified based on the extracted 
components. In particular, component “time management” tended to 
register lower average scores across all areas and the East Midlands area 
showed significant differences from the remaining areas regarding 
components “control”, “awareness and preparedness” and “time 
management”. 
The results from part 2 of the questionnaire support conclusions from the 
interviews. The shift towards high scores registered on all statements 
confirms the relevance of the issues raised. “Understanding the impact of 
planning decisions” and “having trustworthy contacts” stand out as the 
issues which planners identified as having the most significant impact on 
their performance. The strong correlations found between statements are 
also consistent with the outcome of the interviews as they illustrate the 
interdependency of issues. Overall, the questionnaire provided a quantified 
assessment of main planning issues, which contributed to a better 




The research developed has contributed mainly to the understanding of 
planning activities within the context of rail engineering. The adoption of a 
systems approach added to knowledge on aspects of complexity and its 
challenges towards achieving and maintaining safety in high performance 
domains, such as the railways, among others. In particular, the resilience 
engineering perspective through which this approach was developed also 
contributed to the knowledge of this yet recent discipline. 
This section provides an overview of the research findings and places them 
in the context of the proposed aims and objectives by referring back to the 
research questions raised. This discussion is then used to support 
recommendations for the enhancement of resilience in the planning of rail 
engineering (objective 6). 
8.1. The rail engineering planning system 
Objectives Questions 
1) Develop a 
description of the rail 
engineering planning 




2) Identify the critical 
human and 
organisational 
factors of the rail 
engineering planning 
system 
x How is the planning process framed within Network 
Rail’s organisational structure and within the rail 
industry? 
x What are the boundaries of planning? 
x What are the main trends of planning performance? 
x What are the main constraints to planners’ decision 
making? 
x What are the main resources used by planners to 
deal with constraints? 
x How do the planning process and its organisational 
structure support or hinder decision making 
processes? 
 
Rail engineering has been the focus of human factors research for some 
years. Examples can be found in a wide range of fields, such as 
communications (Murphy, 2002), organisational culture aspects 
(Farrington-Darby et al, 2005) and systems ergonomics (Wilson et al, 
2007a). In particular, Schock (2010) addressed aspects of rail engineering 
planning through the identification of functions and activities, and the 
building of visual scenarios for delivery. In broad terms, this corresponded 
to what was described in this thesis as the last stages of the planning 
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process, during which work packs are integrated and scheduled within 
worksites. 
One of the foremost contributions of research in this thesis was the 
thorough description of the planning process and the identification of its 
boundaries. The focus of this research was a top-to-bottom and across-the-
industry investigation of the organisational system that supports the 
decision making process, ranging from high level business targets down to 
the definition of the engineering work that is required to achieve those 
targets. This was early on introduced in section 2.3, and in particular, 
represented in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. The following aspects 
from the literature were made apparent in the rail engineering planning 
system: 
x Rail engineering planning is a complex sociotechnical system that 
operates across a great number and diversity of geographical, 
organisational and temporal boundaries (Carayon, 2006). 
x Like many other planning and scheduling activities, rail engineering 
planning can be fundamentally described as a decision making process 
that aims to allocate limited resources in view of organisational goals 
(Pinedo, 2009). 
x As a decision making process, planning relies considerably on complete 
and accurate information (Roland et al, 2011) to foresee possible 
delivery scenarios and allocate resources accordingly. 
x Managing the variability and uncertainty inherent to high complexity 
(Leveson, 2004) constitutes one of the major challenges for planning 
decision making. These are mainly created by breakdowns in 
information flows and result in poor visibility of planning scenarios and 
problems. 
The initial familiarisation interview with NAU senior planning manager not 
only supported this description of the planning system, but also guided the 
semi-structured interview process. This process highlighted human and 
organisational factors that provided a better understanding of the problems 
experienced by planners and their sources. The management of planning 
changes was the aspect most frequently mentioned by interviewees and on 
which higher concerns were raised. From the information presented in 
section 5.2, it becomes clear that much of the discussion developed by 
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planners during interviews, focused on the causes and consequences of 
the high volume and frequency of planning changes. These are presented 
in more detail in the next section (Figure 8.1). 
As mentioned by the initial interviewee (NAU manager) and described in 
section 5.1.2, planning at area level (ADPU level) tends to be the point in 
the system to which much of the pressure and decision making converges. 
The semi-structured interviews substantiated this point of view, mainly by 
the following arguments presented by planners: 
x Investment projects that have not been able to meet planning targets 
by providing the required information or by continuously having to 
change details, are dragged throughout the long-term process. As 
quarterly plans are passed on to ADPUs, project teams are pressured 
to finalise their details on work packs. The decisions made by project 
teams at this point and submitted to ADPUs, often introduce additional 
changes, which are likely to generate conflicts with other items of work 
already slotted in to the available access and with critical resources 
allocated. 
x It was recognised by planners that maintenance delivery units tend to 
operate under significant shortages of resources, in particular of 
access. Beyond cyclic maintenance work, MDUs also have to respond 
to emergency work requirements, which under considerable resource 
pressure, means having to readjust all maintenance work previously 
planned and redefine priorities. This often implies requesting late 
changes to ADPUs and generating potential conflicts with work already 
allocated. 
In general, this means that from higher levels, project teams pressure 
ADPUs with increasing volumes of work that is needed to respond to the 
business investment targets. From lower levels, maintenance units 
pressure ADPUs with emerging and unforeseen maintenance needs. 
The analysis of planning archival data also contributed to the knowledge of 
planning in rail engineering. Despite the enforcement of a national planning 
process under the principle of “one way of doing things”, a great diversity of 
planning “behaviours” was identified through the quantitative data analysed. 
Data also suggested that the volume and frequency of change tend to 
increase as delivery date approaches and showed that a considerable 
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number of these later changes are in fact reversing previous planning 
decisions. This reinforces the importance of variability and uncertainty in 
planning and of providing reliable information to improve its management. 
8.1.1. Decision making in the planning of rail engineering work 
The planning process is a system that aims to provide detailed information 
organised as an annual plan for the delivery of engineering work. The 
production of this information is greatly reliant on people and their ability to 
communicate and relate with others within the planning organisation, not 
only from within Network Rail, but also from engineering contractors and 
train operators. Therefore, human factors issues are central for the 
production of an efficient, reliable and safe plan, and improving on these 
issues requires an understanding of what supports and what hampers the 
ability of planners to reach adequate decisions. 
Earlier human factors research had explored the central role of decision 
making in planning activities, mostly in manufacturing industry domains 
(McCarthy & Wilson, 2001a). The methods developed in the course of this 
thesis, in particular the interview processes carried out at different stages, 
added to this knowledge by investigating decision making processes in the 
planning of rail engineering work and identifying critical human, 
organisational and system level factors. 
Decision making gained additional relevance for the planning of 
engineering work, as it was found to be at the origin of planning changes. In 
essence, every decision involves accepting or rejecting work submitted to 
planning, or any alterations proposed to work already submitted. As 
discussed in section 7.1.1, because decisions in practice determine how 
much work is safe to deliver with a given amount of resources available, 
they represent critical system trade-offs within the principles of ETTOs 
discussed in section 3.4.4. Figure 8.1 shows a systematic representation of 





Figure 8.1: Summary of human, organisational and system level factor indentified 
in planning 
As shown in Figure 8.1, decision making is at the core of every planning 
activity, both at an individual level and at an organisational and system 
level. System factors prevailed in the development of this research, as the 
emphasis of the research scope was set on system aspects emerging from 
complexity, in particular through the adoption of a resilience engineering 
perspective on safety and efficiency of planning. 
8.1.2. Assessing planning performance 
McCarthy & Wilson (2001b) identified the need to monitor performance as 
one of the crucial areas of research in planning and scheduling. This 
research also contributed to this end by developing a quantitative approach 
to the analysis of the planning system. Archival data sources were studied 
to produce planning performance indicators and subsequently investigate 
different performance trends based on the comparison of different 
geographical structures. The analysis of both work delivery and 
infrastructure and asset data later provided an adequate framework for the 
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interpretation of planning performance. This was based on the principle that 
planning must be oriented towards providing adequate support for delivery 
and therefore, it also must encompass the profile of infrastructure for which 
it is planning. 
The fact that planning changes have at their origin a decision making 
process and that planners described the management of planning changes 
as the most critical issue for the success of planning (section 5.2.3), 
performance measurements were based on the numbers and types of 
changes registered in planning data systems. The concept of “volume of 
change” was created by the researcher and defined as the amount of 
changes made per number of items created (section 4.7.2). Based on this 
concept, planning performance was assessed according to the following 
parameters: 
x The number of items created (possessions and worksites) 
x The number and type of changes made 
x The volume of change for both each type of change and overall (all 
types of changes grouped) 
x The duration of planning 
Apart from basic statistics, the analysis of archival data was based on 
graphical representations. In general, a higher overall volume of change 
was found to be consistent with a longer duration of planning (Figure 5.1). 
Despite this tendency, LNW (N) area was found to have one of the highest 
volumes of change but a relatively short duration of planning, while 
planning for the highest number of possessions. Based on these 
characteristics, LNW (N) was designated as the area with the highest level 
of planning activity. A higher volume of change to possession details (Table 
4.2) was found to be related to a higher density of worksites within 
possessions (Figure 5.2). LNW (N) was the area registering the highest 
volume of change (possession details) and the highest number of worksites 
per possession. In terms of worksite planning, the graphical representations 
showed that a higher percentage of worksites dedicated to more complex 
work (structures or major projects work) tend to be related to a higher 
volume of change. 
Further conclusions are drawn from this data in the next section by 
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comparing planning data against delivery and infrastructure data. This 
provided a better understanding of planning and placed planning 
performance within the context of its operating environment (work delivery 
and rail infrastructure). 
8.2. System interactions 
Objectives Questions 
2) Identify the critical human and 
organisational factors of the rail 
engineering planning system. 
3) Investigate relations between 
planning and engineering work 
delivery and identify the impacts 
of planning on work delivery. 
4) Describe resilience within the 
planning system and identify 
means to improve it. 
x How do the planning process and its 
organisational structure support or 
hinder decision making processes? 
x What are the main trends in work 
delivery performance? 
x What are the different trends in the 
relations between planning and 
delivery? 
x How does variability and uncertainty 
express itself in the planning system? 
 
As earlier stated, the development of a systems approach to rail 
engineering planning constitutes one of the main contributions of this 
research. This was fundamental to support the study of resilience and 
explore possible means of “engineering” resilience in this particular domain. 
Archival data supported the investigation of planning as a system function 
and its interactions with its operating environment. The main trends of the 
relations between planning and work delivery were identified, as well as the 
influences that the profile of the infrastructure for which work is planned and 
delivered may have on these relations. Overall, the exchange of information 
between planning and work delivery was described as being poor and 
fragmented. In line with the concept of a safety control loop described by 
Leveson et al (2003) and presented in section 3.3.6, two main conclusions 
can be drawn: 
x On the up flow of information, planning receives little feedback from 
delivery, which hinders the visibility of planning over delivery needs and 
reduces awareness on possible delivery scenarios. As argued by 
Axelsson (2006), feedback constitutes an important resource for the 
management of “weak and diffuse signals”. 
x On the down flow of information, evidence suggests that planning 
provides little support to delivery, beyond establishing the “where” and 
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“when” of the work. The high frequency and volume of changes that 
often occur at late stages of the planning process and out of its formal 
control (uncontrolled change), transfers a considerable degree of 
uncertainty to those managing work delivery (PICOPs and signallers), 
mainly concerning the “how” of the work (what movements, at what time 
and on which route, what sequence of work, among other details). 
The analysis of safety data have provided evidence of causal factors on 
possession delivery incidents related to planning. These causes were 
mainly originated by poor details of worksite planning. Data on the events 
related to the Christmas 2007 overruns have shown that, among other 
factors, the fragmented organisational structure and flow of information 
within the engineering system can lead to serious losses of operational 
control. 
Although not as robust as thorough statistical verification, the graphical 
representation of relations between the parameters extracted from archival 
data sources provided enough information to support conclusions on main 
system interactions. The relations thought to be relevant for the reliability of 
planning and safety and efficiency of the system as whole were previously 
debated in section 7.2. These relations are represented in Figure 8.2 and 
detailed in the following sub-sections. 
 
Figure 8.2: Representation of system interactions 
The circles with grey filling designate planning parameters, and white filled 
circles correspond to work delivery and infrastructure parameters. One-way 
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arrows were used only when there was information to suggest which of the 
related elements was determinant to the proposed relation. 
8.2.1. Infrastructure profile and volume and type of work planned 
Based on the understanding of planning and the wider engineering system, 
the profile of the infrastructure, namely Equated Track Miles and numbers 
of assets, was expected to influence the volume and type of work planned 
by each area. The data analysed did not support this assumption, which 
indicates that factors other than engineering characteristics must be taken 
into account to understand this relation. The information collected during 
the interview processes in terms of how the management of investment 
projects impacts on planning, leads to consider the influence of business 
decisions as a predominant factor in this relation. Because this was not 
verified through the data sources investigated, the corresponding arrow in 
Figure 8.2 is shown with a dashed line. 
8.2.2. Infrastructure profile and asset incidents 
By definition (section 2.4.8) the number of assets and its complexity are 
some of the main factors included in the calculation of ETM. As argued in 
section 6.3.2, it follows that areas with higher ETM would be more exposed 
to asset incidents. Hence, as illustrated in Figure 6.2 (section 6.3.2), areas 
with more complex infrastructure (higher ETM) tend to register higher 
numbers of asset incidents. 
8.2.3. Volume and type of work planned and volumes of planning 
changes 
The work required to respond to both investments and maintenance needs 
(volume and type of work planned) constitutes the “raw input” to the 
planning process. As shown in Figure 5.4, the worksite volume of change is 
related to the type of work planned by each area. This is consistent with the 
notion that work for which delivery arrangements tend to be more complex 
will also tend to involve additional planning work. As discussed in section 
5.3.5, work such as major renewals or tunnel work will most likely involve 
more machinery and perhaps increased risks, when compared to smaller 
routine maintenance tasks. The planning of worksites dedicated to such 
complex work will involve a higher number of details and perhaps more 
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complex ones (heavier and more complex machinery involved) on which 
decisions have to be reached. 
8.2.4. Volumes of changes, duration of planning and number of 
worksites 
As debated in section 5.3.4, data suggested relations between volumes of 
changes in the planning of possessions and both the duration of planning 
(Figure 5.1) and the concentration of worksites per planned possession 
(Figure 5.2). Planners may favour an extended duration of planning in order 
to integrate all changes which they feel necessary. This could be achieved 
either by starting to plan earlier or by delaying the closing of planning and 
accepting higher numbers of late changes, as often planners PICOPs and 
signallers mentioned during interviews. Having higher numbers of worksites 
integrated into possessions is likely to increase complexity of possession 
planning as more details have to accounted for, such as having to schedule 
and coordinate increasing numbers of machine and train movements in and 
out of worksites and in an out of possession. 
8.2.5. Volumes of planning changes and possession incidents 
Although it would be expected that areas that plan (and therefore deliver) 
higher volumes of work would have a higher exposure to possession 
incidents, data analysed in section 7.2.1 did not lead to this conclusion. 
Areas appear to manage very differently the equally different volumes and 
types of work for which they plan. An increased volume of planning 
changes was also expected to impact on the overall quality of planning by 
putting at risk its coherence and integrity (section 7.2.1). Figure 7.3 has 
indicated a slight tendency for areas with higher volumes of worksite 
changes to also register higher numbers of possession incidents. 
8.2.6. Asset incidents, volume of work planned and volume 
changes 
As debated in section 4.9, the categories of asset incidents investigated 
reflect in some way the need for more or less urgent repair work. Because 
this constitutes a source of unforeseen work needs, it was expected to be 
reflected in planning, in terms of either the additional work as a response to 
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the needed repairs, or of the planning changes necessary to slot this extra 
work in the available access opportunities. As discussed in section 7.2.2, 
higher numbers of asset incidents seem to be more clearly reflected on the 
volumes of possession and worksite changes rather than the volume of 
work planned. The fact that the emergency maintenance needed may be 
delivered under protection arrangements other than T3 possessions and 
that a significant amount of late changes (such as those necessary to 
respond to emergency needs) are likely not to be registered in PPS must 
be taken into account when examining these relations. 
8.2.7. Possession incidents and asset incidents 
The analysis of control logs (section 6.2.1) has shown that the damage to 
assets constitutes one of the main causes of possession failures. Hence, 
areas with higher incidence of possession failures were expected to also 
incur higher numbers of asset incidents. Given that the recovery of such 
incidents frequently resulted in possession overruns, the relation between 
the occurrence of possession overruns and asset incidents was 
investigated. As shown in Figure 7.6 (section 7.2.3), A higher number of 
overruns appears to be strongly related to a higher incidence of asset 
failures. 
8.2.8. A self-reinforcing cycle 
The dimmed block arrows in Figure 8.2 illustrate the fact that some aspects 
of system performance may tend to reinforce each other. This can be 
summarised as follows: 
x An infrastructure characterised by a higher number and density of 
assets (higher complexity) tends to be exposed to a higher frequency of 
asset incidents 
x A higher number of asset incidents may generate higher volumes of 
planning work, as a response to the emergency maintenance work 
needed, which may also impact on the volume of planning changes. 
x A higher number and frequency of planning changes may compromise 
the integrity of the work plan, which may be reflected in a higher 
number of possession incidents, in particular, through damage to assets 
and possession overruns. 
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x A higher incidence of possession failures may result in higher numbers 
of asset failures, namely through damages caused during possessions. 
Planning is at the core of this self-reinforcing cycle, as it mediates demands 
in terms of volume and type of work to be planned against the availability of 
resources (including access). The views of planners during interviews and 
the understanding of the planning system developed throughout this 
research, suggest that the management of planning changes is one of the 
most critical aspects in this mediation. Keeping in mind the evidence earlier 
presented regarding the role of planning in the management of uncertainty, 
by better managing changes, the planning system contributes to a reduced 
uncertainty at work delivery and therefore to a more efficient and safe work 
delivery. 
The evidence gathered from the events of the Christmas 2007 overruns 
shows that over the weeks preceding the Christmas blockade, during which 
work related to the projects was ongoing, problems were already 
accumulating. The way in which poor planning impacted on project delivery 
and poor feedback from delivery hampered the ability of re-planning and 
deploying adequate contingencies, supports the nature of this self-
reinforced cycle. 
8.3. Resilience in rail engineering planning 
Objectives Questions 
3) Investigate relations between 
planning and engineering work 
delivery and identify the 
impacts of planning on work 
delivery. 
4) Describe resilience within the 
planning system and identify 
means to improve it. 
5) Contribute to the development 
of a framework, methods and 
measures for assessing 
resilience in planning. 
x What are the different trends in the 
relations between planning and delivery? 
x How does variability and uncertainty 
express itself in the planning system? 
x What are the sources of resilience in 
planning? 
x What aspects of planning performance 
can potentially support the development 
of resilience indicators? 
x How can resilience in rail engineering 
planning be monitored? 
 
The concept of resilience has recently known a widespread application in 
many different domains (section 3.4). This is with no doubt related to the 
growing awareness of high complexity and its impacts on many of human 
activities. There is yet little research dedicated to resilience engineering 
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within the domain of the rail industry and in particular of rail engineering. 
The focus of this research on the challenges of high complexity for safety 
and efficiency and the development of broad system approach provided an 
adequate framework for the study of resilience and of mechanisms to 
“engineer” resilience in this particular domain. This was apparent by the 
encouraging way in which the potential contribute of this research to the 
development of resilience engineering was welcomed by the international 
workgroups dedicated to the subject (section 4.11). 
8.3.1. Functional analysis of planning 
The theoretical basis of FRAM and its focus on the modelling of system 
interactions made it an approach with interest to the objectives of this 
research. The use of FRAM contributed both to the understanding of the 
planning system and to the development of FRAM itself through the 
participation in its annual workshops. 
The “FRAMing” of the planning system provided useful insights into the 
structure of the system, its flows of information and the nature of its 
interactions. The process leading to the identification of functions added to 
the information presented in section 2.3 and supported the produce of 
diagrams of the planning process shown in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 and 
Figure 2.3. The investigation of function descriptors is at the basis of 
understanding the exchanges of information in planning and the definition 
of categories of functions, which represent different types of interactions, as 
detailed in section 7.3. As shown in Appendix 9, the exploratory work 
carried out with FRAM went beyond what is represented in Figure 7.7 as 
the inputs and outputs of the planning system. Although this provided 
useful insights into both the planning system and the development of FRAM 
as an assessment tool, the identification of all descriptors was not possible 
within the time available for research. Other possible descriptors beyond 
the inputs and outputs were identified for some of the functions but could 
not be verified and thus, were not discussed in the data chapters. The 
extent of the work developed on FRAM is detailed in Appendix 9. 
Overall, the information in Appendix 9 clearly illustrates the complexity of 
the planning system. The graphical representation shown in this appendix 
was produced from an application developed by one of the participants at 
the FRAM workshops and represents all the data from the table also given 
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in this appendix. Each connection between functions represents a shared 
descriptor. Regarding the development of FRAM, the following remarks can 
be made, based on the experience of its application to the planning of rail 
engineering work: 
x An extensive and thorough knowledge of the system must be acquired 
before a full and complete “FRAMing” can be developed. Not only the 
identification of functions must be based on a profound understanding 
of the system, but also the identification of all six descriptors cannot be 
achieved without an in-depth knowledge of system operations. 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the work developed in this research, 
FRAM can provide useful data, even when all six descriptors are not 
fully identified. 
x As in the use of most analysis tools, the purpose of using FRAM must 
be clearly stated from start. There can be no unequivocal rules for the 
definition of functions across all domains in which FRAM can potentially 
be used. Despite the clear definitions for descriptors provided in section 
4.11.2, their identification will often require context specific criteria. 
Given the recent stages of development and the little amount of work on 
FRAM documented, having clearly stated objectives becomes a 
fundamental starting point for the use of this method. The fact that 
FRAM was used in this research, mainly as a support for exploratory 
work and with the intent of contributing to its development, raised some 
difficulties in the definition of clear starting point and objectives for the 
description of functions and its descriptors. 
x FRAM was used in this research to develop a description of the formal 
planning system. Comparison of the formal process against an informal 
description can provide important support to the identification of gaps 
between formal and informal knowledge of system operations (Dekker, 
2006). However, the lack of clarity between the formally documented 
system and the actual system operation may lead misinterpretations of 
system interactions and their variability. 
x Although FRAM can support important system analysis without it, 
eventually a graphical representation becomes fundamental, in 
particular to simulate FRAM instantiations. The value of visual 
scenarios has been amply explored by Schock (2010) in relation to the 
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delivery of rail engineering work. Graphical tools promote 
comprehensibility, reflection and improved coordination and planning 
towards the object of representation (system complexity in this case). 
Schock (2010) quotes a participant in his research approach when 
saying that visual scenarios provided “an excellent opportunity to reflect 
on what we do on a daily basis and question some of the routine 
decisions we make”. 
x Overall, FRAM must be considered within the scope of a longitudinal 
analysis of systems. The use of this tool requires an extensive 
collection of data from different aspects of systems in order to provide 
adequate support, either in the design or the monitoring of the system. 
The full potential of FRAM is believed to reside in the accumulation of 
system data over time, in such a way that the evolution of interactions 
between functions of the system can be perceived and understood. This 
can provide a broad perspective of the variability of system operations 
and the identification of potentially undesired resonance. 
8.3.2. Understanding the potential for resilience 
The semi-structured interview process provided ample contribution for the 
understanding of the planning system, not only of its main human and 
organisational factors, but also of its sources of resilience. In this latter 
case, the literature background, against which relevant issues from the 
interviews were discussed, provided useful information on how such issues 
impact on planners’ performance. This discussion was developed in section 
7.1 and was then used to support the development of part 2 of the 
questionnaire, as detailed in section 4.10.3. The high ratings attributed by 
respondents to statements in this part of the questionnaire confirmed the 
relevance of the issues emerging from the interviews. Two of these issues 
were assessed by respondents as having a more significant impact on the 
performance of planners: 
x Having trustworthy work contacts within the planning organisation 
(issue 7) 
x Understanding the impact of planning decisions on delivery (issue 10) 
Overall, the 10 statements assessed were found to be significantly 
correlated, as shown in Table 7.12. The study of these correlations 
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provided further understanding of human and organisational factors that 
impact on planners’ performance and was earlier presented in section 
7.4.7. This section interprets the identified correlations within the acquired 
knowledge of the planning system in order to identify possible sources of 
resilience. 
Figure 8.3 illustrates all correlations significant at 0.01 level between the 
aspects assessed in part 2 of the questionnaire. Thicker lines between 
aspects designate stronger correlations (above 0.500). 
 
Figure 8.3: Representation of correlations between aspects assessed with part 2 of 
the questionnaire 
Given that all aspects were predominantly rated with high scores (Figure 
7.13 in section 7.4.7), all correlations found are positive, which means that 
for instance, the higher planners consider to be the impact of “having 
trustworthy work contacts”, the higher they also consider to be the impact of 
“informal flow of information”. 
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Figure 8.3 is consistent with the way in which aspects were initially defined 
by the fact that aspects impacting negatively on the performance of 
planners have no correlation with those impacting positively. Only “working 
with incomplete information has shown a relatively weak correlation 
significant at the 0.01 level with “face-to-face discussion” (0.363). Face-to-
face communication occurs almost exclusively during planning meetings. 
This correlation might indicate that incomplete or inaccurate information 
can sometimes impact on the quality of face-to-face communication, as 
during meetings it is not always possible to chase missing or inaccurate 
details. This would require extending the planning meeting throughout the 
day, in order to gather the necessary information to overcome issues. 
Within the scope of these two separate traits shown in Figure 8.3, 
mechanisms towards reinforcement of resilience and those eroding it can 
be outlined as follows: 
x Aspects that tend to reinforce planners’ performance (aspects from 5 to 
10) are more interdependent, as they registered a considerably higher 
number of correlations amongst themselves. Each of the six aspects 
was found to be correlated to the other five. In particular, as discussed 
in section 7.4.7, “understanding the impact of planning decisions” 
shows some of the stronger correlations (all represented in thicker lines 
in Figure 8.3). In line with the discussion developed in section 7.1.8, the 
more planners are able to understand how their decisions may impact 
on delivery, the less uncertain the feel about those decisions. Hence, 
this understanding is at the core of managing uncertainty in planning. 
As argued throughout section 7.1, understanding the impact of 
decisions requires accurate and reliable information (aspects 8 and 9), 
which planners seek to obtain through informal contacts (aspect 7). The 
information planners pull from the system is then interpreted in view of 
their experience and overall knowledge of the railway (aspects 5 and 6), 
in order to develop an adequate understanding of the work delivery 
scenarios undergoing planning. This awareness contributes to 
resilience, as it facilitates the management of planning changes by 
supporting decisions regarding which changes should be 
integrated to improve efficiency of work delivery and which should 
be refused to prevent undesired delivery (and deliverability) risks. 
x The four aspects impacting negatively on planners’ performance 
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(aspects 1, 2, 3 and 4) have shown two particularly strong correlations. 
The “organisational division of planning units” was found to be 
significantly correlated to the “range of inputs”, which is consistent with 
the arguments presented in section 7.1.3 regarding the broadness of 
the planning system and its geographical and organisational dispersion. 
As discussed in sections 7.1.3 and 7.1.5, the range and variability of 
inputs are also a source of uncertainty in decision making.  A second 
significant correlation was identified between the “difficulties in obtaining 
accurate information” and “working with incomplete or inaccurate 
information”. It can be easily assumed that the more difficult it becomes 
to obtain accurate information, the more planners are forced to work 
with inaccurate information. As argued in section 7.1.5, the inaccuracy 
of information is also an important uncertainty factor for planners. Poor 
information, not only generates frequent planning changes, but it also 
was identified by all planners as the main source of uncertainty and 
unpredictability regarding the performance of the system as whole. 
Hollnagel (2011a) placed at the core of achieving and maintaining 
resilience the ability to cope with the variability and uncertainty inherent 
to complex operations. Within this scope, both the variability and 
range of inputs, and the inaccuracy of information, can be 
considered a hindering factor to resilience in the planning system, 
or contributing to its brittleness. 
The interdependencies described between the aspects that impact on the 
performance of planners provided useful insight into the sources of 
resilience in planning. While factors that may hinder resilience are 
fundamentally generated by the complexity of the system, those 
contributing to resilience are mainly derived from informal strategies of 
communication used by planners. On the one hand, the organisational 
fragmentation and the variability and inaccuracy of information, increase 
the uncertainty which planners have to manage throughout decision making 
processes. On the other hand, the experience and overall knowledge of the 
system, and the informal flows of information, aim to cope with uncertainty 
and better manage planning changes through an improved understanding 
of decision making problems. From this perspective, the six aspects 
impacting positively on planners’ performance, which were rated highly in 
part 2 of the questionnaire, are in fact facilitating factors of planners 
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decision making and can therefore, contribute to enhanced potential for 
resilience. 
8.3.3. Measuring resilience 
The discussions developed within the scope of the international 
collaborations around the subject of resilience engineering and FRAM often 
focused on the need to measure and monitor resilience. The assessment 
carried out with part 1 of the questionnaire and the subsequent principal 
components analysis contributed to this end, as shown by the work already 
published (Ferreira et al, 2011). 
The extracted components underline a relation between the questionnaire 
and resilience engineering constructs, hence showing a potential use as 
measurable factors (Ferreira et al, 2011). These components were earlier 
defined in Table 7.10 and are here recalled: 
x Adaptability and flexibility 
x Control 
x Awareness and preparedness 
x Trade-offs 
x Time management 
Despite this potential, the approach taken here requires further 
experimentation, in order to respond to two fundamental questions: 
x Other statements and issues should be tested as potentially useful 
contents for the questionnaire. Despite the extensive analysis of 
resilience definitions and concepts which supported its development, 
the questionnaire used in this research requires further testing and 
alternative statements should be investigated in order to better 
approach aspects of planners’ performance which might be relevant for 
the “emergence” of resilience at system level. As suggested in the 
previous section, issues more directed at uncertainty in decision making 
and at means to cope with it, should be explored. 
x As Kline (1994) points out, the validity of extracted components and 
their interpretation should be thoroughly tested. Although the approach 
taken in this research for the interpretation of extracted components 
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was founded on demonstrated methods and literature, the methods 
should be reproduced in different contexts and timings in order to be 
fully validated. 
The design of questions constitutes one of the main challenges of this 
approach. On the one hand, as basic principle in the design of 
questionnaires, statements must be designed in such a way that 
respondents can relate them to their normal every day activities, without 
which statements can become easily misinterpreted and compromise the 
validity of the data obtained. On the other hand, for the purpose at hand, it 
is also fundamental that statements reflect system level aspects with 
relevance for resilience. Resilience engineering is currently a relatively 
recent discipline and its concepts are certainly beyond the scope of 
“common knowledge”. Hence, some of these system aspects may regard 
issues with which respondents might not be familiar with, which can 
contribute to the misinterpretation of the questions asked. This was 
explored during the iterative process used to develop statements for this 
part of the questionnaire. Often statements initially proposed by the 
researcher, aiming to have a close relation with resilience engineering 
concepts, had to be reworded to avoid potential sources of 
misinterpretation identified by the peer reviewers from the ergonomics 
team. 
As discussed in section 3.4.6, the Resilience Analysis Grid proposed by 
Hollnagel (2011b) relies on the development of questionnaires relevant for 
each of the four basic resilience capabilities. The questionnaire approach 
taken in this research for the measurement of resilience can contribute for 
the development of a RAG in engineering planning. In particular, the use of 
a principal components analysis method can be proposed as a way to 
validate the questionnaires that are required to assess the four main 
capabilities. 
8.4. The reorganisation of planning 
Throughout the duration of this research, the planning organisation 
underwent profound transformations. Despite the difficulties that this 
represented from a methodological point of view, it provided a great 
diversity of opportunities to follow up on the on-going reorganisation and on 
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some occasions, cooperate with people developing work within the scope 
of the transformation programme. 
An initial report based on the outcome of the interviews was produced, 
upon the interest shown by planners on learning more about the results and 
the process itself. This report was primarily disseminated amongst 
participants in the interview process and was later, on a number of 
occasions, requested by other members of the planning organisation and 
by people working at the time in relation to the transformation of planning. 
Towards the conclusion of research, which coincided with the initial steps of 
the implementation of the current organisational structure of planning (as in 
Figure 2.3), there were several opportunities for informal exchanges of 
information with project managers leading the transformation programme. 
This contributed to a better understanding of the planning organisation and 
of the objectives and motives driving the transformation programme. In 
particular, this was the opportunity for the exchange of data, which similar 
to the approach taken in this research, members of the project team for the 
reorganisation of planning were also extracting from PPS. This reinsured 
the views expressed in this thesis regarding the need to develop means of 
monitoring and understanding planning performance and the relevance of 
planning changes towards this end. 
8.5. Recommendations 
This section produces recommendations to promote safety and efficiency in 
rail engineering through improved planning, as defined by objective 6. The 
conclusions of this research come at a time when the transformation 
programme is concluded or at its final stages. Nevertheless, 
recommendations in the following sections can be drawn from the work 
described in this thesis, which can contribute to further improvements of the 
planning of rail engineering work and some, perhaps useful as well, to the 
broader engineering system. Recommendations are highlighted in the up-
coming sections with bold characters. 
8.5.1. Empowerment of planning 
The implementation of formal and national processes such as PL0056 and 
PL0086 was broadly considered by planners as a major contribution to the 
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integrity of planning.  Having this formal support, planners were able to 
impose common mile-stones and deadlines to stakeholders. Despite this 
improvement, poor information flows and communication breakdowns 
remain one of the main constraints for planners. Often, the origin of 
problems and planning conflicts was untraceable and information sources 
potentially unreliable. All planners expressed their conviction that the 
creation of an autonomous planning structure could result in significant 
improvements, as opposed to a disseminated ownership among several 
functions in and out of the organisation. 
The adoption of a structure similar to the model used under the West 
Coast Main Line Modernisation Programme can help shift away from a 
system with no specific ownership into which stakeholders input as 
they can (or as they will), thus transferring their own operational 
pressures onto planning. 
As planners expressed during the interviews, solving planning problems 
such as access conflicts between work packs or between train routes 
requires detailed understanding of the work, in order to establish priorities 
and decide accordingly. Such details are often not provided, incomplete or 
inaccurate, which renders decision making processes considerably more 
uncertain. Thus, in order for planners to have control over decision making 
processes and the effective management of planning priorities and needs, 
information flows must be considerably improved. Most of the Area Delivery 
Planning Managers (ADPMs) interviewed recalled having at some point, 
received instructions from higher management levels requesting that a 
particular change (frequently accepting additional work) be agreed. 
The organisational structure of planning must be provided with the 
means (and the responsibility) to make “sacrificing decisions” against 
excessive business production pressures. Planners must be given 
access to information which allows them to realise when changes to 
planned work are compromising allocated critical resources and 
given the responsibility to refuse such changes. 
8.5.2. Training and experience in planning 
Job experience and knowledge of the railway were frequently mentioned as 
fundamental assets for the reliability of planning. The organisational 
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transformation appears to have been accompanied by the retirement and 
reallocation of considerable numbers of experienced planners and by the 
placement of new people, in some cases, with no experience at all in the 
rail industry. This may jeopardised the continuity of fundamental work 
practices and planning expertise, which ceases to be transmitted from 
senior planners down to junior ones. 
A formal and structured form of training and induction into planning 
can be an important element in the strengthening of planning good 
practices and a contributor for the robustness of the planning system. 
The pursuit of the study on planning archival data and the improvement of 
performance indicators can provide important support for the identification 
of planning good practices. The data explored throughout this thesis and 
the overview of planning performance by areas earlier discussed (section 
8.3) demonstrates the potential of this approach. 
Good practices should then be disseminated through more formal 
planning training or, as suggested by Axelsson (2006), through 
engineering discussion forums. 
8.5.3. National robustness versus local flexibility 
The scale and complexity of the railway system is entirely compatible with 
the principles of underspecification and uncertainty. This was shown in the 
literature to be incompatible with strict and rigid planning processes and 
centralised control of operations. While local autonomy may be useful to 
respond to unforeseen issues and adjust planning to emerging work needs, 
some level of rigidity is necessary to avoid the wasting of resources. Two 
conflicting planning needs must be balanced: 
x Centralised planning is needed to optimise resource allocation at 
national level. For instance, some of the crucial resources for renewals 
work such as engineering wagons and some of the most higher 
performance and complex track machinery, must be allocated with 
considerable time before work delivery, so that all the necessary details 
can be planned, namely, the rostering of the necessary staff, the 
definition of routes and schedules to enter and exit possession and to 
and from depots. Late changes to the planning of such resources can 
compromise, not only formal agreements with TOCs regarding access, 
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but also the efficient utilisation of resources and generate conflicts with 
other events within possessions or with the route of other train services 
on open lines. 
x Planning must ensure a certain degree of flexibility in order to 
respond to emergency maintenance work and other unforeseen 
issues that can compromise deliverability of work, such as staff 
absenteeism, equipment breakdown or extreme weather conditions that 
can delay work progress. Having access to information in an accurate 
and timely manner, many of such problems, or the likelihood of issues 
become problems, can be anticipated and delivery plans adjusted 
accordingly. 
The management of planning changes is at the core of the balance 
between these two opposing requirements. The key issue is generating 
information that can support the understanding of what changes 
should be accepted as improvements of resource allocation, and up 
until which point in time and stage of the process these changes 
should be admitted without compromising robustness and safety of 
the plan and long-term engineering commitments. This information 
should also support the identification of changes that can be admitted 
beyond this point, as adjustments to unforeseen issues, and those 
that should be rejected for safety reasons. McDonald (2006) 
approaches these issues while discussing studies on the comparison of 
aircraft maintenance practices, mainly a traditional top-down planning, with 
no flexibility for operational feedback and adjustments, against coordinated 
efforts for planning adjusted to variations of the operational environment. 
8.5.4. Cooperation between planning, delivery and operations 
The relation between planning and delivery is clearly a crucial one for both 
the reliability of the plan and the safety and efficiency of work delivery. 
While a safe and efficient delivery relies on the reliability of the details 
prepared during planning, feedback from delivery is a fundamental source 
of engineering expertise and local infrastructure knowledge. The exclusion 
of those responsible for managing and overseeing work delivery from 
the entire planning process represents an obstacle to an efficient 
exchange of information between planning and delivery. It cannot be 
accepted that PICOPs disregard the information that is handed to them 
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during briefings on the day before, because it is likely to change from the 
day to the night, or stating that they have no knowledge whatsoever of 
engineering planning, including that it is a complex process which develops 
throughout a period of approximately 18 months. 
PICOPs should be called in to planning meetings to offer advice 
regarding the admissibility of certain late changes and the potential 
impacts that these may have on the remaining work planned for a 
given possession. This has also been described by PICOPs as a more 
efficient way of learning about the work to be delivered and which they will 
be managing on the night, as opposed to reading about times and places 
on PICOP packs on the day before. 
Whenever complex movements of machinery and engineering trains are 
involved, the presence of signallers from local signalling boxes has also 
been described as good practice, both by planners and signallers who have 
had such experiences. Similar to PICOPs, signallers also considered that 
this helps preparing for the signalling work which will be required by 
possessions with numerous movements. 
The fact that PICOPs and signallers have tight and variable work rosters to 
comply with represents an obstacle to the dissemination of these good 
practices. In particular, PICOPs are normally working nights and have 
difficulty in attending meetings during day time. Improved coordination 
between planning meeting timings and rosters can be achieved in 
order to allow this kind of useful expertise to be called into planning 
meetings whenever necessary. 
Beyond the added value of this cooperation during planning, an efficient 
communication between PICOPs, signallers and control centres has been 
described as a useful resource in the mitigation of incidents on the night of 
work delivery. For instance, if a PICOP foresees a likelihood of a 
possession overrun, by communicating this to signallers and control 
centres, arrangements can be made to minimise possible impacts on train 
services, among other benefits. 
Overall, from a resilience perspective, the cooperation and 
communication at different levels and stages of the engineering work 
cycle, between planning, delivery and operations, represents a 
valuable contribute towards the ability avoid something bad from 
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happening, the ability to survive by minimising the impact of incidents 
and the ability to recover quickly to normal operations. 
8.5.5. Resilience in planning and resilience in the engineering 
system 
This thesis investigated planning based on the notion that its purpose is to 
develop reliable information to support a safe and efficient delivery of 
engineering work. From this perspective and in line with the arguments 
presented in section 3.5, planning should be the source of management of 
uncertainty for work delivery, either by minimising it or by providing means 
to cope with it (Grote et al, 2009). Decision making in planning must 
manage uncertainty in such a way that it is not transferred down to delivery. 
A balance should be achieved between self-contained tasks that can 
locally reduce complexity of decision making, and the integration and 
articulation of the whole planning decision making process so as to 
avoid fragmentation and excessive complexity of the planning 
system. 
Two approaches to the management of uncertainty should be considered 
complementary towards achieving and maintaining resilience in planning: 
x Decisions addressing details of work that should not be submitted to 
later changes (critical resource allocation, train routes, among others), 
should be seen as the definition of rigid boundaries according to which 
the remainder (less critical) details of work should be planned. Such 
decisions would contribute to minimise uncertainty as they would limit 
the possibilities for further planning. As a basic example, if a track 
renewals job is agreed and the necessary train routes are planned, at 
the scheduled time and path of these trains, no other work is viable. 
The approach of planning processes so far has been to establish critical 
resources as soon as possible. Keeping in mind the principles of 
underspecification and complexity, the sooner these decisions are 
made, the more likely it is they will have to be submitted to later 
changes, as new conditions emerge and adjustments have to be made. 
Within this scope, attempts should be made to address critical 
decisions as close as possible to delivery, leaving only the time 
necessary to plan and schedule less critical work details. 
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x Having decided and agreed on the scheduling and allocation of critical 
work and resources, less critical work such as minor maintenance work, 
requiring smaller windows of access and few resources, can be slotted 
in to the plan as close as possible to delivery in order to provide enough 
flexibility to respond to emergent work needs. This would be where 
close cooperation between planning and delivery (MDUs in this 
case) becomes more relevant, as it can improve the ability to 
locally (at area or MDU level) cope with uncertainty. 
The timing at which critical planning details should be finalised and barriers 
raised against any changes to them, may depend on the type of work and 
the profile of the infrastructure in question. However, it should be kept in 
mind that the purpose of imposing a deadline for decision on critical 
planning details is to achieve a national coherence of the plan, and 
thus it may not be realistic to have it subjected to any variability. 
Regarding less critical work and planning decisions with no impact on 
previous national agreements on critical work, eventually deadlines must 
be established in order to ensure that necessary arrangements for a 
safe access are made. However, these are likely to be manageable more 
flexibly at a local level, and according to local needs. 
The arguments previously presented suggest the adoption of planning 
rules and procedures that can ensure a dynamic balancing of the 
need for a plan robust at national level with minimised uncertainty, 
against a local need for flexibility and means to cope with uncertainty. 
8.6. The research methods 
The investigation of planning in rail engineering and the broad system 
approach documented in this thesis constitute two considerable research 
novelties. Interview approaches have an extensive tradition in social 
sciences and in human factors research. As in this particular research, they 
have often demonstrated their value as approaches to task and job 
analysis. The study of archival data on such a large scale has proven 
challenging but with an extensive added research value for both the 
understanding of the context under investigation and the development of 
more in-depth quantitative analysis of its performance. The gathering of 
data on a wider time scale is likely to provide more solid grounds for 
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statistical analysis and further pursue the work initiated in this thesis. 
Work that more directly addressed resilience aspects in planning was 
clearly the area with less background support. The use of a questionnaire 
approach within this scope has only recently been proposed in literature by 
Hollnagel (2011b). This method was found to be an efficient means of 
assessment and monitoring for resilience, without having to resort to 
complex metrics. The work initiated in this thesis should be further pursued 
in the sense of “fine-tuning” statements and questionnaire structure, by 
reproducing the application of the questionnaire within planning. The 
reproduction of this approach will also provide additional support to further 
investigate and validate the resilience constructs extracted by means of the 
principal components analysis method. Factor analysis methods tend to 
consume a significant part of the restricted time available for research, 
which may discourage its use. Nevertheless, beyond the assessment of 
resilience factors carried out, this approach can potentially support the 




The research developed is one of the first few approaches dedicated to the 
study of planning in rail engineering, both from a human factors and a 
systems perspective. Up until recent years, the planning of rail engineering 
work was barely recognised as an organisational function. A detailed 
description of the planning organisation did not exist within Network Rail or 
in the wider rail industry. The published work found on the subject provided 
a relatively small research background on which to ground this study, which 
constituted one of the first and most significant challenges. From this 
starting point, the research carried out contributed extensively to the 
understanding of planning within the domain of rail engineering. This 
required a broad system analysis, as opposed to the investigation of 
particular aspects or parts of the planning system. The full time placement 
at Network Rail’s central offices, working in cooperation with the 
Ergonomics NST, was crucial for the widespread access to data sources 
and to gather all the conditions necessary for the participative work carried 
out, which extended at a national level and within many different levels and 
functions of the organisation. 
The exploratory work carried out (as discussed in section 4.2) produced a 
thorough description of the planning system and its boundaries. Planning 
was fundamentally described as a decision making process that manages 
business strategic targets (i.e. investments) against engineering needs (i.e. 
maintenance) and operational constraints (i.e. access). The main 
contributions for the knowledge and understanding of rail engineering 
planning can be summarised as follows: 
x Managing planning changes is the single most complex challenge that 
planners are faced with. Not only does poor information and 
communication breakdowns at system boundaries increases 
uncertainty in decision making, but also little organisational and 
operational autonomy is given to them in terms of control over planning 
decision processes as whole. 
x Informal communication together with job experience and 
understanding of the rail industry are the most important means of 
managing uncertainty in planning decision making by contributing to an 
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increased awareness regarding the potential impacts of decisions on 
work delivery. 
x The analysis of the sequence of planning changes showed that earlier 
planning decisions are frequently reversed at later stages and that this 
occurs beyond the deadlines imposed by the planning process, which 
shows that a considerable part of the planning activity is not developed 
“to the process”. Beyond the fact that this means that planning is partly 
uncontrolled (at least formally), it demonstrates the need for 
adjustments which can meet the existing gap between formal and 
informal procedures. 
x Despite the efforts towards a national planning process and “one way of 
doing things”, the archival data investigated showed a considerable 
diversity of trends in planning performance. From region to region, the 
rail infrastructure is characterised by different degrees of complexity, 
and requires different types and volumes of work to respond to, either 
investment scopes or maintenance standards. Planning was found to 
respond very differently to such demands, even when faced with similar 
infrastructure profiles and engineering and business requirements. 
It is important to recognise that planning is charged with, and made 
responsible for, critical business decisions but lacks fundamental 
organisational aspects to support such complex decision making 
processes. The planning system must be empowered to make critical 
planning decisions withstand operational and business pressures. The lack 
of ownership caused by the fragmentation of the core planning process 
(both top-down and cross-organisational) hindered planners’ ability to 
maintain control over decision making processes from strategic targets 
down to work delivery. A considerable amount of planning activity takes 
place informally and outside the standards and deadlines established by 
formal processes. The reorganisation of planning has created a national 
centralised planning unit under NDS, which appears to have contributed 
towards increased ownership and control over planning decision making 
processes.  
The planning system must also develop local flexibility, in order to adjust 
planned work as necessary to respond to emerging needs. Despite the 
increased centralised control of planning, a considerable part of the 
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process remains under the responsibility of engineering areas. The new 
planning processes (NR/L2/NDS/202 and NR/L3/NDS/302 – section 2.3) 
also appear to have brought in more flexible principles to the management 
of planning activities. These two factors could contribute to the local 
empowerment of planners, necessary to recognise and adequately 
integrate whatever late changes are needed to respond to unforeseen 
problems, as opposed to having considerable volumes of uncontrolled 
changes just hours before work delivery. 
The increased ownership and local empowerment of planning must be 
accompanied by the consolidation of planning expertise and dissemination 
of good practices. Even with improved information flows in the process, 
planning experience and knowledge of the railway are fundamental 
resources to understand how decisions may impact on delivery or realise 
when further input from planning stakeholders is necessary to solve 
complex engineering or operations problems. 
9.1. Further research 
The extent of exploratory work carried out has given an important 
background to support a more in-depth study of specific planning issues, in 
particular regarding the relations between the planning system and its 
operating environment: 
x The data sources investigated only allowed for the quantification of 
planning changes. Beyond the volumes and timings of changes, the 
analysis of the types of changes submitted to planning and those 
rejected may improve the understanding of how planning influences 
delivery and thus, contribute to the understanding of how planning can 
be improved towards better supporting work delivery. 
x Beyond the numbers and types of assets, more detailed knowledge of 
the characteristics of the infrastructure can also contribute to a better 
understanding of the constraints and engineering demands that can be 
imposed on planning. For instance, data regarding the annual tonnage 
that operates in different areas (volume and type of train traffic 
operating) or the proportions of non disruptive and disruptive access 




Although the sample of data extracted from PPS represented 
approximately 36% of all the work within the timescale considered (three 
weeks), this corresponded to only 2.2% of the expected yearly volume of 
work planned. This suggests that, despite the focus on developing a 
representative geographic and time base of analysis, a longer-term sample 
may be required to recognize clearer patterns and assess the magnitude of 
the variability in planning performance. 
Throughout this research, it became apparent that informal communication 
considerably contributes to decision making processes. Although the time 
and geographical frame in which such exchanges of communication may 
occur render this analysis quite challenging from a methodological point of 
view, this can provide useful insight towards better understanding human 
and organisational factors in planning. Keeping in mind that a great deal of 
the informal exchange of information and of uncontrolled planning change 
tends to occur within the last few days before delivery, further investigation 
should be considered with a higher focus on engineering area level of 
planning and its relations with Maintenance Delivery Units. 
The pursuit of resilience research in rail engineering can contribute to the 
monitoring of business pressures on planning and how planning can better 
cope with such pressures. The reformulation of the questionnaire approach, 
in view of the findings debated in this thesis and of the most recent 
resilience engineering literature published, can be the foundation of a 
robust method of measuring planning resilience and monitoring its sources. 
Further extending the “FRAMing” of the planning system can also support 
the identification of critical system interactions in terms of managing 
uncertainty in decision making. In particular, work towards reproducing the 
informal planning system, rather than the formal one, constitutes an area of 
interest for the development of both the knowledge of rail engineering 
planning and of the discipline of resilience engineering. 
9.2. The challenges for the success of railways 
Recent events around the UK rail industry suggest that the near future 
should be faced with particular caution. Within the scope of CP4 and CP5, 
additional engineering challenges are imposed on Network Rail and its 
stakeholders in view of further enhancements of the rail infrastructure, 
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whilst further efficiency demands must be met (cost reductions, among 
other specific objectives). These targets will most certainly increase 
operational pressures, which already show signs of eroding overall system 
defences. Only during the year of 2007, two particular occurrences at very 
different levels of the engineering organisation suggest this: 
x The derailment of the Virgin train at Lambrigg on 23, February 2007, 
which among other causes, was directly related to local resource 
shortages and the inability to respond to maintenance needs under 
continuous resource limitations. 
x The serious possession overruns occurred in the Christmas period, as 
detailed in sections 6.2.3 and 7.2.5, were originated by an 
unprecedented volume and complexity of work planned, and the way in 
which both planning and management and supervision of work delivery 
were unable to cope with such demands. 
As an interesting fact, the report of the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR, 
2008) recommended to Network Rail the development of mutually 
beneficial contractual relationships with its supply chain and a genuine spirit 
of partnership in project delivery along the lines adopted by British Airport 
Administration (BAA) for major projects such as Heathrow Terminal 5. It 
should be pointed out that just months after the publication of this ORR 
report, Terminal 5 was inaugurated and rapidly demonstrated serious 
operational problems, which were traced back to its original scheme and 
project development. 
Overall, these developments bring increasing relevance to the research of 
resilience, not just in planning, but also in the broader rail engineering 
system. At the very least, the potential benefits of better “engineering” 
resilience in the rail system in terms of ensuring a safe and efficient rail 
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035H01 0.494 0.749 1.756 
035H03 0.544 0.837 2.007 
035H07 0.666 1.055 2.644 
035H15 0.837 1.313 3.667 
035H30 1.040 1.605 5.458 
035N01 0.487 0.737 1.698 
035N03 0.505 0.769 1.795 
035N07 0.578 0.903 2.162 
075H01 0.579 0.869 2.142 
075H03 0.674 1.064 3.011 
075H07 0.900 1.572 5.076 
075H15 1.167 1.957 7.566 
075H30 1.519 2.601 12.043 
075N01 0.554 0.821 1.969 
075N03 0.610 0.942 2.528 
075N07 0.714 1.229 3.628 
075S01 0.540 0.795 1.834 
075S03 0.573 0.861 2.084 
075S07 0.635 1.050 2.586 
105H01 0.587 0.886 2.258 
105H03 0.692 1.171 3.416 
105H07 0.944 1.689 5.983 
105H15 1.250 2.180 9.418 
105H30 1.671 3.051 15.749 
105N01 0.574 0.863 2.181 
105N03 0.654 1.102 3.204 
105N07 0.792 1.432 5.076 
105S01 0.548 0.811 1.930 
105S03 0.608 1.018 2.895 
105S07 0.690 1.175 3.397 
125H03 0.776 1.405 5.095 
125H07 1.076 2.108 9.824 
125H15 1.680 3.428 18.760 
125H30 2.172 4.820 35.135 
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4. Sample of tables created for the analysis of PPS data 
Anglia Week 16 (12/07/2008 - 18/07/2008) 
Pos ref. 1069049 WS ref. 2108839 WS ref. 1898530 WS ref. 1899202 WS ref. 1899204 WS ref. 1899325 
Item 11 24-06-08 Structures work 06-06-08 Track maintenance 25-03-08 S&T work 10-04-08 S&T work 25-03-08 Litter & Graffity 25-03-08 
possession amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended 
possession amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended 
possession amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended 
blocked line amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended 
blocked line amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended route  created worksite amended 
blocked line amended worksite amended worksite amended worksite amended route  deleted worksite amended 
blocked line amended worksite amended worksite amended route  created route  created worksite amended 
blocked line amended route  created blocked line amended route  deleted worksite created route  created 
blocked line amended route  deleted blocked line amended route  created blocked line created route  deleted 
blocked line amended route  deleted blocked line amended worksite created blocked line created route  created 
blocked line amended route  created blocked line amended blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
possession amended route  created blocked line amended blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
possession amended worksite amended blocked line amended blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
possession amended worksite amended blocked line amended blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
possession amended worksite created route  created blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
possession amended blocked line amended route  deleted blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
blocked line amended blocked line created route  created blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
blocked line amended isolation amended worksite created blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
blocked line amended isolation created blocked line amended blocked line created blocked line created blocked line created 
blocked line amended 
 
15-05-08 blocked line amended blocked line created 
 
10-10-07 blocked line created 
blocked line amended 
  
blocked line amended blocked line created 
  
blocked line created 
blocked line amended 
  





blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 




blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
possession amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
route  created 
  
blocked line created 
      
blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
blocked line amended 
  
blocked line created 
      
blocked line amended 
   
10-10-07 
      
blocked line amended 
          
blocked line amended 
          
blocked line amended 
          
blocked line amended 
          
blocked line amended 
          
blocked line amended 
          
blocked line created 
          
blocked line created 
          
blocked line created 
          
blocked line created 
          
blocked line created 
          
blocked line created 
          
blocked line created 
          
blocked line created 
          
possession amended 
          
possession created 
          
 
25-03-08 












6. Sample of control logs 
01-12-08 
(LNW) WON 36 (IM) item 18 Hanslope Junction - Kilsby Tunnel Down and 
Up Main lines blocked 0700 (Sat) – 0530 (Mon) overran until 0753 due to 
no tamper being booked for the work. 
03-12-08 
(Sc) At 0327 (Wed) it was reported that WON 36, Item 389 (NDS) 
Scotland East possession, Up & Down lines Markinch – Ladybank 
Junction, 0105 (Wed) – 0450 (Wed), was likely to overrun. Stressing 
issues were stated as the cause. The Up line was handed back at 0524 
(Wed), and the possession of the Down line was shortened at the same 
time. An estimate of 0700 was given for handing the Down line back, but 
at 0657, it was reported that the fishplates supplied were of the wrong 
type. Down trains were diverted via Stirling and Perth. Fishplates of the 
correct type were located in Edinburgh, and were en route to site at 0741. 
NWR from 0912 after the plates were installed and the possession 
handed back.  
05-01-2009 
(A) WON 41 item 1, (II) Liverpool Street to Shenfield, Up & Down Main 
and Up & Down Electric lines blocked 0140 (Sun) to 0400 (Mon) overran 
until 0457 (Mon) on the Electric lines and until 0548 (Mon) on the Main 
lines due to shortage of staff due to illness amongst the signal testing 
teams, Fast clipper machine failure and difficulties encountered by 
tampers at the Balfour Beatty track renewals site in the Manor Park area. 
The tamping marks had been obscured by snow and when the snow was 
brushed away this also erased the marks, with the plans having to be 
consulted to determine the tamping requirements. This delayed OLE staff, 
who were following the tamper, from completing their gauging and testing 
work before the OLE isolations could be given up.  
19-01-2009 
(WX) At 0302 (Mon) the Engineering Supervisor working within (IM) 
possession WON 43, Item 52, Portcreek Junction - Havant, Up 
Main/Brighton line blocked, 2335 (Sun) – 0420 (Mon), reported that the 
Stoneblower machine had dislodged the railhead equipment for ‘VHF’ & 
‘HFY’ axle counters, together with having damaged a length of associated 
cable, on the Up Main line at Bedhampton. It was confirmed that the 
markers for the damaged cable had apparently been washed away. The 
possession was handed back 18 mins. late at 0438 (Mon), and repairs & 
rectification were undertaken under T2X protection, with NWR at 0630.   
09-02-09 
(LNW) Engineers Infrastructure Investment possession Kingmoor 
Junction – Cove L.C.  (WON 46, item 183,  All lines blocked 0430 Sat – 
0030 Mon) overran on the Down Main line until 0148 and on Up Main line 
until 0328. At 1730 (Sat) Babcock Rail reported that the Babcock Rail 
S&C renewals site at Mossband was running three hours late, due to 
difficulty in shunting ballast trains during the track renewal and ballast 
removal. This time was not recovered and installation of the S&C track 
panels commenced at 0845 (Sun). However, moving and installation of  
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the new S&C panels proceeded much slower than planned, with the last 
of the track panels not being installed until 1845 (Sun), 10 hours late. By 
1630 (Sun) it had been reported that the possession would overrun on the 
Up Main and Up Goods line until 0230 (Mon), but would be given up on 
time on the Down Main line and arrangements were put in place to 
institute Single Line Working. Ballast unloading was completed at 2036 
(Sun) and tamping completed at 2330 (Sun), seven hours late. Difficulty in 
completing the handover of the Form ‘C’ Permit to Work prevented the 
traction current on the Down Main line from being re-energised until 0131 
(Mon). 
29-03-09 
(LNW) At 0700, it was reported that possession planning issues had been 
discovered at Manchester Piccadilly. LNW(N) WON 01, Item 267 
(Infrastructure Maintenance) shows various lines blocked, Slade Lane 
Junction – Manchester Piccadilly, 2130 (Sat) – (0700) Sun. However, in 
the Protection Limits section of the WON, the Up & Down Fast lines were 
shown as being blocked 0130 (Sun) – 0800 (Sun). The staff working in the 
possession were working to the latter times. However, with LNW(N) WON 
01, Item 273 (Infrastructure Maintenance), various lines blocked including 
All lines Ordsall Lane Junction - Manchester Piccadilly and Up & Down 
Slow Longsight South – Manchester Piccadilly, 0700 – 0800, there was no 
route out of Manchester Piccadilly. Item 267 was handed back at 0716, 
and Item 273 was taken between 0724 and 0828.  
31-03-09 
(A) Anglia WON 1, Item 10 (Various lines blocked T3, London Liverpool 
Street – Bethnal Green / Stratford Central Junction West / Maryland East 
Junction, 2215 – 0545). The possession of the Down & Up Suburban 
lines, London Liverpool Street – Bethnal Green West Junction, was 
booked from 2215 to 0125. However, for this to take place, staff required 
the Up & Down Electric and Main lines blocked under T12 conditions to 
access the Suburban lines. These lines were subsequently blocked for 10 
minutes, and the possession of the Suburban lines was taken at 2312. In 
addition, no schedule provision was made for trains requiring to call at 
Bethnal Green station ,which only has platforms on the Suburban lines. 






Questionnaire for the assessment of planning decision making processes and 
problem solving 
This questionnaire looks at how people make decisions related to planning and 
the areas that affect them.  
Thank you for your cooperation! 
Route  Territory / Area  




Section 1: Generic assessment 




































































I receive feedback on the outcome of my planning       
I have a clear picture of how my planning contributes 
to the building of an integrated national delivery plan       
I manage to finish whatever plans I start       
I have all the information I need to do my work       
I have the information necessary to deal with 
unexpected situations       
I have the information needed to detect potential 
planning failures       
I have enough time to do my planning thoroughly       
I have enough time to reflect on my planning       
I am encouraged to reflect on my planning       
I revise my planning whenever new information 
arises       
I take into account a balance between safety and 
efficiency in my planning decisions       
I can adjust my way of working according to external 
pressures       
I can solve problems even when pressured to deliver 
fast results       
I can solve problems even when faced with 
unexpected situations       
I feel in control of my work activities       
I assess the potential safety impacts for each of my 
planning decisions       
I can identify when my planning decisions are 
pushing the boundaries of safe performance       
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I can detect failures or errors in my planning before 
they create problems       
I have the support of my manager to make decisions       
My management does not blame me for any poor 
outcome of my planning       
Because something has always gone well before, I 
feel confident that it will continue to go well in the 
future 
      
I can communicate my decisions promptly to those 
that rely on them       
Section 2: Assessment of specific issues previously identified as impacting 
on planning 
Mark how you feel the following factors influence 




































The organisational division of planning units (NDS, 
NAU, II, IM…)       
The range of inputs (formats, type of information and 
timings) to the planning process       
Difficulties in obtaining accurate information       
Working with incomplete or inaccurate information       
Planning experience       
Geographical knowledge of the railways       
Having trustworthy work contacts within the planning 
organisation       
Informal flow of information by means of phone calls, 
e-mails       
Informal face-to-face discussion of issues       
Understanding the impact of planning decisions on 
delivery       
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8. Analysis of possession overruns in the Christmas 2007 
List of work being delivered at national level during the period of Christmas 
2007 
Location Scope of work Work description 
Edinburgh 
Waverley 
Enhancements Mound tunnel track lowering and installation 
of fixed conductor; Waverley bridge jack and 
girder modifications 




Track S&C renewals 
Clyde viaduct Enhancements Track renewals 
Annan Enhancements Gretna doubling project 
Preston E&P Points heating 
Farnworth 
tunnel 
Track Reballast, Resleeper, Rerail 
Manchester Track S&C renewals 
Sandbach WCRM Data load and testing of new signalling 
system -  




Civils  Waterproofing 
Trent Valley WCRM Four tracking - plain line and bridge works 
Rugby-
Nuneaton 
WCRM Remodelling and line speed improvements 
Leamington S&T Enabling works (Signalling renewals) 
Milton Keynes WCRM Remodelling and line speed improvements 
Swindon Track S&C Renewals 
Radlett 
Junction 
E&P  Head span wire renewals 
Airport 
Junction 
Track Great Western route performance 
improvement (S&C renewals) 
Bethnal Green Track S&C renewals 
Liverpool 
Street 
Enhancements Bridge 19 Demolition 
E&P Contact & cantenary wire renewal, removal 




Track S&C renewals 
Stratford Enhancements Extension of western underpass & 





E&P Contact & cantenary wire renewal 
Stevenage Track S&C upgrading 
Sundon & 
Sandridge 
E&P Neutral section renewals 
Westoning E&P Head span wire renewals 
Wrawby 
Junction 
Track S&C renewals 
Hull Docks Enhancements Infrastructure refurbishment 
Wakefield 
(Kirkgate) 
S&T Signalling interlocking renewal 
Dewsbury Civils Under-bridge replacement 
Keighley Civils Under-bridge replacement 
Newcastle Track King Edward Bridge longitudinal timber 
replacement 
 
Information extracted from control logs regarding events on other projects 
Control 
log date Location 
WON / 
















Possession causes severe line congestion 
and delays with the agreed train plan 





Street – Gidea 
Park 
39/1 
Possession overran due to the wrong crews 








Possession overran due to late installation 
of rails on the swing bridge, with further 
delays awaiting base plates to secure the 
rails to the bridge beams. Further delays 




07:00 (Wed): track renewals was running 
three hours late, with tamping work 
programmed to start at 09:00 (Wed) now 
expected to start at 12:00 (Wed), and work 
on installing rails across the Hull River 
Swing bridge still not completed 
18:00 (Wed): tamping operations had not 
yet started, estimating that the Hull Docks 
Branch would not reopen until 15:00 (Thu) 
00:21 (Thu): tamping operations on the Up 
Main line were completed 
04:20 (Thu): tamping operations on the 
Down line were completed 
05:00 (Thu): work on the Swing Bridge had 
been completed but the Up & Down Main 
lines would overrun until 06:15, the point 
work at Hessle Road would be secured with 
detection available in the normal position 
only, and the Hull Docks Branch would 
remain blocked until 12:00 Friday 
27-12-07 St. Pancras - Cricklewood 39/23 
Possession overran due to delays in work 
and planning error 
19:40 (Tue):  digging associated with the 
renewals work at Carlton Road Junction 
was 4 hours late 
05:30 (Wed): Kirow cranes were taking 
much longer than planned to install track 
panels, with the work now 6 hours behind 
05:00 (Thu): confirmed that the possession 
would overrun until 08:00 
07:20 (Thu): track bonding associated with 
the OLE had not been completed, 









All signalling work completed but the Hull 
Docks branch was short of ballast, which 
required further unloading before tamping 
could commence. Estimated that the work 








00:55 (Sat): ballast was delivered to site by 
road and unloaded 
02:48 (Sat): tamping operations were 
completed 
05:13 (Sat): Up & Down Main lines 
reopened without restriction 
06:40 (Sat): Hull Docks lines reopened with 







Delays to trains due to congestions. Delays 
exacerbated due to possession 






18:00 (Tue): due to a shortage of OLE staff 
the possession would overrun until 05:00 
(Wed) 
01:40 (Wed): OLE work would be 
completed by 02:30 on the Main and 
Suburban lines, and OLE work would be 
completed by 04:00 
03:00 (Wed): completion estimate was 
revised to 07:00 
05:00 (Wed): Area E&P Engineer reported 
that, having walked through and examined 
the OLE, the previously given estimates 
were not accurate, there was no likelihood 
of the Electric lines being returned during 
the day and that the Main and Suburban 
lines were not likely to be returned before 
12:00 
14:00 (Wed): OLE work affecting the Main 
lines 
Would be completed by 15:30, but that OLE 
restoration on Electric lines would continue 






Possession continued to overrun on the 





9. Work developed with FRAM 
Function Who Inputs Outputs Preconditions Time Resources Controls 
Development of 




detailed work plans  
TOC agreement 
to access T-16 weeks PPS 
Rules of the 
Route (RotR) 






detailed Work plans 









Available resources PossMan 
Available access Ellipse 
Outstanding actions   
Development of MP&I 
work plans Project team CPPP 















MP&I detailed work 
plans Work approved 
  
T-14 weeks PPS 
CPPP 





Haulage and trains 
plan T-10 days 






Work approved Locked-down 
haulage and train 
plan 




Haulage and trains 
plan PPS 
Issue of WON 
Network 
Access Unit 




Work approved WON TOC agreement to access T-7 days PPS   
Development of 
maintenance work packs 
Maintenance 
Delivery Unit Proposed work 
Maintenance work 
packs  
    
PPS 
  Site specific 
information PossMan 
Development of MP&I 
delivery details (work 
packs) 
Project team 
MP&I detailed work 
plans MP&I work packs 
    
PPS 
  
Contractors plans Site specific information PossMan 
Appendices 
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Deliverability and risk 
assessments Project team 





        
Available resources         
Available access Other risk 
assessments as 
required 
        













deliverer WON supplement PossMan 
  
Site specific 
information   
Integration of emergency 
and late changes ADPU 
Maintenance work 
packs WON supplement     PPS Approval by line 
manager 
MP&I work packs PossMan 
PICOP briefing ADPU 
PICOP pack 
Work delivery details   T-3 days PossMan   Site specific 
information 
Work delivery Work deliverer 
Work delivery details 
PICOP report     PICOP pack   
Locked-down 
haulage and train 
plan 
T+1 review Maintenance Delivery Unit 
PICOP report Asset update 
  T+1 weeks Ellipse   
MP&I hand back Outstanding actions 
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